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ABSTRACT
THE NATURE OF MORAL VIRTUE
MAY 2000
ERIK J. WIELENBERG, B.A., LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The dissertation is centered around the Moral Virtuosity Project (the
attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being a
moral virtue). The central task of the dissertation is to examine what other
philosophers have had to say on this topic and ultimately to successfully
complete this project.
Chapter One is concerned exclusively with Aristotle's attempt to
complete the Moral Virtuosity Project. I defend the view that Aristotle holds
that each moral virtue is a disposition toward proper practical reasoning,
action, and emotion within a certain sphere. I critically examine Aristotle's
argument for the unity of the virtues. I then try to point to some areas where
Aristotle's views on moral virtue fail to correspond with our ordinary
common sense views on moral virtue.
Chapter Two has three main parts. First, I consider Immanuel Kant's
attempt to complete the Moral Virtuosity Project. I develop an interpretation
of Kant's views on this topic. Second, I take up the topic of the relationship
between Aristotle's views on moral virtue and Kant's views on moral virtue.
Third, I examine some objections to Kant's views on moral virtue. I conclude
that Kant's account of moral virtue goes wrong because it is inextricably tied
up with the concept of moral obligation.
VI
Chapter Three is devoted to critical discussions of contemporary attempts to
complete the Moral Virtuosity Project. Authors whose views are discussed
include: G.H. von Wright, Philippa Foot, Judith Thomson, Linda Zagzebski,
and Thomas Hurka. I conclude that each view has serious problems.
In Chapter Four I develop a novel account of moral virtue by appealing
to the concept of admirability. Drawing on work on virtue by Michael Slote, I
try to shed some light on the concept of admirability and distinguish the
concept from related concepts. I then appeal to the concept of admirability to
explicate the concept of a moral virtue, thus completing the Moral Virtuosity
Project. I discuss a number of other topics, including "hard cases", excessive
virtue, and two sorts of morally virtuous persons: the Good Hearted Hero
and the Conflicted Hero.
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INTRODUCTION
The current interest in the vaguely delineated area of moral
philosophy that usually goes by the name "virtue ethics" began with G.E.M.
Anscombe's landmark paper "Modern Moral Philosophy", which first
appeared in print in 1958. In that paper, Anscombe argues that moral
philosophy of the time, because it is centered around the concepts of moral
duty, rightness, and wrongness, is a thoroughly unprofitable endeavor. The
reason, according to Anscombe, is that such concepts "are survivals, or
derivatives of survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer
generally survives, and are only harmful without it" (Anscombe 1958, 1).
Anscombe goes on to suggest that a profitable study of ethics would begin
with the concept of virtue (Anscombe 1958, 15).
I will not discuss Anscombe's arguments for her thesis. I do not share
her pessimistic views about normative ethics. I do think, however, that the
study of virtue has suffered from relative neglect as compared to the study of
the concepts of moral obligation, rightness, and wrongness. One of the goals
of this dissertation is to contribute toward remedying this relative neglect.
Before we jump right in and start talking about virtue, however, we
must try to get clear on just what questions we are going to be considering.
We can begin by distinguishing virtue-based normative ethics from virtue
theory. Virtue-based normative ethics is a branch of the normative ethics of
behavior. It is centered around the attempt to formulate a theory of right and
wrong action that is based on virtue. 1 Thus, virtue-based normative ethics is
in direct competition with more traditional normative ethical theories, such
as Kantianism and the various forms of Utilitarianism.
1 Such theories have recently been defended by Rosalind Hursthouse (Hursthouse 1996) and
Linda Zagzebski (Zagzebski 1996).
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This is a dissertation not in virtue-based normative ethics but rather in
virtue theory. Virtue theory may be roughly characterized as the study of the
nature of virtue. But this characterization is too rough. Philosophers
working in virtue theory have been engaged in a variety of projects that must
be distinguished from one another. One such project is the attempt to answer
this question: what is the mark of virtue? This project, which I shall call the
\ irtuosity Project," is the attempt to give necessary and sufficient conditions
for a thing's being a virtue.
Some philosophers think that the virtues fall into various kinds.
Example include: moral virtues (courage, benevolence, justice), intellectual
virtues (practical wisdom, curiosity, inventiveness), and aesthetic virtues
(gracefulness, beauty). This gives rise to another set of projects. These
projects are the attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a
thing's being a virtue of a particular type. So, we can distinguish the "Moral
Virtuousity Project," the attempt to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for a thing's being a moral virtue, the "Intellectual Virtuosity
Project," the attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a
thing's being an intellectual virtue, and so on.
Another sort of project is the attempt to provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for a thing's being a particular alleged virtue. This gives
rise to a whole slew of projects: the "Benevolence Project," the attempt to
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being benevolence,
the "Courage Project," the attempt to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for a thing's being courage, and so on . 2
2 The presence of the word ‘alleged’ in this paragraph is important. A philosopher may engage
in one or more of the projects listed here and conclude that certain traits that are traditionally
classified as virtues are not virtues after all (e g. Thomson 1997).
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This dissertation will be focused on the Moral Virtuousity Project. I
will critically examine various attempts to complete this project. Though the
Moral Virtuousity Project is the focus of the dissertation, it is not the only
project of the ones distinguished above that I will be concerned with. I will
also be considering various attempts to offer accounts of specific moral
virtues. So, we will be concerned with the Courage Project and the
Temperance Project, among others. Finally, when the time comes to explain
my own way of completing the Moral Virtuousity Project, it will turn out
that a preliminary step in this project is the completion of the Virtuousity
Project.
The fact that I will be criticizing various attempts to complete the
Moral Virtuousity Project raises an important question: how does one
evaluate the truth or falsity of a given attempt to complete the Moral
Virtuousity Project? How can one tell whether a given theory of the nature
of moral virtue is true or false?
I shall assume that there is a single coherent concept that is currently
expressed in English by the phrase 'moral virtue.' I will not argue for this
assumption at the outset; rather, I want to suggest that the proof is in the
pudding. I will try to show that there is such a concept by providing an
account of that concept. If I succeed in providing an account of the concept in
question, I will have also shown that there is such a concept.
In testing the truth or falsity of a given attempt to complete the Moral
Virtuousity Project, then, I shall take certain claims as the data that any such
project must take into account. If a theory contradicts the data, this fact
constitutes a serious reason for thinking that the theory in question is false.
But what are the data here?
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The most important bits of data will be claims to the effect that certain
traits of character are in fact moral virtues. Various writers provide various
lists of moral virtues, but, some traits are common to all or most of these
lists. I will refer to such traits as "paradigmatic moral virtues." Then we can
say that if V is a paradigmatic moral virtue, then the claim that V is a moral
virtue is a piece of data that any adequate completion of the Moral
Virtuousity Project must take into account. Among the paradigmatic moral
virtues I include courage, benevolence, justice, and temperance. So, if a
given theory implies that courage is not a moral virtue, this is a serious piece
of evidence against the theory in question.
There are other traits of character that do not seem to be paradigmatic
virtues but which are such that if a given theory implies that one or more of
these traits is not a moral virtue, this constitutes at least some reason for
thinking that the theory in question is false. Among these traits I include
generosity, compassion, honesty, kindness, patience, and conscientiousness.
One way a theory can go wrong, then, is by implying that some or all of
the traits listed above are not moral virtues. A second way a theory can go
wrong is by implying that some trait which is clearly not a moral virtue is a
moral virtue. The most serious cases of this kind of difficulty occurs when a
given theory implies that a trait that seems to be a moral vice is a moral
virtue. So, if a theory implies that cowardice is a moral virtue, this is a
serious piece of evidence against the theory in question.
By way of illustration, we may consider the following attempt to
complete the Moral Virtuousity Project:
Dispositions-Toward-Right-Action (DTRA): x is a moral virtue if and only if
x is a disposition to perform morally right actions (in a certain area of life).
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This view has it that each moral virtue is associated with a certain area
of life. 3 For example, benevolence is associated with helping others; courage
is associated with facing danger.
DTRA is false in both directions - that is, it both (i) implies that some
traits that are obviously not moral virtues are moral virtues, and (ii) implies
that some traits that are obviously moral virtues are not moral virtues.
To see (i), consider the Case of the Moral Observer. Suppose a person,
whom we can call "Archie", suffers from the delusion that he is constantly
being watched by the Moral Observer. The Moral Observer is an extremely
powerful being that will severely torture Archie if he performs any morally
wrong actions. Archie, being a fairly cowardly fellow, is so terrified of being
tortured by the Moral Observer that he is disposed to perform a morally right
action in just about any situation he finds himself in. But all of this do-
gooding grates on Archie's nerves. He would much rather be swindling his
fellow man, stealing candy from babies, and in general acting in a most
dastardly way. Fortunately for those around him, his fear keeps him in line.
DTRA implies that Archie has lots of moral virtues -- for example,
benevolence. DTRA picks out the disposition to do what is morally right
with respect to helping others as the virtue of benevolence. And Archie has
this disposition. But Archie doesn't really care about other people at all — if it
weren't for his terror of the Moral Observer, Archie would never help anyone
else. He feels no compassion for others; in fact, he feels nothing but disdain
and contempt for them. He hates helping others — but is driven to do so by
fear. Archie does not have the virtue of benevolence. Yet DTRA implies that
he does. The following argument captures this point:
3 We shall see that this sort of idea is common to many accounts of moral virtue.
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1. If DTRA is true, then Archie has the virtue of benevolence.
2. It s not the case that Archie has the virtue of benevolence.
3. Therefore, DTRA is false.
To see (ii), consider the moral virtue of compassion. This virtue
involves a certain emotion - concern for other people. So we might say that
compassion is the disposition to care about others. And compassion is a
moral virtue. But DTRA implies that compassion is not a moral virtue, since
it is not a disposition to perform morally right actions.4 That is:
1. If DTRA is true, then compassion is not a moral virtue.
2. Compassion is a moral virtue.
3. Therefore, DTRA is false.
Thus, DTRA fails to complete successfully the Moral Virtuousity
Project. The problem with DTRA is not hard to diagnose: being virtuous is
not merely a matter of external behavior. It is a matter of the heart - whether
a person is virtuous is in large part a question of the emotional dispositions
of that person as well as the motives on which that person is disposed to act.
We will begin our more serious inquiry into the nature of moral
virtue with an examination of the account of moral virtue provided by
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. Many contemporary philosophers
working on virtue theory look to Aristotle for guidance. In fact, some
philosophers seem to identify virtue theory with virtue theory as Aristotle
does it.5 This is one reason for beginning our study of virtue with Aristotle.
A second more compelling reason is that Aristotle's treatment of virtue is
4
It might be objected that compassion disposes those who have it to perform morally right
actions. But even if this is correct, compassion itself cannot be identified with any disposition to
perform morally right actions (in a given area of life). We can see this by considering Archie.
Archie lacks the virtue of compassion: he doesn’t give a damn about others. Yet, for any area of
life, Archie has the disposition to perform morally right actions in that area. So if compassion were
such a disposition, Archie would have compassion -- but he doesn’t.
5 So, George Terzis writes “According to a virtue ethics, the ultimate practical aim of a person’s
life is her own flourishing” (Terzis 1994, 333).
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one of the most extended, insightful, and philosophically fruitful works on
virtue in all of western philosophy. This makes the Nicomachean Ethics an
excellent starting point for the present dissertation. Let us turn to an
examination of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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CHAPTER 1
ARISTOTLE
1.1 Exposition Of Aristotle's Theory Of Moral Virtue
1.1.1 Introduction
Which of the projects distinguished in the Introduction is Aristotle
engaged in in the Nicomachean Ethics? In NE 2.1, Aristotle distinguishes two
kinds of virtue: intellectual virtue and moral virtue. A great deal of the
subsequent text is devoted to the Moral Virtuosity Project. NE 2.7 and 3.6 -
5.11 are devoted to a variety of Particular Virtue Projects, including the
Courage Project, the Justice Project, and others. Aristotle also has a lot to say
about a particular intellectual virtue: practical wisdom [phronesis]. We can
call this inquiry the "Practical Wisdom Project".
Since my interest is in moral virtue, I will focus on Aristotle's Moral
Virtuosity Project. Aristotle's Moral Virtuosity Project is closely related to
various Particular Virtue Projects. We will consider some of these as well,
particularly the Practical Wisdom Project, since there is a close relationship
between moral virtue and practical wisdom in the Aristotelian framework.
1.1.2 Aristotle's Practical Goal
The purpose of the Nicomachean Ethics is not merely to answer
various theoretical philosophical questions. While doing just this is one of
the goals of the work, it is not the main goal. Aristotle's main goal in the
Ethics is a practical one.
The central theoretical project of the Nicomachean Ethics is the
attempt to answer this question: what is the best sort of life for a human
being? According to Aristotle, the best life for a human being is one in which
the human function [ergon] is performed excellently throughout the life (NE
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1.7). A good human is a human who is disposed to perform the human
function excellently (NE 1098a5-15); therefore, a good human is a human who
is disposed to live the best kind of life for a human. Moreover, "the virtue of
a man also will be the state of character which makes a man good" (NE
1106a20-25)6. Since the virtues make humans who have them good humans,
the virtues dispose those who have them to live the best kind of life for a
human. It is because the virtues are connected with the best sort of life in this
way that Aristotle is interested in the nature of virtue:
[T]he present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like
the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what
virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our
inquiry would have been of no use) (NE 1103b25-30).
The inquiry Aristotle conducts in the Nicomachean Ethics is
undertaken not merely for the purpose of understanding the nature of virtue,
but also for the purpose of actually going some way toward turning Aristotle's
audience into good (virtuous) human beings. The point of this project lies in
the fact that good human beings are disposed to live the best kind of life for
human beings. Thus, the ultimate goal of Aristotle's inquiry is to turn
Aristotle's listeners and students into human beings who are disposed to live
the best kind of life available to human beings.
Understanding Aristotle's practical project will help us to understand
his theoretical views. And, as I will suggest later, it turns out that Aristotle's
practical project influences his theoretical views.7 Let us turn now to
Aristotle's Moral Virtuosity Project.
6 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Nicomachean Ethics are from W.D. Ross’s
translation in Richard McKeon’s Introduction to Aristotle
7 See section 1.4 below
9
1.1.3 Virtues As Dispositions Toward the Mean
Aristotle s official account of moral virtue is found in one of the most
well-known and puzzling passages in the Nicomachean Ethics:
V irtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying
in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by
a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of
practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between
two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends
on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively
fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions,
while virtue finds and chooses that which is intermediate (NE
1 106b36-NE 1 1 07a6)
.
In this passage, Aristotle contrasts two ways in which moral virtue is a
mean. 8 The first way implies that excessiveness, deficiency, and intermediacy
can be properties of states of character. Virtue is said to be an intermediate
state of character “between" two vices. One of these vices "depends on"
excess; the other "depends on" deficiency. If there are intermediate states of
character, then presumably there are excessive and deficient states of character
as well. Thus, virtue is an intermediate state of character between two vices,
one being a deficient state of character (the one that "depends on" defect), and
the other being an excessive state of character (the one that "depends on"
excess).
The second way virtue is "in a mean" is that it "finds and chooses that
which is intermediate." Aristotle's view is that (at least sometimes)
excessiveness, deficiency, and intermediacy are properties of actions
(particular actions) as well as of emotions (particular instances of emotions),
and that virtues are dispositions toward actions and emotions that are
8 Throughout the remained of this chapter, ‘virtue’ should be understood as short for ‘moral
virtue’.
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intermediate.9 So, in the passage cited above, Aristotle seems to endorse the
following pair of claims:
The C haracter Claim: Each moral virtue is an intermediate state of character,
lying between a deficient state of character and an excessive one.
The Action and Emotion Claim: Each moral virtue is a disposition toward
intermediate actions and emotional experiences.
In what follows, I will focus on the second claim, as it seems to be
central to Aristotle s account of moral virtue. Consider, for example, this
passage:
If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well - by looking to
the intermediate and judging its works by this standard.
. .and if,
further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature
also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the
intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is
concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess,
defect, and the intermediate (NE 1106b8-17).
In the last sentence of this passage Aristotle declares that "in" actions
and emotions there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. In the preceding
sentence he declares that virtue aims at the intermediate in both action and
9
I shall use the familiar type/token distinction with respect to both actions and emotions. An
action token is a particular dated action - e g. Bob eating a slice of pizza on October 7, 1997 at
6:03 pm. An emotion token is the particular dated experiencing of some emotion by a particular
person on a particular occasion - e g. Bob being afraid that he has food poisoning on October 7,
1997 at 6:04 pm. Emotion types, by contrast, are universal - anger, fear, and so on, that can be
experienced on multiple occasions by different people. One problem is that in English, 'action'
typically indicates an action token, whereas ‘emotion’ typically indicates an emotion type. In what
follows, I shall use 'action’ to indicate an action token, ‘emotion’ to indicate an emotion type, and
emotional experience’ to indicate an emotion token. According to Aristotle, sometimes the
appropriate response with respect to a given emotion is not to feel the emotion at all -- a
courageous person will not fear poverty or disease at all (M 361 ). So I intend to use ‘emotional
experience’ broadly so as to include failing to feel a given emotion (or even any emotion) at all.
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emotion. Aristotle is clearly focusing on the Action and Emotion Claim in
this passage.
Later, he says that “it [virtue] is such [intermediate] because its character
is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions" (NE 1109a20-25).
The passage suggests that Aristotle holds that intermediate actions and
emotional experiences are more fundamental than intermediate states of
character in the sense that the intermediacy of the latter is parasitic on the
intermediacy of the former.! o As a first draft of Aristotle's account of virtue,
then, let us try:
AVI: x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a state of character such that
anyone who has x is disposed toward intermediate actions and emotional
experiences.il
(AVI) appeals to the notion of intermediate actions and emotional
experiences. Taken literally, the existence of excessive and deficient actions
and emotional experiences implies that actions and emotional experiences
can be ordered such that the intermediate actions and emotional experiences
are, in some sense, "in the mean" between deficient and excessive actions and
emotional experiences. But what is it for an action or emotional experience
to be intermediate, or in the mean?
10 Julia Annas agrees: “[The virtues] are not themselves directly states which embody the
mean of anything. . rather they are mean states because they are the states of someone who has
acquired a settled disposition to aim at the mean” (Annas 1993, 59).
1 1
I follow L A. Kosman here in supposing that Aristotle’s view is that each virtue “is a disposition
with respect to a characteristic set of actions and feelings” (Kosman 1 980, 1 09).
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1.1.4 Urmson On the Doctrine Of the Mean
J O. Urmson claims that according to Aristotle, "an action can be
regarded as manifesting and embodying some emotion" (Urmson 1980, 159).
One interpretation of Aristotle's view is that "one should always feel and
exhibit a moderate.
. .quantity of a given emotion" (Urmson 1980, 160). The
idea is that any action, a, performed by an agent, S, is a manifestation of some
emotional experience of S's, e. Whenever a person experiences an emotion,
she experiences it to some degree. One person is angrier than another just in
case the first person is experiencing anger to a greater degree than the second
person.
Let us suppose that the degree to which an emotion is experienced on a
particular occasion can be assigned a numeric value where higher numbers
indicate that the emotion is being felt to a greater degree and lower numbers
indicate that it is being felt to a lesser degree. Let 'l(e)' designate the intensity'
of emotional experience e. Certain values of 1(e) are classified as moderate.
For instance, moderate anger would be roughly halfway between no anger at
all and mind-numbing rage. The view described by Urmson can be stated like
this:
DM1: (i) An emotional experience, e, is intermediate iff 1(e) is moderate, and
(ii) an action, a, is intermediate iff a exhibits an emotional experience, el, such
that I(el) is moderate.
The conjunction of (DM1) and (AVI) is, as Urmson notes, "plainly
absurd" (Urmson 1980, 160). Not only is it absurd, it is not Aristotle's view. A
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person who, "in face of a noble death" (NE 1114333), performs an action that
exhibits a moderate degree of fear (perhaps hiding from the enemy) is,
according to Aristotle, performing a cowardly action, and therefore is not
performing an intermediate action. But (DM1) implies that such a person has
performed an intermediate action. This result is inconsistent with Aristotle's
view.
Urmson prefaces his own interpretation of Aristotle's view with these
remarks:
It is perfectly plain, in fact, that for Aristotle what is primarily in
a mean is a settled state of character.
. .thus an emotion or action
is in a mean if it exhibits a settled state that is in a mean
(Urmson 1980, 161).
The passage suggests that Urmson thinks that intermediacy of actions
and emotional experiences is parasitic on intermediacy of character.^
Urmson holds:
Ul: An action or emotional experience of S's, x, is intermediate if and only if
x exhibits an intermediate state of character of S's.
When is a given state of character intermediate, or in a mean?
Urmson offers the following example of intermediate character:
The man whose character is such that he feels only mild
annoyance at a trivial slight and is enraged by torture has a
character that is in a mean between one that exhibits rage on
trivial as well as important occasions and one that can coolly
contemplate the greatest outrages. On each occasion his reaction
exhibits a mean state, and thus his actions are on each occasion
in a mean (Urmson 1980, 161).
12 We already have reason to suspect that Urmson is on the wrong track here Recall the
passage from Aristotle I cited earlier: “it [virtue] is such [intermediate] because its character is to
aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions” (NE 1 109a20-22)
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The excessive state in this example is the disposition to exhibit extreme
anger at any slight. The defective state is the disposition never to exhibit
anger at all. How should we characterize the mean state? Perhaps simply as
the disposition to exhibit mild anger at some slights and extreme anger at
other slights.
But if meeting that condition is sufficient for a state of character to be in
a mean, then the person whose character is such that she feels only mild
annoyance at torture and is enraged by trivial slights also exhibits a state of
character that is in a mean between one that exhibits rage on trivial as well as
important occasions and one that can coolly contemplate the greatest
outrages. If this is correct, then (Ul) implies that the relevant actions and
emotional experiences of the first person are intermediate. But this is absurd.
Presumably Urmson would deny that the state of character just
described is an intermediate state of character. But then the question remains:
how, according to Urmson, is a mean state of character to be characterized?
Immediately after the passage cited above, Urmson writes:
To have one's emotions and actions in a mean. . .is to feel and
manifest each emotion at such times, on such matters, toward
such people, for such reasons, and in such ways as are proper.
To diverge from the mean in the direction of deficiency is as
much not to experience and exhibit emotions at all when one
should, or not about matters about which one should, or not
toward people toward whom one should as it is to exhibit the
emotions to the wrong degree (Urmson 1980, 161).
This is an odd passage, given that Urmson has just said that "[i]t is
perfectly plain. . .that for Aristotle what is primarily in a mean is a settled
state of character." We might expect Urmson next to provide a substantive
15
account of intermediacy of character. But he doesn't. Instead, he offers an
account of intermediacy of actions and emotional experiences:
U2: An actlon or emotional experience of S's, x, is intermediate if and only if
S does or has x at the proper time, on the proper matter, toward the proper
people, for the proper reasons, and in the proper way.
Although he doesn t explicitly say so, I suspect Urmson intends to
include proper duration and to the proper degree as well - and, in fact, all the
relevant respects in which a person might act or feel improperly. In short, I
suspect that Urmson holds:
U2': An action or emotional experience of S's, x, is intermediate if and only if
S does or has x properly.!
3
The conjunction of (Ul) and (U2') implies:
U3: An action or emotional experience of S's, x, exhibits an intermediate state
of character of S's if and only if S does or has x properly.
(U3) does indeed suggest an account of the intermediacy of character: a
state of character is intermediate just in case it leads one to act and feel
properly. So the correct characterization of the mean state with respect to
anger is a disposition to get angry when, why, for how long, at whom, and so
on, as is proper.
13 S does or has x properly if and only if S’s doing or having of x is proper in every respect.
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Urmson's discussion runs roughly like this: actions and emotional
experiences are intermediate just in case they exhibit intermediate states of
character. But states of character are intermediate just in case they are
dispositions to act and feel properly. Thus, Urmson's view about the
intermediacy of actions and emotional experiences comes to simply this:
actions and emotional experiences are intermediate just in case they are
proper -- this is what (U2') says. Despite his earlier claim that "for Aristotle
what is primarily in a mean is a settled state of character," Urmson himself
ends up explaining the intermediacy of states of character in terms of proper
actions and emotional experiences.
Despite his apparent confusion, it seems to me that in the end, Urmson
does arrive at a correct interpretation of Aristotle's view about what it is for
actions and emotional experiences to be intermediate. Intermediate actions
and emotions are actions and emotional experiences that do not go wrong in
some way. To act or feel properly, one must act or feel "at the right times,
with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right
motive, and in the right way" (NE 1106b20-22); (see also: NE 1109a25-30). As
Howard Curzer puts it, "[a] virtue is a disposition for getting all of the
relevant parameters right" (Curzer 1996, 130). Kelly Rogers puts the point this
way: "[t]he mean. . .is a condition of equilibrium. .
.,
in which one's feelings
and actions are in every respect fitting or appropriate" (Rogers 1993, 356). At
the heart of Aristotle's view about virtue is the notion of properness or
appropriateness.14 On Aristotle's view, moral virtues are dispositions to act
and feel properly.
14 According to Annas, the central notion here is obligatoriness: “What is it. . to aim at the
mean? Aristotle, when he actually spells this out. . does so in terms of what one should do or
ought to do, using the word del
,
‘one ought”’ (Annas 1 993, 59). For support for my view that the
central notion is appropriateness, see my discussion of acting for the sake of the noble below.
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It should be clear that on this interpretation, Aristotle's account of
virtue makes use of a non-naturalistic account of intermediate actions and
emotional experiences. The latter account makes use of what is obviously a
normative concept, the concept of properness or appropriateness.
A debate has arisen in the literature over whether Aristotle's talk of
intermediacy, deficiency, and excess with respect to actions and emotional
experiences should be taken literally or merely figuratively. What is at issue
in this debate is whether the Nicotnachean Ethics contains a naturalistic
account of propemess.
W.F.R. Hardie (Hardie 1965), Rosalind Hursthouse (Hursthouse 1980),
Peter Losin (Losin 1987), and Sarah Broadie (Broadie 1991) have all argued
against attempts to understand the doctrine of the mean (the Action and
Emotion Claim) literally. Howard Curzer (Curzer 1996) has recently defended
a literal account of the doctrine of the mean.
It seems to me that this debate is not particularly important for our
purposes here. To see this, consider the following. It is clear that Aristotle
holds that each moral virtue is a disposition toward proper or appropriate
actions and emotional experiences. What is at issue in this debate is whether
properness can be explicated naturalistically. Suppose that we are confronted
with some naturalistic account of propemess -- call the account 'NA'.
Suppose we refute NA. Have we refuted Aristotle's account of moral virtue?
The answer is no. Rather, we have shown that NA fails as an account of
properness. Since I am concerned here primarily with Aristotle's account of
moral virtue, the formulation and evaluation of accounts like NA is
somewhat off our topic. Moreover, the inquiry into Aristotle's account of
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moral virtue can continue fruitfully if we simply take the notion of
properness as a conceptual primitive.
1.1.5 Virtuous Action And Acting Virtuously
In a pair of crucial passages, Aristotle distinguishes between
performing a virtuous action and acting virtuously. He writes:
[I]f the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have
themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are
done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain
condition when he does them; in the first place, he must have
knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them
for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a
firm and unchangeable character (NE 1105a28-34).
Much later, we find this passage:
As we say that some people who do just acts are not necessarily
just, i.e. those who do the acts ordained by the laws either
unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and
not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to be sure, they
do what they should and all the things that the good man
ought), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a
certain state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do
them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves
(NE 1144al4-22).
These passages indicate that Aristotle holds that a person may perform
a virtuous action and yet fail to act virtuously. For instance, a person might
perform a brave action "by chance or at the suggestion of another" (NE
1105a24) and thus fail to act bravely.
The following passage sheds more light on the distinction between
performing a virtuous action and acting virtuously:
Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such
as the just or temperate man would do; but it is not the man
who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also
does them as just and temperate men do them (NE 1105b5-10).
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In this passage, Aristotle appeals to a distinction between what is done
on the one hand and how it is done on the other. Whether an action is
virtuous or not is determined entirely by what is done; whether or not an
action is done virtuously depends further on h o w it is done.
In the previous section, I attributed to Aristotle the view that each
moral virtue is a disposition to act and feel properly. I propose that we draw a
distinction between merely performing a proper action and acting properly.
Whether or not an action is proper is entirely determined by what is done;
w hether or not an action is done properly depends further on how it is
done. 15
For example, consider Aristotle's claim that to act or feel properly, one
must act or feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards
the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way" (NE 1106b20-22).
Intuitively, the first three of these requirements have to do with what is
done, whereas the last two have to do with how it is done.16
Using this distinction, we are able to state two distinct but equivalent
formulations of Aristotle's account of virtue. The first of these is relatively
unhelpful:
AV2: x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a settled disposition to (i) act
properly and (ii) feel properly.
15 Note that just as one cannot act virtuously without performing a virtuous action, so one
cannot act properly without performing a proper action.
16 Another perhaps clearer way of specifying the distinction is as follows: an action is proper just
in case it is proper in all the external, or observable respects; an action is done properly just in case
it is proper in absolutely every respect.
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The second formulation, which draws on the two passages cited at the
start of this section to specify what is involved in acting properly, is more
informative:
AV2': x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a settled disposition to (i) perform
proper actions, with knowledge and as a result of choosing these actions for
their own sakes, and (ii) feel properly.
1.1.6 The Domains Of the Virtues
Aristotle holds that each moral virtue is associated with a particular
kind of action and a particular kind (or kinds) of emotion. For example, he
says that
by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men
we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the
presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or
confidence, we become brave or cowardly (NE 1103bl4-17).
The virtue of justice is associated with making monetary transactions;
the virtue of courage is associated with actions such as facing danger and
running away, and with emotions such as fear and confidence.
Aristotle specifies the kinds of actions and emotions associated with
some of the other virtues in NE 2.7: "With regard to giving and taking of
money the mean [i.e. the virtue] is liberality. . .with regard to honor and
dishonor the mean is proper pride" (NE 1107b9-23).
Let us say that for each virtue, V, there is a set of possible actions and
emotional experiences that the virtue is associated with, which we may call
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V s " acti™ and emotion set."i7 The action and emotion set for courage, for
instance, will include all possible actions where the agent faces danger. Some
of these actions are proper; others are improper. This set will also include all
possible experiences of fear and confidence that relate to facing danger. Again,
some of these emotional experiences are proper; others are improper.
Using these ideas, we can refine (AV2') like this:
AV3: x is a moral virtue if and only if there is some action and emotion set,
EA, such that x is the settled disposition to (i) perform proper actions in EA,
with knowledge and as a result of choosing these actions for their own sakes,
and (ii) have proper emotional experiences in EA (properly). 18
l.E7 Virtue And Knowledge
C ondition (i) of (AV3) specifies that having a given virtue involves
being disposed to act with knowledge. But knowledge of what? Aristotle
does not explicitly answer this question, so we must go beyond the text and
look for a plausible account of what he might have had in mind.
Recall that Aristotle brings up the knowledge requirement in the
context of distinguishing merely performing virtuous actions from acting
virtuously. The knowledge requirement is intended to go some way toward
making this distinction.
1
7
Not just any set of actions and emotional experiences counts as an action and emotion set.
For instance, there is no virtue associated specifically with, say, tree-climbing, and so the set of all
possible cases of tree-climbing (and related emotional experiences) is not an action and emotion
set.
18 Although Aristotle does not distinguish between merely having an appropriate emotional
experience and feeling properly, I wish to leave open this possibility. Thus, clause (ii) specifies
that each virtue is, in part, a disposition toward feeling properly
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What sort of knowledge might make the difference between merely
performing a proper action and acting properly? Suppose a person believes
himself to be performing an improper action - say, giving his friend a cup of
poison, but is really performing a proper action (he is really giving his friend
a cup of healthy, delicious, poison-free apple juice). This is plausibly
construed as a case where the agent performs a proper action but fails to act
properly.
A second kind of case involves a person who has no idea what is
proper or improper, and who simply picks an action at random. Luckily, he
picks a proper action. Again, this seems to be a case of performing a proper
action (by chance) but failing to act properly.
What we need is some condition involving knowledge that gives the
correct result with respect to both of these examples. One condition that does
this is: a person, S, acts properly at time, t, only if at t, S knows of himself or
herself that he or she is performing a proper action. This principle implies
that the person who takes himself to be poisoning his friend does not act
properly, nor does the person who simply happens to perform a proper action
by chance. That the principle gives the correct result constitutes a small
amount of prima facie evidence that it is close to what Aristotle has in mind.
Of course, there are many other such principles that would give the correct
result in these cases. A second bit of evidence in favor of this interpretation is
that, as we will see later, it meshes nicely with the rest of Aristotle's view . 19
We can incorporate the principle into the account of moral virtue like
this:
^Comments by Ed Abrams motivated me to clarity and expand this discussion somewhat (this
is not to suggest that Abrams would agree with what I say here).
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AV4: x is a moral virtue if and only if there is some action and emotion set,
EA, such that x is the settled disposition to (i) perform proper actions in EA
while knowing that one is performing a proper action and as a result of
choosing these actions for their own sakes, and (ii) have proper emotional
experiences in EA (properly).
1-1-8 Virtue, Choice, And Deliberation
According to condition (i) of (AV4), each moral virtue is a disposition
to choose proper actions for their own sakes. The following passage sheds
some light on this condition:
[S]ince moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice,
and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must
be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good (NE
1139a20-25).
One obvious implication of this passage is that each moral virtue
involves a disposition to make good choices. Thus, we can revise (AV4) like
this:
AV5: x is a moral virtue if and only if there is some action and emotion set,
EA, such that x is the settled disposition to (i) perform proper actions in EA
while knowing that one is performing a proper action and as a result of good
choices of those actions for their own sakes, and (ii) have proper emotional
experiences in EA (properly).
In the ideal case, choice involves both the rational and the appetitive
parts of the soul, and the latter is directed by, or obeys, the former (see NE
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1102b26-28) 20 This is why Aristotle says that choice may be described as
"either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire" (NE 1139b4). Ideally
choice involves both judgement and desire. It is a desire for "what has been
decided on by previous deliberation" (NE 1112al5). Therefore, to make a good
choice, one must have previously deliberated.
What is deliberation? Aristotle tells us that "[w]e deliberate about
things that are in our power and can be done.
. .every class of men deliberates
about the things that can be done by their own efforts" (1112a29-33).
Deliberation is a certain kind of process. The process is concerned with one's
various (apparent) alternatives, and the process ends with some sort of
judgement. It is not important for our purposes what the exact form of this
judgement is supposed to be. The judgement involves the selection of a
particular alternative as the one to be done.
All good choices have two features. First, the process of deliberation
that leads to the choice is "true" or excellent. Second, the agent is actually
moved to perform the action that she has selected as the one to be done. The
following principle captures these two elements:
GC: A choice of S's, c, is good if and only if (i) c is the result of excellent
deliberation, and (ii) S tries to perform the action that S has selected in the
deliberation preceding c.21
20 This is the ideal case because in the case of incontinent action, desire does not follow the
dictates of reason.
21 Condition (ii) serves to distinguish the virtuous person and the continent person from the
incontinent person. The incontinent person’s appetites do not follow the dictates of his reason:
he may judge that a particular action is the one to be done, and yet try to perform some other
action.
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Aristotle takes up the topic of excellent deliberation in NE 6.9 He says,
excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation
ere emg more than one kind of correctness, plainly
excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind (NE 1142M5-
Excellent deliberation is correct in some way or other. But there are
many ways a particular piece of deliberation might be correct, and not all of
these ways are sufficient for excellence.
Immediately after the passage cited above, Aristotle gives some
examples of correct but non-excellent deliberation. The first of these
examples appears in these lines:
[T]he bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his
calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have
(NE
b
lT42M7
C
19)
eC^^/^^ haVG g0t f°r Wmself a §reat evil
The man who, while visiting the wife of a good friend of his, comes to
the conclusion that the thing to do is take up the wife's offer for sex, has not
deliberated excellently. The reason is that the action that has been selected by
the process of deliberation is one that is improper or inappropriate. Thus,
one necessary condition on excellence of deliberation is that the action
selected in the deliberation is a proper action:
EDI: A particular episode of deliberation by S, d, is excellent only if d results
in the selection of a proper action.
Aristotle describes a second kind of correct but non-excellent
deliberation in these lines:
[I]t is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism, and to
attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the
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middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in
deliberation - this state in virtue of which one attains what one
ought but not by the right means (NE 1142b21-26).
In this second kind of case, something goes wrong in the process of
deliberation, but by luck or accident, a proper action is selected anyway.
Deliberation of this sort satisfies the necessary condition specified by (EDI),
but nevertheless fails to be excellent. Aristotle describes a case in which the
middle term is false, but it seems that there are many ways in which the
process of deliberation might be defective and nevertheless end with the
selection of a proper action.
In terms of the practical syllogism, there are three possible mistakes:
making an invalid inference, using a false major premise, and using a false
minor premise. Putting aside the machinery of the practical syllogism, the
last two kinds of mistake are, roughly, (i) appealing to a false claim about
what is noble or worth doing, and (ii) being mistaken about the nature of one
of the particular features of the situation at hand.22
The first of these two kinds of mistakes merits additional comment. In
NE 3.4, Aristotle notes that
each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant,
and perhaps the good man differs from the others most by seeing the
truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of
them (NE 1113a30-33).
The idea here is that everyone has at least some views about what
things, or kinds of things, are noble (and, presumably, about what things or
kinds of things are base).23 Let us refer to claims of this sort as 'axiological
T~'
22 Thus, this condition overlaps with condition (i) of (AV4).
23 Although Aristotle here mentions both the noble and the pleasant, it turns out that thinking
something is noble and finding something pleasant are quite different for Aristotle (see NE 7 and
1 0). It is the agent's views about what is noble that are directly relevant to the topic at hand.
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claims', and call the set of axiological claims a person believes that person's
'axiological outlook.' One of the points Aristotle is making in the passage
above is that not all axiological outlooks are created equal. The best
axiological outlook is one that perfectly matches the truth - i.e. it contains all
and only true axiological claims. This is the axiological outlook of the
perfectly virtuous person.
Aristotle says that "we choose what we best know to be good" (NE
1112ab7). This comment suggests that a person's axiological outlook will
greatly influence the choices that person makes. Aristotle explains the nature
of this influence in greater detail elsewhere:
[F]or the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things
which involve a starting point, viz. 'since the end i.e. what is
best, is of such-and-such a nature/ whatever it may be (let it for
the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident
except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us
to be deceived about the starting-points of action (NE 1144a31-
36).
Deliberation is ultimately grounded in a person's axiological outlook.
Excellent deliberation requires that the person not appeal to any false
axiological claims. Only a person with a completely accurate axiological
outlook will be able to deliberate excellently in all possible cases.
Thus, we can specify three additional necessary conditions on
excellence in deliberation:
ED2: A particular episode of deliberation by S, d, is excellent only if (i) d
results in the selection of a proper action, (ii) S does not make any invalid
inferences in d, (iii) S does not make use of a false axiological claim in d, and
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(iv) S does not make use of a false claim about a particular feature of the
situation at hand.
Aristotle says that
it is possible to attain it [i.e. to select a proper action] by long
deliberation while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in
the former case we have not yet got excellence in deliberation
(NE 1142b26-28).
So we need a fifth condition:
ED3: A particular episode of deliberation by S, d, is excellent only if (i) d
results in the selection of a proper action, (ii) S does not make any invalid
inferences in d, (iii) S does not make use of a false axiological claim in d, (iv) S
does not make use of a false claim about a particular feature of the situation at
hand, and (v) S doesn't take too long to carry out d.
Finally, Aristotle distinguishes between excellence in deliberation in
the unqualified sense and excellence in deliberation with respect to a
particular end.2 4 He says that “[excellence in deliberation in the unqualified
sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the
unqualified sense" (NE 1142b28-29).
Aristotle's account of deliberation is a means-ends account: on his
view, whenever a person deliberates, she is trying to figure out the best way of
achieving some end. Thus, every episode of deliberation is associated with
some end or other. Aristotle's point in the passage just cited is that in
unqualifiedly excellent deliberation, the end is “the end in the unqualified
24 A particular end being an end other than happiness or the good life (or virtuous activity).
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sense.
' The end in the unqualified sense, as Aristotle has told us in NE 1.7, is
happiness. Happiness has been declared to be virtuous activity (NE 1098al5-
18). Thus, in truly excellent deliberation - the kind of deliberation that a
virtuous person engages in — the end is virtuous activity .25
Aristotle s account of excellence in deliberation, then, is captured by
this principle:
ED4: A particular episode of deliberation by S, d, is (unqualifiedly) excellent if
and only if (i) d results in the selection of a proper action, (ii) S does not make
any invalid inferences in d, (iii) S does not make use of a false axiological
claim in d, (iv) S does not make use of a false claim about a particular feature
of the situation at hand, (v) S doesn't take too long to carry out d, and (vi) the
end that d is concerned with is virtuous activity.
We now have in hand Aristotle's views on good choice and excellent
deliberation. But we still have to contend with Aristotle's contention that the
virtuous person chooses proper actions "for their own sakes." What is it to
choose an action for its own sake?
1.1.9 Choosing an Action For Its Own Sake
Proper actions are means to virtuous activity not in the sense that the
former lead to or result in the latter, but rather in the sense that proper
actions are constituents of virtuous activity. The virtuous person chooses
proper actions for their own sakes in the sense that he chooses them not for
the sake of some end completely distinct from the actions themselves, but
25
I interpret Aristotle as holding that having a given virtue involves being disposed to deliberate
excellently in the unqualified sense. For further support that this is in fact Aristotle's view, see
section 1.1.10.2 below.
30
rather for the sake of an end of which they are a component. This
comprehensive end is virtuous activity. Thus, Alasdair MacIntyre is exactly
right when he says that on Aristotle's view, the virtuous agent “does what is
virtuous because it is virtuous" (MacIntyre 1984, 140).
H.H. Joachim ascribes essentially this view to Aristotle when he writes
The good life.
. .is the end.
. .The means to this end are
themselves constituents of it. . .The ideally good life is not a goal
lying beyond morally good conduct and true thinking or
speculation, and these are not means leading to it as a result
external to, and other than, them. The ideally good life is the life
of noble action and true thinking, and they lead to it or are
means to it only as the healthy action of the heart may be said to
lead to or be a means to the healthy life of the body as a whole
Ooachim 1951, 188-189).
One of the strengths of this interpretation is that it allows us to pull
together a number of claims Aristotle makes elsewhere. For example, it
coincides perfectly with Aristotle's discussion of excellent deliberation (see
previous section). There, Aristotle asserts that the virtuous agent takes
virtuous activity as his end when he deliberates. Deliberation begets choice
which in turns begets action, the action being done for the sake of what the
agent takes as his end in deliberating. Thus, the fact that the virtuous agent
takes virtuous activity as his end when he deliberates implies that he acts for
the sake of virtuous activity — the very interpretation of Aristotle's view that
I endorse.
The interpretation also allows us to make sense of a claim that has
given commentators a lot of trouble: "its [good action's] end is doing well
itself" (NE 1140b7, Irwin). I think that this remark ought to be understood as
follows: virtuous activity aims at virtuous activity; that is - a person acts
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virtuously on a given occasion only if his goal in acting on that occasion is
virtuous activity itself.26
Finally, consider Aristotle's explanation of why the virtuous person's
life is a pleasant one:
Their life is also pleasant. For pleasure is a state of the soul, and
to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g.
not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle
to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are
pleasant to the lover of justice and in general* virtuous acts to the
lover of virtue (NE 1099a5-15, my emphasis).
In this passage, Aristotle characterizes the virtuous person as a lover of
virtue. My interpretation allows us to take Aristotle at his word: the virtuous
person loves virtuous activity - it is his ultimate goal.
How can we incorporate this interpretation into Aristotle's account of
moral virtue? It turns out that we already have, by way of clause (vi) of (ED4).
Aristotle's earlier and somewhat cryptic claim that the virtuous person
chooses virtuous actions "for their own sakes" is explained in Aristotle's
discussion of excellent deliberation. The virtuous person, recognizing that
the best life is one filled with virtuous activity, takes virtuous activity as his
end when deliberating, and therefore can be said to choose his (virtuous)
actions for the sake of virtuous activity — or, as Aristotle somewhat obscurely
(and perhaps misleadingly) puts it, for their own sakes.
Since good choice requires excellent deliberation, the expression
"making a good choice of an action for its own sake" is redundant: any good
choice is of some virtuous action for the sake of virtuous activity. With this
in mind, we can simplify (AV5) somewhat:
26 Alfred Mele defends a similar view - see (Mele 1 981 ), particularly section 1 -- “Choosing
something for its own sake.’’
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AV6: x 1S a moral virtue if and only if there is some action and emotion set,
EA, such that x is the settled disposition to (i) perform proper actions in EA
while knowing that one is performing a proper action and as a result of good
choices of those actions, and (ii) have proper emotional experiences in EA
(properly).
In ascribing this view to Aristotle, I am ascribing to Aristotle a version
of what has come to be known in the literature as the "Grand End View."
One commentator who has recently argued that Aristotle does not hold any
such view is Sarah Broadie. In the following section, I will defend my
interpretation against Broadie's objections.
1.1.10 Broadie And the Grand End View
1.1.10.1. Introduction
Broadie characterizes the Grand End View in these lines:
Practical wisdom.
. .seeks to realize.
. .the human good without
restriction; and in this it takes its cue from an explicit,
comprehensive, substantial vision of that good, a vision
invested with a content different from what would be aimed at
by morally inferior natures (Broadie 1991, 198).
The Grand End View has two main tenets: (i) the virtuous person has a
substantial view about the nature of the best life for human beings, and (ii)
when the virtuous person deliberates, she always take this substantial view as
her ultimate end.27
I think that Aristotle's view is that (i) the virtuous person's view is that
the best life for a human is a life filled with virtuous activity, and (ii) the
27 in the passage I have cited from Broadie, she speaks of practical wisdom, not virtue. But
since Aristotle holds that S is virtuous if and only if S is practically wise, to characterize the
practically wise person is to characterize the virtuous person (and to characterize the virtuous
person is to characterize the practically wise person).
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virtuous person's deliberation always takes virtuous activity as its end .28
This is clearly a version of the Grand End View.
In the preceding sections, I have presented textual evidence that I think
supports the attribution of my version of the Grand End View to Aristotle.
What are Broadie's arguments that Aristotle does not hold the Grand End
View?
1.1.10.2 What Aristotle Does Not Say
Broadie writes:
[Aristotle] gives us regrettably little by way of example or
concrete description of practical (as distinct from technical)
deliberation.
. .Aristotle takes it for granted that we know pretty
well in nonanalytic fashion what practical wisdom is like, from
our experience. This tells against the Grand End theory.
. .since
few of us would claim to know either at first or second hand
what it is like to deliberate with a view to realising a Grand End
(Broadie 1991, 198).
Broadie argues not from what Aristotle does say, but rather from what
he does not say. Since Aristotle does not provide us with examples of
practical reason, it must be that he thinks we already know what practical
wisdom is like; since we don't know what it is like to deliberate with a view
to a Grand End (and presumably Aristotle realizes this), this indicates that
Aristotle does not hold that practical wisdom involves deliberation with a
view to a Grand End.
I propose that we look at what Aristotle actually does say about practical
wisdom. Aristotle's official account of practical wisdom appears in NE 6.5. It
begins with these words:
Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to
be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for
28 Furthermore, the virtuous person has specific (and true!) views about which actions are
virtuous and which are not, lest there be any doubt that his vision of the good is “substantial” on
my interpretation.
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himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of
thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of
thing conduce to the good life in general.
. .we credit men with
practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have
calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of
those that are not the object of any art (NE U40a25-30).
One of the claims made here is that what is distinctive of the practicallv
wise person is that he deliberates excellently. Aristotle distinguishes two
varieties of practical wisdom here: practical wisdom with respect to some
particular end, and practical wisdom in the unqualified sense. The first
sentence of the passage makes it clear that real practical wisdom, the kind that
the virtuous agent has, is practical wisdom in the unqualified sense. What
does practical wisdom in the unqualified sense aim at? It aims at "the good
life in general." It seems clear that Aristotle's claim here is that the practically
wise person takes the good life as his end when he deliberates.
This is confirmed by Aristotle's discussion of excellence in deliberation
in NE 6.9. There, we find Aristotle making a distinction that corresponds
perfectly with the earlier distinction between practical wisdom with respect to
a particular end and practical wisdom in the unqualified sense. Aristotle
writes:
Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in the
unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end.
Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that
which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the
unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular
sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end (NE
1142b25-35).
The distinction made here is between excellence in deliberation with
respect to a particular end, and excellence in deliberation in the unqualified
sense. The earlier distinction between two sorts of practical wisdom
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corresponds perfectly to this distinction between two sorts of excellent
deliberation. Surely the most natural understanding of Aristotle's view is
that the person who is practically wise in the unqualified sense is the one
who deliberates excellently in the unqualified sense. In the passage just cited,
Aristotle says that the person who deliberates excellently in the unqualified
sense takes as his end what is the end in the unqualified sense. In NE 1.7, the
end in the unqualified sense is declared to be happiness, which is
subsequently identified with virtuous activity. Aristotle's view is that the
practically wise person deliberates with a view to virtuous activity.
I do not know why Aristotle does not provide us with examples of
practical deliberation. But I do know that Aristotle's discussion of practical
wisdom and excellent deliberation provide strong evidence that he held (a
version of) the Grand End View.
1.1.10.3 The Lack Of Description Of a Grand End
Broadie writes: "[i]f Aristotle believes in a Grand End for practical
wisdom, he with his practical concern should try to state what that end is like.
He does not try" (Broadie 1991, 200).
As far as I can see, Broadie' s claim here is that if Aristotle in fact held
the Grand End View, he would have tried to describe this Grand End. He
doesn't try to describe the Grand End; therefore he does not hold the Grand
End View.
I find the second premise of this argument to be simply incredible.
Aristotle tells us that the practically wise person takes as his end the good life,
or happiness. Is Broadie's claim here, then, that Aristotle never tries to tell us
what the good life consists in? But of course doing just this is the central
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theoretical project of the Nicomachean Ethics. Since I do not know what else
Broadie might have meant here, I will simply move on.
1.1.10.4 The Charge Of Circularity
Just after the passage cited above, Broadie writes: "[Aristotle] cannot
. . .ascribe without circularity the picture of the good which he is developing,
since this picture includes a portrait of practical wisdom" (Broadie 1991, 200).
The charge here is that if Aristotle holds the Grand End View, then his
account is circular, and therefore defective. (AV5) is, in part, an account of
virtuous activity (each moral virtue is a disposition toward virtuous activity
in a certain domain). Clause (i) makes use of the notion of good choice,
which makes use of the notion of excellent deliberation. Finally, (ED4) tells
us that a person deliberates excellently only if that person takes virtuous
activity as her end (clause (vi)). Thus, the charge of circularity must be
addressed.
Circularity is bad in that circular accounts are uninformative. The
following account is obviously uninformative:
Cl: x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a moral virtue.
This account of moral virtue will not help a person who does not
already know what moral virtue is find out what it is. But it should be clear
that (AV5) is not like (Cl) in this respect. A person who does not already
know what virtuous activity (or what moral virtue is) can learn quite a bit
from (AV5). This is so because while (AV5) does implicitly appeal to the
concept of virtuous activity, it explicitly appeals to a wide range of other
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concepts.29 (AV5) provides a substantive and informative account of moral
virtue.
1.1.10.5 Conclusion
Finally, let me conclude this section with a comment by Richard Kraut
that helps to clarify the view I am attributing to Aristotle:
This [the Grand End View] would be an implausible account of
wise practical reasoning.
. .if it held that the best moral agent is
one who mentally says to himself, at every waking moment,
"Happiness consists in such-and-such; let me see, now, what
must I do in these particular circumstances to achieve it." But
the Grand End view need not endorse this picture of the
practically wise person's conscious mental life.
. .What is
essential to the Grand End view is a thesis about the justification
of decisions: if a person of practical wisdom is asked to state his
reasons for making a decision, then the full justification must
begin with a substantive and correct conception of happiness
(Kraut 1993, 362).
The point here is that the fact that x is S's ultimate goal does not imply
that S always has x in mind, or that S begins all his deliberations by
consciously thinking of x. We ought to understand Aristotle's view that the
virtuous person's end is virtuous activity in light of these comments.
Aristotle's view does not imply that the virtuous person always has virtuous
activity in mind, or that the virtuous person begins all his deliberations by
consciously thinking of virtuous activity. Rather, the claim is that the
virtuous agent has virtuous activity as her ultimate goal, and virtuous
activity is what ultimately justifies each of her actions.
1.1.11 Virtue And Acting For the Sake Of the Noble
At various points in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle connects virtue
with nobility. In NE 4.1, for example, he declares that "virtuous actions are
29 Richard Kraut makes this point as well: see (Kraut 1993, 369).
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noble and done for the sake of the noble" (NE 1120a22-23). What are we to
make of this passage, and how does it fit together with what Aristotle says
elsewhere?
Passages like the one I have cited have led some commentators to
conclude that Aristotle is specifying a new condition on moral virtue (or
acting virtuously), distinct from the ones I have discussed so far 30 I think
this is a mistake.
Kelly Rogers writes:
In the Topics
,
Aristotle says that the [appropriate] is definitory
•
•
[nobility], and also that [appropriateness] cannot be a
property of [nobility] since, in fact, the two are the same (Rogers
1993, 356, my emphasis).
For Aristotle, nobility just is properness or appropriateness. Thus,
\\ hen Aristotle says that virtuous actions are noble, he is simply restating the
familiar claim that to act virtuously, one must do what is proper. This is
precisely the conclusion Rogers reaches:
Thus, to describe a virtuous act as [noble] is, at the literal level, to
say that it is fully medial and appropriate, occurring at the right
time, about the right thing, towards the right people, and so
forth (Rogers 1993, 357).
And when Aristotle says that virtuous actions are done for the sake of
the noble, he is once again alluding to his view that the virtuous person takes
proper (virtuous) activity as her ultimate end.
30 So, Sarah Broadie writes: “I think, ‘for the sake of the noble’ refers to a spirit in which the
person does whatever he has independent reason to think it right or good to do” (Broadie 1991
.
92).
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1.1.12 Pleasure As a Sign Of Moral Virtue
1.1.12.1 Introduction
Various passages in the Nicomachean Ethics indicate that Aristotle
holds that there is an important connection between moral virtue and
pleasure. In NE 1.8 Aristotle says:
[T]he man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even
good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy
acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal
actions; and similarly in all other cases.
. .virtuous actions must
be in themselves pleasant (NE 1099al5-20).
Later, in NE 2.3, we find this passage:
We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain
that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily
pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the
man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands
his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or
at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a
coward (NE 1104b6-9).
A natural reading of the first passage has it that Aristotle is claiming
that the virtuous actions of a virtuous agent are pleasing to that agent. A
natural reading of the second passage has it that Aristotle is claiming that
abstaining from bodily pleasures is pleasing to the temperate person but
painful to the self-indulgent person, and that standing one's ground against
what is terrible is pleasing to the courageous person but painful to the coward.
But these natural readings seem problematic. With respect to the first
passage, it seems clear that virtuous actions are sometimes not pleasing to
their agents and may even be painful to their agents -- even if such agents are
virtuous. Indeed, Aristotle's examples in the second passage actually lend
support to this claim. Surely facing what is terrible is likely to be painful,
even to the virtuous agent. Sarah Broadie makes this point forcefully when
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she says: How can it realistically be held that fighting until one is cut to
pieces is pleasant or even.
. .'not painful'?" (Broadie 1991, 91).
Such difficulties make it appear as if the natural readings of these
passages are quite implausible. Some commentators have supposed, perhaps
because of this apparent implausibility, that Aristotle does not mean what he
seems to be saying in these passages. Broadie is one such commentator:
So it seems that when in the earlier books Aristotle talks of the
virtuous agent as taking pleasure in virtuous actions, this
should mean no more than that the agent acts wholeheartedly,
which is compatible with his not enjoying what he does (Broadie
1991, 318).
Broadie here suggests a somewhat watered-down interpretation of the
passages in question according to which Aristotle's claim is merely that the
virtuous agent acts "wholeheartedly" when he does his virtuous deeds.
Broadie has abandoned the natural readings sketched above.
I will defend the claim that the natural readings of the two passages
cited at the outset are, suitably clarified, correct. I will propose and defend a
somewhat more precise version of the natural readings outlined above.
1.1.12.2 Two Kinds Of Pleasure
We need to consider an important question: what sort of notion of
pleasure is Aristotle working with? The answer to this question may give us
insight into the view Aristotle is proposing in the passages I cited at the outset
of the previous section.
Fred Feldman has distinguished two kinds of pleasure: what he calls
"sensory pleasure" on the one hand, and what he calls "propositional
pleasure" on the other. Explaining sensory pleasure, Feldman writes:
Imagine that you are on a sunny tropical island. . .Imagine that
you are lying on the sand, delighting in the fresh air, sunshine,
peacefulness, and warmth. You are experiencing many
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pleasurable sensations. These would include the pleasures
associated with the feelings of warmth, the smell of the fresh
salty air, and the tingling feeling produced by the caress of the
gentle breeze. Each of these sensations is. . .a sensory pleasure
(Feldman 1997, 82)
Concerning propositional pleasure, Feldman has this to say:
Consider a man with smart children. Suppose he learns that his
children have gotten report cards filled with 'A's. . .He is pleased
that his children have gotten good report cards. In this case, the
man's pleasure has an 'object', and the object is a proposition
. . .he is experiencing propositional pleasure (Feldman 1997, 83).
Feldman elaborates on the concept of propositional pleasure a bit later:
Propositional pleasure is a 'pro-attitude'. It belongs in the same
family as wanting, and favorably evaluating.
. .to be pleased
about a state of affairs. . .one must 'welcome' that state of affairs
(Feldman 1997, 96-97).
Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to distinguish two kinds of
mental items — (i) qualia, or "raw feels", and (ii) intentional states. Examples
of qualia include smells, tastes, and sensations of color. Intentional states are
about other things. It is this aboutness that is distinctive of intentional states.
It is clear, I think, that Feldman's sensory pleasures are all qualia and
his propositional pleasures are all intentional states. We have, then, two
fundamentally different notions of pleasure. Which of these notions, if
either, does Aristotle recognize?
I will argue that the most plausible interpretation of the passages from
the Nicomachean Ethics cited earlier is one that makes use of the notion of
propositional pleasure (and pain) as well as sensory pleasure (and pain). To
lend support to this claim, let us first try to interpret those passages under the
assumption that Aristotle is working only with the concept of sensory
pleasure (and pain).
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At the end of the second of the two passages Aristotle says, "he who
stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at
least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward." If
Aristotle has sensory pleasure and pain in mind here, then the most likely
interpretation of his claim is, in part, that a person who experiences sensory
pain as a result of standing his ground against what is terrible is a coward.
But this is implausible. Performing courageous actions, such as
fighting in battle, often results in painful injuries. This fact is not lost on
Aristotle; he recognizes that "courage involves pain" (NE 1117a30-35) and
that "wounds will be painful to the brave man" (NE 1117b5-10). Tie is fully
aware that fighting in battle, even when done by a courageous person, often
results in painful sensations (sensory pains). This shows that he does not
hold the untenable position that experiencing sensory pain as a result of
performing courageous actions indicates a lack of courage. We should look
for a more promising interpretation of Aristotle's remarks.
1.1.12.3 A New Interpretation
Consider Aristotle's claim that "the man who abstains from bodily
pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is
annoyed at it is self-indulgent." The language here strongly suggests a view
according to which pleasure and pain may have objects. Thus, the language
supports a view involving propositional pleasure and pain.
If we make use of these notions then we can say that Aristotle's claim is
that the temperate person takes propositional pleasure in the fact that he
(himself) is abstaining from bodily pleasure, whereas the self-indulgent
person takes propositional pain in the fact that he (himself) is abstaining from
bodily pleasure.
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This interpretation raises two questions, one more mysterious than the
other. First, why would the self-indulgent person take propositional pain in
the fact that he is abstaining from bodily pleasure? The more mysterious
question is this: why would the temperate person take propositional pleasure
m the fact that he is abstaining from bodily pleasure? Let's consider the first
question first. I think that the correct answer to the first question suggests an
answer to the second question.
The answer to the first question, I think, turns on Aristotle's view that
each sort of person values different things (NE 1113a30-35).3i The self-
indulgent person values bodily pleasure3 2; the virtuous person, on the other
hand, values what is really valuable - virtuous activity. 33 Thus, the self-
indulgent person typically will not welcome the fact that he is abstaining
from bodily pleasure, for two reasons: first, he he does not value virtuous
activity, and so he does not value abstinence from bodily pleasure. Second,
he does value bodily pleasure, and the fact that he is abstaining means that he
is not getting that which he values. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that
the self-indulgent person takes propositional pain in the fact that he is not
getting bodily pleasure (or that he is not getting enough of it). This
31 Valuing a thing is not the same as desiring that thing. For an excellent discussion of the
distinction between valuing and desiring, see Gary Watson's article Tree Agency," Journal of
Philosophy 72 (April 1975), 205-220.
32 One contemporary philosopher who agrees with this position (and therefore, I would argue,
agrees with Aristotle on this point) is Lester Hunt. Hunt writes: “Gluttony is not the same thing as
having a large appetite, nor is anyone a glutton simply because he has gotten into the habit of
stuffing himself whether he is hungry or not — a glutton is someone who places more importance
on food than on certain other things” (Hunt 1978, 182).
33 Throughout this section, when I say that a person values something, I mean that that person
values the thing for its own sake. Similarly, when I speak of something being valuable, I mean that
the thing is valuable for its own sake.
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interpretation is supported by remarks Aristotle makes in his discussion of
temperance in NE 3.11:
[T]he self-indulgent man is so called because he is pained more
than he ought at not getting pleasant things. . .and the temperate
man is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what
is pleasant and at his abstinence from it (NE 1118b30-35).
The temperate person, recognizing his own abstinence as a virtuous
action, takes propositional pleasure in such abstinence. He is pleased by his
abstinence because he recognizes his abstinence as virtuous, and he values
virtuous activity.! 6 Moreover, the temperate person does not take
propositional pain in the fact that he is not getting bodily pleasure (nor,
obviously, does he take propositional pain in the fact that he is abstaining
from bodily pleasure).
The self-indulgent person, by contrast, does not take propositional
pleasure in the fact that he is abstaining, and he does take propositional pain
in the fact that he is not getting bodily pleasure (or that he is not getting
enough of it). While it is not characteristic of the self-indulgent person
morally to disapprove of his own abstinence, it is characteristic of the the self-
indulgent person to believe that he is missing out on something of value by
missing out on bodily pleasure. And this explains his taking propositional
pain in the fact that he is not getting bodily pleasure.
What about Aristotle's claim that "he who stands his ground against
things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave,
while the man who is pained is a coward"? I think we should understand the
first clause of this sentence as saying that the courageous person takes
propositional pleasure in the fact that he is standing his ground against what
is terrible. He is pleased for much the same reason the temperate person is
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pleased by his own abstinence. The courageous person recognizes that by
standing his ground he is performing a virtuous action, and he values
virtuous activity.
But what about the second clause? Why would the coward take
propositional pain in the fact that he is standing his ground against what is
terrible? The answer again lies in the fact that the virtuous person and the
vicious one value different things. The coward does not value standing his
ground. This, together with his recognition that standing his ground may
result in pain and even death, has the result that he is appalled at the fact that
he is standing his ground - he takes propositional pain in this fact. It may
also be that he values his own comfort and safety excessively, and so he takes
propositional pain in the fact that he is giving up something of value (his
own safety) in exchange for something of no value (standing his ground).
This interpretation makes sense of the passage at hand, but comments
Aristotle makes later in his extended discussion of courage reveal that there is
more to the story:
And the more possessed of virtue in its entirety and the happier
he [the brave man] is, the more he will be pained at the thought
of death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is
knowingly losing the greatest goods, and this is painful (NE
1117bl0-20).
One thing that is striking about this passage is that in it Aristotle
explicitly says that what one values influences what one takes pain in. The
virtuous person is the most pained at the thought of death because she
(rightly) values her own life a great deal.
Does this mean that Aristotle is retracting the claim made in the earlier
passage (as I understand it) that the brave man takes propositional pleasure in
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the fact that he is standing his ground? The answer is no. The brave person
can be pained at the thought of death and yet take propositional pleasure in
the fact that she is standing her ground.
Aristotle's somewhat involved discussion of what pains and pleases
the courageous person is a consequence of his recognition that courageous
action poses a unique dilemma for the virtuous agent. The virtuous agent
has more to lose than anyone else by facing danger, for by doing so he risks
his own life, and his life, filled as it is with virtuous activity, is more valuable
than the life of any other sort of person. So in this respect, courageous action
is painful to him most of all (he is pained at the thought of death). On the
other hand, he recognizes the value of courageous action, and in this respect
courageous action is pleasant to him (he takes propositional pleasure in the
fact that he is standing his ground).
Thus, Aristotle's remarks concerning temperance, self-indulgence,
courage, cowardice, and the relationship of these states of character to
pleasure and pain point toward a deeper view. The temperate man and the
courageous man both value virtuous activity; this is why the former takes
propositional pleasure in abstaining from bodily pleasure and the latter in
standing his ground. The coward and the self-indulgent man, by contrast,
view themselves as giving up something of value (and, perhaps in the case of
the coward, acquiring something of disvalue) by performing virtuous actions,
and that is why the self-indulgent person takes propositional pain in his own
abstention from bodily pleasure and the coward takes propositional pain in
the fact that he is standing his ground.
I have offered an interpretation of Aristotle's remarks concerning
temperance and courage, but what of his more general view? In the first of
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the two passages from Aristotle cited at the outset, Aristotle says, "no one
would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal
who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases."
Consider a case where a virtuous person performs some just action —
e.g. he distributes some money appropriately. If the agent is virtuous, then he
will take propositional pleasure in some state of affairs. What is the object of
his pleasure?
The agent might consider his action under a number of descriptions,
and the object of his propositional pleasure will vary with these descriptions.
He might consider the action under the description 'performing a virtuous
action', and thus take propositional pleasure in the fact that he is performing
a virtuous action. He might consider the action under the description
'performing a just action', taking propositional pleasure in the fact that he is
performing a just action; he might consider the action under the description
'distributing the money appropriately', taking propositional pleasure in the
fact that he is distributing the money appropriately.
In each of these cases, the agent considers his action under some
description, and this description determines the object of his propositional
pleasure. I will call all cases of this sort cases of an agent's taking
propositional pleasure in his or her performance of an action. I will not give
a technical definition of an agent's taking propositional pleasure in his or her
performance of an action, but I think that the notion is clear enough for our
purposes here. Using this notion, we can state Aristotle's general view like
this:
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PP. A person, S, has a given moral virtue, V, only if: whenever S performs a
V-action, a, (i) S takes propositional pleasure in his or her performance of a,
and (ii) S takes such pleasure (at least in part) because S recognizes a as a
virtuous action.
What is important is not which description the agent considers the
action under, but rather that whatever the description, he recognizes that the
action is a virtuous action and as a result takes propositional pleasure in his
performance of the action. A person who regularly fails to do this reveals a
lack of virtue.
This interpretation explains Aristotle's comment that pleasure and
pain are "signs" of states of character. What a person takes pleasure and pain
in is a good indication of what that person values. And as Aristotle remarks,
perhaps the greatest difference between the virtuous person and the vicious
person lies in what each kind of person values (NE 1113a30-35). In this way,
what a person takes pleasure and pain in is an indication of that person's
character.
1.1.12.4 Defending the Interpretation
I noted earlier that the natural readings of the passages from Aristotle
face a number of difficulties. In this section I address these difficulties as well
as some others that have been raised by other commentators.
The main difficulty was that virtuous actions are often painful even
when performed by a virtuous agent. This difficulty is easily resolved.
Aristotle need not deny this claim. Virtuous actions may sometimes be
painful to the virtuous agent — but the virtuous agent will nevertheless take
propositional pleasure in such actions. An analogy may help to make this
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point clear. Consider a person who values competition. Perhaps he competes
by running a marathon. Running the marathon is quite painful;
nevertheless, he is pleased that he is running the marathon because by doing
so he is competing. It is the same for the virtuous agent. The virtuous agent
values virtuous activity. Sometimes virtuous actions are painful;
nevertheless, the virtuous agent takes propositional pleasure in such actions.
Broadie raises some difficulties concerning the second of the two
passages cited at the outset:
A satisfactory interpretation.
. .would have to distinguish types
and levels of pleasure and pain so as to overcome such problems
as the following. (1) Virtue is sometimes expressed in our being
pained at things at which we should be pained (e.g. someone
else's vile action): how is this consistent with taking pleasure
('delighting') in one's morally correct response? (2) How can it
realistically be held that fighting until one is cut to pieces is
pleasant or even. . .'not painful'? (Broadie 1991, 91).
The solution to the first of Broadie' s difficulties is as follows. It may be
that some virtuous actions are painful. Compassionate action, for example,
might involve taking propositional pain in the fact that others are suffering.
But this does not imply that compassionate action does not also involve
pleasure — the compassionate person may also take propositional pleasure in
the fact that she is helping those who are suffering.
The solution to the second of Broadie's difficulties is that Aristotle
need not deny that fighting in battle is painful. His view is that the
courageous person takes propositional pleasure in the fact that he is standing
his ground. And he may do this despite suffering painful injuries.
Once we recognize that the presence of pain does not imply the absence
of pleasure, then, it is easy to see how Aristotle's view can accommodate the
difficulties suggested by Broadie.
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Writing on the first of the two passages I cited at the outset, Robert C.
Roberts says, “someone who fails to rejoice in his temperate behavior is not
thereby indicted as self-indulgent.
. .for he may just not be reflective enough
about his temperance and its value to be emotionally affected by it" (Roberts
1989
,
304 ).
Roberts' point here is that failing to take propositional pleasure in the
fact that one is abstaining from bodily pleasure does not necessarily indicate a
lack of temperance; it may just indicate a certain lack of reflectiveness. A
person might have the virtue of temperance without reflecting on the value
of temperance. Such a person might be temperate without taking
propositional pleasure in his own temperate actions.
The Aristotelian response to Roberts' objection here is that the putative
counterexample is impossible. According to Aristotle, the virtuous person
recognizes that the best kind of life is one filled with virtuous activity.
Moreover, the virtuous person knows which actions are virtuous and
chooses to perform these actions at least in part precisely because they are
virtuous. So a person who fails to recognize either that what he is doing is a
virtuous action or fails to recognize the value of virtuous activity lacks the
virtue of temperance (indeed, lacks all the virtues).
Roberts gives a different objection elsewhere:
A person who enjoys enduring dangers is better called a
daredevil. A particularly bizarre illustration. . .has been collected
by William James:
I believe, says General Skobeleff, that my bravery is simply the
passion for and at the same time the contempt of danger. The
risk of life fills me with an exaggerated rapture. The fewer there
are to share it, the more I like it. . .a meeting of man to man, a
duel, a danger into which I can throw myself head-foremost,
attracts me, moves me, intoxicates me. I am crazy for it, I love it.
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I adore it. I run after danger as one runs after women.
. .my
entire nature runs to meet the peril with an impetus that my
will would in vain try to resist.
If joy in enduring danger were a mark of courage. General
Skobeleff would appear to be an exceptionally courageous man
. . .But. . .his disposition is not courage.
. .there is nothing
admirable about General's lust for dangers (Roberts 1984 230-
231).
Here, Roberts interprets Aristotle in the passages under discussion as
giving a sufficient condition for having a given moral virtue - in this case,
courage. Roberts interprets Aristotle as claiming that a person who is
disposed to enjoy facing danger is courageous; the objection is that this view
has the absurd consequence that General Skobeleff has the moral virtue of
courage. But the objection relies on a misinterpretation of Aristotle's view.
(PP) implies that, for all we know about Skobeleff, he lacks the virtue of
courage. On Aristotle's view, if Skobeleff is to have the virtue of courage, he
must take pleasure in facing danger because he recognizes that it is virtuous
to do so. But nothing in the description of Skobeleff suggests that this is the
case; rather, Skobeleff simply gets a thrill from facing danger. Roberts is
correct to suggest that Skobeleff lacks the virtue of courage — and Aristotle
would agree.
I conclude that (PP) is a plausible interpretation of the passages from
Aristotle under discussion. We can incorporate (PP) into the Aristotelian
Moral Virtuosity Project in two steps. First, we will revise (AV6) as follows:
AV7: x is a moral virtue if and only if there is some action and emotion set,
EA, such that x is the settled disposition to (i) perform proper actions in EA,
(a) knowing that one is performing a proper action, (b) as a result of good
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choices of those actions, and (c) satisfying the pleasure requirement with
respect to those actions, AND (ii) have proper emotional experiences in EA
(properly).
Second, we add the following principle to our interpretation of
Aristotle's view:
PR: A person, S, satisfies the pleasure requirement with respect to a proper
action, a, if and only if (i) S takes propositional pleasure in his or her
performance of a, and (ii) S takes such pleasure (at least in part) because S
recognizes a as a virtuous action.
1.1.13 Summary Of Aristotle's Moral Virtuosity Project
At this point, it is worth summarizing the account of moral virtue we
have been developing. First, I will restate each of the principles that is a
component of Aristotle's Moral Virtuosity Project:
AV7: x is a moral virtue if and only if there is some action and emotion set,
EA, such that x is the settled disposition to (i) perform proper actions in EA,
(a) knowing that one is performing a proper action, (b) as a result of good
choices of those actions, and (c) satisfying the pleasure requirement with
respect to those actions, AND (ii) have proper emotional experiences in EA
(properly).
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GC: A choice of S's, c, is good if and only if (i) c is the result of excellent
deliberation, and (ii) S tries to perform the action that S has selected in the
deliberation preceding c.
EDA. A particular episode of deliberation by S, d, is (unqualifiedly) excellent if
and only if (i) d results in the selection of a proper action, (ii) S does not make
any invalid inferences in d, (iii) S does not make use of a false axiological
claim in d, (iv) S does not make use of a false claim about a particular feature
of the situation at hand, (v) S doesn't take too long to carry out d, and (vi) the
end that d is concerned with is virtuous activity.
PR: A person, S, satisfies the pleasure requirement with respect to a proper
action, a, if and only if (i) S takes propositional pleasure in his or her
performance of a, and (ii) S takes such pleasure (at least in part) because S
recognizes a as a virtuous action.
Consider a particular moral virtue — courage. On Aristotle's view, a
courageous person is one who, when facing some danger, will feel the proper
amount of fear and confidence (toward the proper objects, for the proper
duration, and so on), will, through sufficiently brief deliberation in which the
end is virtuous activity, select a proper action, by making valid inferences and
appealing to no false beliefs, who will try to perform the action selected in
deliberation, who will in fact knowingly perform the action selected, as a
result of choosing to perform it, and who will take propositional pleasure in
the fact that he is performing a proper action as a result of his recognition that
his action is a virtuous one.
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1.2 Aristotle's Argument For The Unity Of the Virtues
1.2.1 Introduction
In the preceding section I presented an Aristotelian theory of the
virtues. In this section I turn to evaluation of Aristotle's argument for the
unity of the virtues. I shall argue that even if the moral virtues are what
Aristotle says they are, it is possible for a person to have some of the moral
virtues without having all of the moral virtues.
1.2.2 The Unity Of the Virtues
Toward the end of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
declares that
[W]e may also refute the dialectical argument whereby it might
be contended that the virtues exist in separation from each
other; the same man, it might be said, is not best equipped by
nature for all the virtues, so that he will have already acquired
one when he has not yet acquired another. This is possible in
respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of those in
respect of which a man is called without qualification good (NE
1144b35-1145a2).
Aristotle claims to be able to refute an argument the conclusion of
which is "that the virtues exist in separation from each other." This claim is
ambiguous. I see two readings, a stronger reading and a weaker reading.
Weak Reading (WR): Every human moral virtue is distinct from every other
human moral virtue.
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Strong Reading (SR): It is possible that a person has one human moral virtue
but does not have all the human moral virtues.34
Which of these claims does Aristotle deny? The latter portion of the
passage cited above suggests that Aristotle is attacking the claim that a person
might acquire one moral virtue without acquiring all the moral virtues. That
is, he is denying (SR), but not necessarily (WR).
What is Aristotle's argument against (SR)? He writes:
For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule,
but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is
virtue, and practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters
(NE 1144b26-27).
Aristotle s point here seems to be that a person cannot have any of the
moral virtues without also having practical wisdom. This is the first premise
of Aristotle s argument against (SR). The second premise is "with the
presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues"
(NE 1145al-3). Thus, I take it that Aristotle's argument can be formulated like
this:
Argument for the Unity of the Virtues (First Version)
1. For any person S, and any human moral virtue V, if S has V, then S has
practical wisdom.
2. For any person S, if S has practical wisdom, then S has all the moral
virtues.
3. Therefore, for any person S, and any human moral virtue V, if S has V,
then S has all the moral virtues.
34 Of course, the Strong Reading itself is ambiguous, due to the presence of the word
possible What sort of possibility is involved here? Kinds of possibility are distinguished by what
is held constant. For example, logical possibility holds constant only the laws of logic; nomological
possibility holds constant the laws of logic and the actual laws of nature. I take it that the kind of
possibility involved in the Strong Reading holds constant the laws of logic, the laws of nature, and
all laws governing human physiology and psychology (perhaps such laws are entailed by or
included in the laws of nature; in that case, the possibility involved in (SR) is nomological
possibility).
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How good is this argument? Let's take a closer look at the first premise.
According to Aristotle, practical wisdom is "a true and reasoned state of
capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (NE
1140b5-7). Terence Irwin translates this passage as "[practical wisdom] is a
state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what
is good or bad for a human being" (NE 1104b5-7, Irwin).
Practical wisdom has (at least) three components. The first component
is propositional knowledge. The practically wise person knows what is good
and bad, noble and base, virtuous and vicious. That is, the practically wise
person has an axiological outlook consisting of the set of all and only true
axiological claims.
The second component of practical wisdom is a certain kind of
perceptiveness. The practically wise person is good at determining what
features of a situation are morally relevant. This kind of how-to knowledge
can only be acquired through experience — this is why "a young man of
practical wisdom cannot be found" (NE 1142al2).
Finally, the practically wise person is not only perceptive in this way;
she is also good at figuring out how to reach her virtuous aims. The
practically wise person has a faculty called cleverness; and this is such as to be
able to do the things that tend toward the mark we have set before ourselves,
and to hit it" (NE 1144a25-27). Aristotle notes that cleverness can be put to
good or bad use, so that being clever is necessary but not sufficient for being
practically wise (NE 1144a28-29).
Could there be a person who is practically wise with respect to some
sphere of action - for instance, those which involve facing danger - but not
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others? Such a person might be courageous but would not have practical
wisdom m the full sense. Thus, he would be courageous, but not practically
wise (in the full sense). If there could be such a person, then premise (1) is
false. Since the existence of such a person is prima fade plausible, we have a
prima facie case against premise (1).
At the very least, considerations of this sort suggest that there is more
to Aristotle's argument than is captured by the version of it stated above.
Aristotle describes practical wisdom as "one quality," or, as Terence Irwin
translates it, as "a single state." This suggests that Aristotle would deny that
practical wisdom can be divided up in the way I have suggested. Aristotle
would maintain that either a person has practical wisdom in the full sense -
with respect to all spheres of action — or that person does not have practical
wisdom at all. Aristotle would endorse this principle:
Lnity of Practical Wisdom (UPW): For any person S, and any virtue V, if S
has practical wisdom with respect to V's action set, then S has practical
wisdom with respect to all action sets.35
Appealing to (UPW), we can formulate a second version of Aristotle's
argument for the unity of the virtues:
Argument for the Unity of the Virtues (Second Version)
P. For any person S, and any moral virtue V, if S has V, then S has practical
wisdom with respect to V's action and emotion set.
UPW. For any person S, and any moral virtue V, if S has practical wisdom
with respect to V's action and emotion set, then S has practical wisdom
with respect to all action and emotion sets.
3'. For any person S, if S has practical wisdom with respect to all action and
emotion sets, then S has all the moral virtues.
35 Neera Badhwar also notes this step in Aristotle’s argument, calling it “[t]he crucial premise’’
(Badhwar 1996, 312).
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4 . Therefore, for any person S, and any moral virtue V, if S has V, then S has
all the moral virtues.
What support is there for (UPW)? One line of argument in favor of
the principle is that "the goodness of a human life is an 'organic' unity, so
that it is impossible to fully understand.
. .any part of the good without fully
understanding the whole" (Badhwar 1996, 313). Terence Irwin (Irwin 1988,
71), Julia Annas (Annas 1993, 75-77), Richard Sorabji (Sorabji 1980, 207), and
Elizabeth Telfer (Telfer 1989, 37) all discuss this sort of approach. Let us
suppose that for each virtue, V, there is at least one set s (there may be many
such sets), of axiological claims such that anyone who knows the axiological
claims in s has enough propositional knowledge about what is good and bad,
noble and base, to acquire V. Let us call such sets the "minimal axiological
outlooks" of V. The line of reasoning discussed by the writers mentioned
above is in support of something like this principle:
Epistemic Unity Thesis (EUT): If S knows all the axiological claims in one of
the minimal axiological outlooks of some virtue V, then S knows all true
axiological claims.
Evaluation of (EUT) is a daunting task. Fortunately, it is also an
unnecessary one, since acceptance of (EUT) does not commit us to (UPW). I
described three components of practical wisdom above. The Epistemic Unity
Thesis bears only on the first component. But what of the other two
components? For example, couldn't there be a person who is good at figuring
out how to perform the proper action in situations in which danger is present
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but not in all situations involving the giving and taking of money? Such a
person might be courageous but not liberal.
It seems easy to imagine how such a person could develop, given
Aristotle's views about moral development. The person could, through
instruction, come to know all and only true axiological claims (the first
component in practical wisdom). But we can imagine that the person, while
familiar with the theory behind all the virtues, is exposed to spheres of action
involving only some of the virtues. In particular, he is exposed to many
situations in which he is faced with danger, but very few situations involving
the giving and taking of money. As a result, he develops the other two
components of practical wisdom (perceptiveness and cleverness) with respect
to facing danger but not with respect to the giving and taking of money.
Thus, he becomes practically wise with respect to the former sphere of action
but not with respect to the latter. Perhaps he is very perceptive when it comes
to detecting and evaluating danger, but he is not perceptive at all when it
comes to detecting people in need. Alternatively, he might be good at
preparing plans for battle, but inept in figuring out how to distribute money
to those who need it. As far as I can see, the existence of such a person is
compatible with Aristotle's account of virtue as well as practical wisdom. I
conclude that (UPW) is false.
Premise (3') is problematic as well. Commenting on Aristotle's
argument for the unity of the virtues, Richard Kraut writes:
Even if we grant him the premiss that understanding one good
requires understanding them all, we would still need to be
persuaded that if one has successfully integrated certain
emotions within one's reasoned conception of the good, then
one has been equally successful with all of one's emotions (Kraut
1988, 83).
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I take it that Kraut's point here is that possession of practical wisdom
with respect to a given sphere of action is not sufficient for possession of the
virtue associated with that sphere, since practical wisdom alone does not
ensure having the proper emotional experiences.36 Kraut mentions a person
who "has more anger than is appropriate, but he manages to control it and
typically acts in accordance with his reasoned decisions" (Kraut 1988, 83). (3’)
seems to be false as well.
Thus, two premises of Aristotle's argument for the unity of the virtues
are false. I conclude that the argument fails.
1.3 Evaluation Of Aristotle's Theory Of Moral Virtue
1.3.1 Introduction
In the previous section, I argued that even granting Aristotle his view
about the nature of moral virtue, his argument for the unity of the virtues
fails. In this section, I turn to criticism of Aristotle's account of moral virtue.
1.3.2 Misguided Courage
I think that (AV7) captures the Aristotelian Moral Virtuosity Project.
Furthermore, (AV7) can be used to generate Aristotelian accounts of specific
moral virtues. Tet's call the action and emotion set associated with courage
C'. Here is a principle that gives an account of Aristotelian courage:
A-COURAGE: x is Aristotelian courage if and only if x is the settled
disposition to (i) perform proper actions in C while knowing that one is
performing a proper action and as a result of good choices of those actions,
and (ii) have proper emotional experiences in C (properly).
36 Julia Annas agrees: “[H]aving one virtue fully. . .having one’s feelings completely in harmony
with one s judgements in that area, involves having every other virtue fully. It seems obvious that
this must be false” (Annas 1993, 77).
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I think a person might have courage and fail to have Aristotelian
courage. If I am right, then Aristotelian courage does not correspond to our
ordinary conception of courage.
Gregory Trianosky briefly mentions a courageous Nazi soldier
(Tnanosky 1987, 132). Let's flesh out the example a bit. The Nazi soldier I
have in mind is one who is devoted to Hitler. He believes that carrying out
Hitler s wishes is a noble end. The Nazi I have in mind is also courageous.
He is fearless in battle. He defends a concentration camp against
overwhelming odds; he risks his life to get supplies to the front line, and so
on. He faces danger and fear on a daily basis, but he is able to overcome the
danger, master his fear, and act. Whenever he faces danger, he reminds
himself that carrying out Hitler s wishes is a noble end, and he acts as best he
can to carry out what he takes to be Hitler's wishes. He thinks Hitler would
want the concentration camp to be defended, so he defends the concentration
camp (despite the danger to himself).
I maintain that the Nazi soldier I have described has courage. But he
lacks Aristotelian courage.
According to Aristotle, courage is the virtue that comes into play when
a person faces danger. Whenever the soldier I have described finds himself
facing danger, he appeals to his belief that carrying out Hitler's wishes is a
noble end in order to decide what to do. When facing danger, the soldier is
disposed to appeal to this belief in his deliberations. But this belief of the
soldier's is false; the satisfaction of the wishes of an evil madman is clearly
not a noble end. The soldier is disposed to make use of this false belief while
deliberating in situations in which he faces danger. Such deliberations fail to
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satisfy condition (in) of (ED4), and so (ED4) implies that these deliberations
are not excellent deliberations. The soldier is not disposed to deliberate
excellently when facing danger. He is disposed to deliberate non-excellently.
Since courage involves situations in which a person faces danger, all
the actions in C (the action and emotion set associated with courage) occur in
situations in which danger is being faced. Therefore, the soldier I have
described fails to satisfy condition (i) of (A-COURAGE). He lacks the
disposition to perform proper actions in C as a result of good chorees of those
actions. (A-COURAGE) implies that the soldier lacks Aristotelian courage.
Consider a second example. Consider a courageous villain. The
villain is disposed to perform a wide range of improper actions - to cheat,
steal, betray, murder, and so on. But performing actions such as these often
requires that the villain face danger. In order to carry out many of his
nefarious deeds, the villain has to be courageous. Fortunately for the villain,
he is courageous. Like the Nazi soldier, the villain is able to overcome his
fear, face the danger, and act nefariously.
The villain lacks the disposition to perform proper actions in C. He is
disposed to act nefariously when facing danger. Therefore, (A-COURAGE)
implies that the villain lacks Aristotelian courage.
What conclusions can we draw from all of this? The answer is that it is
unclear. The reason that it is unclear what conclusions we can draw here is
that it is unclear that what I have called misguided courage is a moral virtue.
An Aristotelian might reasonably claim that whereas Aristotelian courage is a
virtue, misguided courage is not. Thus, the examples given here do not
refute (AV7). He might add that furthermore, since Aristotle is interested in
giving an account of virtuous courage, the fact that his account of courage
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excludes misguided (non-virtuous) courage, the examples discussed here pose
no problem (A-COURAGE). Misguided courage appears to be a "hard case"; it
is unclear whether or not it is a virtue, and so the examples I have presented
do not clearly refute (AV7), nor do they clearly refute the Aristotelian
Courage Project.
I include these examples here because I suspect that at least some
readers will share my intuitions that miguided courage is a kind of courage
and hence is a moral virtue. Those readers who share these intuitions
should reject both (AV7) and (A-COURAGE).
1.3.3 Two Kinds Of Temperance
Condition (ii) of (AV7) implies that a person has a given moral virtue,
V, only if that person is disposed toward proper emotions in V's action and
emotion set. The following passage sheds light on Aristotle's view about
which emotional experiences are proper and which are not:
[W]e must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is
something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and
opposing it. . .Now even this seems to have a share in the
rational principle - and presumably in the temperate and brave
man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters,
with the same voice as the rational principle (NE 1102b25-30).
Of particular interest is the colorful prose at the end of this passage.
The point is that the virtuous person does not experience conflict between the
appetitive and rational parts of his soul. He does not experience conflict
between his emotions and his reason.
In this section I will examine the implications of this view with respect
to a particular moral virtue: temperance. I will argue that it is plausible to
suppose that Aristotle's Temperance Project goes wrong just in the way his
Courage Project goes wrong. In the previous section I suggested that there is a
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kind of courage that Aristotle's Courage Project cannot accommodate. In this
section I will argue that there is a kind of temperance that Aristotle's
Temperance Project cannot accommodate.
In his discussion of temperance and self-indulgence in NE 3.10 — 3.12
Aristotle says that "a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad
appetites" (NE 1146al0-15). Later, he adds this:
[T]he appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize
with the rational principle; for the noble is the mark at which
both aim, and the temperate man craves for the things he ought,
as he ought, and when he ought; and this is what the rational
principle directs (NE 1119al5-20).
The view put forth in this passages is, I think, relatively
straightforward. The temperate person is one who not only does not pursue
bodily pleasures when it is improper to do so; he knows when it is proper to
pursue or partake in bodily pleasures, and he desires to pursue or partake in
bodily pleasures just in case it is proper to pursue or partake in such
pleasures. Ele does not have to struggle against, overcome, or subjugate
inappropriate desires for bodily pleasures, because he has no such desires.37
The temperate person, then, is one who never experiences a certain
kind of phenomenon, a phenomenon in which the following conditions are
satisfied: (i) the agent knows that pursuing or partaking in a particular bodily
pleasure would be improper, and (ii) the agent has a desire to pursue or
partake in said bodily pleasure. Cases where these two conditions are met can
be described as cases where the agent has desires for bodily pleasure that
conflict with his reason.
37 On this interpretation, improperness of desires is parasitic on improperness of actions. A
desire is improper iff it is the desire for an improper action.
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The following principle provides an account of Aristotelian
temperance:
A-TEMPERANCE: x is Aristotelian temperance if and only if x is the settled
disposition to (i) perform proper actions in T while knowing that one is
performing a proper action and as a result of good choices of those actions, (ii)
have proper emotional experiences in T (properly), and (iii) not have desires
for bodily pleasure that conflict with one's reason.38
Consider the case of Charlie. Charlie loves chocolate cake. More
accurately, Charlie loves the bodily pleasures that he experiences when he
eats chocolate cake. Whenever he is confronted with chocolate cake, Charlie
has a strong desire to indulge in the bodily pleasures associated with eating
chocolate cake. These desires of Charlie's are often improper desires;
sometimes the chocolate cake belongs to someone else, sometimes Charlie
has already had five pieces of cake and only one piece remains, and so on. In
cases of this sort, Charlie always manages to suppress his desire for the
pleasures of chocolate cake so that he never acts on them. Charlie has the
disposition never to indulge in the pleasures of chocolate cake when doing so
would be improper, but he lacks the disposition not to have desires for bodily
pleasure that conflict with his reason (in T). Thus, Charlie runs afoul of
condition (iii) of (A-TEMPERANCE), and hence he lacks Aristotelian
temperance.
I maintain that Charlie has temperance. Since he lacks Aristotelian
temperance, this shows that Aristotle's account of temperance is too narrow.
38 Strictly speaking, condition (iii) is implied by condition (ii), but it is useful to make condition (iii)
explicit.
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It mistakenly excludes temperance of the sort possessed by Charlie. This
shows that Aristotle's Temperance Project fails.
Again, I suspect that some readers will share my intuitions about this
case whereas others will not. The Aristotelian might plausibly reply that
while Aristotelian temperance is a moral virtue, the kind of temperance
Charlie has is not, and so the case of Charlie does not refute (AV7). And he
might add further that since (A-TEMPERANCE) is intended to be an account
of virtuous temperance, the fact that it cannot accommodate Charlie's (non-
virtuous) temperance poses no problem for (A-TEMPERANCE).
1.3.4 Moral Virtue And Virtuous Activity
To this point I have been unable to offer decisive reasons for thinking
that (AV 7) is false. In this section I attempt to offer such reasons.
Consider a person who believes that the well-being of human beings is
intrinsically good — valuable for its own sake. This person is disposed to try
to increase the well-being of those around her in various ways - and, she
very often succeeds in her attempts to improve the lives of other people. She
considers the fact that a given course of action would promote the well-being
of others as a reason for performing that action. Of course this is not to say
that she considers the well-being of others to be more important than
anything else in the world. For instance, she would not commit a heinous
crime simply in order to bring about some small increase in the well-being of
a few other people (even if the crime would not result in a decrease in the
well-being of some other person or persons).
It seems to me that the person I have described has the moral virtue of
benevolence. But let us suppose further that when this person performs
benevolent actions, her ultimate aim in so acting is not that she herself
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engage m virtuous activity; indeed, her ultimate goal is not to engage in any
sort of activity at all (although obviously she must engage in some sort of
activity if she is to accomplish her goal). Rather, her goal is simply the well-
being of others. This is her final end in her benevolent actions: no further
explanation of her behavior is available.
On Aristotle's view, because the ultimate goal of this person is not
virtuous activity but rather the well-being of others, this person is not
disposed to deliberate excellently. Her deliberations fail to satisfy condition
(vi) of (ED4). Therefore, she is not disposed to make good choices, and (AV7)
implies that she lacks the virtue of benevolence.
Aristotle's view goes wrong in this case in that it implies that a person
has a given moral virtue only if that person's ultimate goal is virtuous
activity itself. The person I have described does not make virtuous activity
her ultimate goal. Her ultimate goal is a world of a certain sort, not activity of
a certain sort. This example shows that (AV7) is false.
It might be objected that despite appearances, the person I have
described here really does not possess the virtue of benevolence. For if her
ultimate goal when she performs benevolent actions is really just the well-
being of others, then she will be disposed to break laws, sacrifice her own
well-being to an unacceptable degree, and perform any number of heinous
acts in order to bring about the well-being of others. And a person with such
a disposition does not possess the moral virtue of benevolence. If she is really
disposed to pursue the well-being of others just in case it is appropriate or
acceptable to do so, then her ultimate goal must be acting appropriately — her
ultimate goal must be virtuous activity itself.
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In a somewhat different context, Barbara Herman discusses the notion
of socialized" desires. She writes:
In the mature agent, objects of judgment (puzzles about what to
do, questions about what is right) will present themselves
already laden with deliberative and evaluative content,
.the
frenzied intensity of a young child's demands.
. .is. . .the product
of unmediated desire - desire whose importance is still a direct
function of its momentary strength.
. .By contrast, the accurate
representation of judgment and deliberation in the normal
rational adult requires a model that exhibits the enmeshed
development of the system of desires and the capacity for
effective practical rationality.
. .The desire for drink becomes a
desire for safe and pleasant (not dangerous or unpleasant) drink,
and also a desire for an available (not otherwise possessed)
drink. The desire itself becomes socialized.
. .My desire for a new
computer or car does not. . .range over those already owned by
others, a desire to have a child does not include a desire for
anyone else's child (Herman 1996, 46).
In this passage, Herman contrasts the desires of a child with the desires
of a normal rational adult. A crucial difference is that the desires of the latter
are "socialized." One way of understanding this difference is in terms of
dispositions. If a child is thirsty, the child is disposed to desire any drink that
the child encounters. By contrast, a thirsty and responsible adult has not this
disposition but rather the disposition to desire any drink that meets certain
conditions - e.g., is safe, pleasant, and doesn't belong to anyone else. What is
important for our purposes here is that we need not suppose that whereas
what the child desires is a drink, what the adult desires is a drink that is safe,
pleasant, and doesn't belong to anyone else.39 Rather, the child's desires and
the adult's desires may have the same kinds of intentional objects: particular
drinks. The difference is that the adult will not desire a given drink if (she
39 Herman’s comments may suggest that this is in fact her explanation of the difference
between the child and the adult. But my point is only that we need not see things this way.
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realizes that) the drink is unsafe or unpleasant or belongs to someone else,
whereas the child will desire any drink he comes across.
I think that the desires for the well-being of others of the person I
described above could be socialized desires. We need not suppose that
when she performs benevolent actions her ultimate aim is virtuous activity.
Rather, her ultimate aim is promoting the well-being of others - but she does
not desire the well-being of others when promoting the well-being of others
would require her to act in a non-virtuous fashion. She is disposed to act i n a
virtuous fashion, but she need not be disposed to act for the sake of virtuous
activity. I conclude that (AV7) is false.
1.4 Why Aristotle Went Wrong
Early in this chapter, I suggested that one of Aristotle's goals in the
Nicomachean Ethics was the production of good humans - humans that are
disposed to live the best sort of life for humans. I think that this practical goal
influences Aristotle's theoretical view, and this suggests an explanation of
why his theoretical view goes wrong in the way that it does.
In the course of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle develops a
hierarchy of kinds of persons. The position of each sort of person in this
hierarchy is a function of the extent to which a person of the sort in question
is disposed to perform the human function well — is disposed to live the best
sort of life for human beings. At the top of this hierarchy is the person of
practical wisdom, or the good person, or the virtuous person (these are three
ways of describing a single type of person). The virtuous person is put forth
as an ideal: if you want to live the best life you can (and of course you do), says
Aristotle, then become as much like the virtuous person as you can.
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Because of this, giving an account of the individual virtues takes on a
secondary role; the purpose of discussing particular virtues is to describe the
good person -- how he acts, what he believes, what his emotional life is like.
Given this, a natural step is to view the virtues as the states of character that a
good person has. Indeed, Aristotle appears to endorse precisely this view:
"the virtue of a human being will likewise be the state that makes a human
being good" (NE 1106a20-25, Irwin).
Thus, when Aristotle sets out to characterize courage, he tries to
characterize the courage of a perfectly virtuous person; when he sets out to
characterize justice, he tries to characterize the justice of a perfectly virtuous
person, and so on. This may explain why Aristotle overlooks the
phenomenon of misguided courage; after all, the courage of the good person
is not misguided because it is under the direction of practical wisdom.
We may also have here an explanation of why the Aristotelian Moral
Virtuosity Project seems to go wrong. In the previous section I argued that
that project goes wrong in that it implies that to have any virtues, a person
must make virtuous activity her ultimate goal. A person who accepts this
claim and who wants to become virtuous himself is likely to make virtuous
activity his goal.40 A person who does this is likely to act like a virtuous
person, and therefore, if Aristotle's theory of moral development is correct, is
likely ultimately to become a virtuous person himself. Aristotle puts forth a
theory which tends to turn those who hold the theory into virtuous persons.
Thus, Aristotle's theoretical account of moral virtue may have the peculiar
feature of being false but nevertheless one which we would be better off
40 Moreover, anyone who accepts the rest of Aristotle’s view will want to become virtuous: part
of Aristotle’s view is the virtuous person is most likely to live the best kind of life.
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believing - since, were we to believe it, we would likely become virtuous
ourselves.
It appears that Aristotle may have sacrificed theoretical truth for his
practical goal of producing virtuous persons. The Nicomachean Ethics fails to
achieve some of its most important theoretical goals. I have argued that it
fails with respect to the Courage Project and with respect to the Moral
Virtuosity Project. But perhaps we should not be surprised by this, for
Aristotle warns us from the start that his practical goal has priority over any
theoretical goal: "we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in
order to become good" (NE 1103b25-30).
1 .5 Conclusion Of This Chapter
I have developed an interpretation of Aristotle's views on moral
virtue. I have critically examined Aristotle's argument for the unity of the
virtues, claiming that even if Aristotle's views on the nature of moral virtue
are correct, his argument for the unity of the virtues nevertheless fails.
Finally, I have criticized both the Aristotelian Courage Project and the
Aristotelian Moral Virtuosity Project and offered a possible explanation of the
failure of these projects.
In what follows, I will take a tremendous leap forward in time, and
turn to the examination of the views of more recent authors. Despite the
failure of Aristotle's own view, I believe that two things will become clear as
we examine these modern writers. First, that Aristotle's influence on many
of these authors is pervasive. Second, that Aristotle's examination of moral
virtue remains one of the most extended and insightful in all of philosophy,
and the contemporary ethical philosopher ignores these insights at his or her
peril.
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CHAPTER 2
KANT
2.1 Exposition Of Kant's Theory Of Moral Virtue
2.1.1 Moral Virtue
The first passage in The Metaphysics oj Movals in which Kant discusses
moral virtue is this one:
Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong
but unjust opponent is fortitude (fortitudo) and, with respect to
what opposes the moral disposition within us, virtue (MM, 380).
The first thing to notice here is that Kant is not providing an account of
what it is for a given trait to be a moral virtue. Instead, he is providing an
account of moral virtue, which he views as a property that human beings can
have to varying degrees. The property is a complex one involving (i) the
ability to perform a certain task and (ii) the "considered resolve" to perform
that task. A morally virtuous person is capable of and committed to
withstanding those forces that oppose his "moral disposition."
Kant enumerates various forces that might oppose the moral
disposition in us. He writes: "the sensible inclinations of human beings
tempt them to ends. . .that can be contrary to duty" (MM, 380). A bit later
Kant gives us some specific examples of these troublesome sensible
inclinations: "Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to violate one's
duty" (MM, 388).
Based on these passages, we might suppose that Kant's view is that a
person is morally virtuous to the extent that she is both capable of and
committed to overcoming inclinations to perform actions that would be
morally wrong. But this cannot be what Kant intends. For consider a person
who has this capacity to a tremendous degree but who is also subject to
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experiencing extremely strong inclinations toward morally wrong actions —
inclinations which are such that he can almost overcome them (but not
quite). This person is disposed to have, struggle against, and ultimately
succumb to immoral sensible inclinations. Such a person is capable of and
committed to overcoming strong inclinations to perform actions that are
morally wrong, yet he almost always does the wrong thing. The suggested
interpretation of Kant's view implies that the person is morally virtuous to a
notable degree. But the person I have described would most accurately be
described as a person who suffers from a severe case of weakness of will
rather than a morally virtuous person. Hence, Kant must have something
else in mind .41
Elsewhere, Kant says that "[t]he greatest perfection of a human being is
to do his duty from duty (for the law to be not only the rule but also the
incentive of his actions)" (MM, 392). Kant clearly takes it that moral virtue is
the greatest perfection a human being can have. A more plausible
interpretation of Kant's view, then, is that a person is morally virtuous to the
extent that the person is disposed to do his duty from duty .42 Of course this
view stands in need of clarification.
On Kant's view, a person does her duty just in case she acts in
accordance with the Categorical Imperative. Now, an adequate discussion of
the Categorical Imperative would require at least another dissertation. In
discussing Aristotle's theory of moral virtue, I noted that his theory makes
use of the notion of properness. I also observed that in certain passages it
41 This is an instance of what Alvin Plantinga has called “the argument from smartness":
Philosopher X is smart; view V is stupid; therefore, X does not hold V.
42 Further evidence that this is Kant’s view appears in his Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point
of View. “Virtue is. . moral strength in pursuing our duty” (ApH, 147).
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appears that Aristotle is trying to give an account of this notion in terms of
intermediacy. I adopted a certain methodological strategy: I put aside
Aristotle s account of properness and simply took properness as a conceptual
primitive. I propose that we adopt a similar (though not exactly parallel)
strategy with respect to Kant. I propose that we understand doing one's duty
as performing a morally obligatory action, keeping in mind that Kant thinks
that which actions are morally obligatory is determined by the Categorical
Imperative. But I will not attempt to specify exactly what is involved in
acting in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. This strategy will allow
us to focus on what seems me to be the most important and interesting part
of Kant's views on moral virtue: the notion of acting from duty.
What is it to act from duty7 ? The passage cited above suggests that
when a person performs an action from duty, "the law" is the agent's
incentive for performing that action. The law is, of course, the Categorical
Imperative. So Kant's idea is that the Categorical Imperative itself somehow
motivates the agent to perform a given action. Elsewhere, Kant says, "the
way to acquire it [virtue] is to enhance the moral incentive (the thought of the
law)" (MM, 397). Kant's idea is that a person can use the Categorical
Imperative to figure out where her duty lies in any given situation.
Furthermore, the person's recognition that a course of action is obligatory (or,
what comes to the same thing on Kant's view, is required by the Categorical
Imperative) can motivate her to perform that action. To do one's duty from
duty is to do one's duty precisely because it is one's duty.
It is important to notice that motivation of this sort is not identical
with or essentially related to any desires or to what Kant calls "inclinations."
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The following controversial passage from the Groundwork of the
Metaphysic of Morals makes this clear: "Now an action done from duty has
to set aside altogether the influence of inclination.
. .so there is nothing left to
determine the will except objectively the law" (GMM, p. 68).
The passage implies (at least) that the motive of duty is a
fundamentally different sort of motive from inclination. Acting from duty
involves being motivated by a purely cognitive state - one's belief or
recognition that a particular course of action is morally obligatory.
Kant's view of moral virtue is based on a certain picture of human
nature. On this picture, to be human is to be involved in a lifelong internal
struggle - a struggle between one's practical reason and one's emotions and
desires. This is a not unfamiliar picture of human nature. As we have seen,
Aristotle discusses this sort of conflict. On Aristotle's view, the conflict takes
the form of a struggle between a person's conception of the good life and his
emotions. The Aristotelian conflict is successfully resolved when the agent's
conception of the good life is the right one and when his emotions are in line
with this conception of the good life -- when the irrational part of the soul
"speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle" (NE
1102b25-30).
On Kant's view, the conflict takes the form of a struggle between a
person's recognition that he is morally required to act in a certain way and his
emotions. Kant sets a somewhat less demanding criterion for victory in this
battle: "virtue. . .contains a positive command to a human being, namely to
bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) control and so to
rule over himself" (MM, 408). On Kant's view one's emotions need not
43 For discussion of some of the controversy, see section 2.2 below.
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"speak in the same voice" as one's practical reason; all that is required for
virtue is that one acts as the latter commands - because it so commands.
Here, then, is a principle that captures Kant's view of moral virtue:
KV : x is moral virtue if and only if x is the disposition to (i) perform morally
obligatory actions (ii) being sufficiently motivated by the recognition that
what one is doing is morally obligatory.
The following passage lends support to this interpretation:
[Vjirtue cannot be defined as an aptitude for free actions in
conformity with law unless there is added "to determine oneself
to act through the thought of the law".
. .Only such an aptitude
can be counted as virtue (MM, 407).
The locution 'sufficiently motivated' in (KV) requires some
explanation. An agent is sufficiently motivated by motive m to perform
action a on a given occasion just in case two conditions are met. First, on that
occasion, m actually motivates the agent to perform a. Second, if, on that
occasion at the time of action, the agent had had no other motive for
performing a, m would have motivated the agent to perform a. In evaluating
this counterfactual condition, we need to hold fixed any motives the agent
has for performing actions other than a (including any motives for refraining
from performing a). The idea is that a sufficient motive on an occasion is one
that did in fact motivate action on that occasion and would have motivated
action on that occasion even if no cooperating motives had been present. The
motive would have been sufficient, by itself, to overcome any conflicting
motives the agent in fact had on that occasion.
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The strongest textual support for this interpretation that I can find
appears in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone:
the impurity of the human heart consists in this, that although
the maxim is indeed good in respect of its object.
. .and perhaps
even strong enough for practice, it is yet not purely moral; that
is, it has not, as it should have, adopted the law alone as its all-
sufficient incentive: instead, it usually (perhaps, every time)
stands in need of other incentives beyond this, in determining
the will to do what duty demands (RWLR, 25).
In this passage, Kant is distinguishing a morally inferior sort of person
- one who suffers from what Kant calls "impurity of the human heart" from
a morally perfect sort of person, whom we can plausibly identify as the
morally virtuous person. The former sort of person is motivated by his
recognition that a certain course of action is morally obligatory but if he is to
do his duty, at least one other motive for that same course of action must be
present. The latter sort of person, by contrast, is motivated by his recognition
that a certain course of action is morally obligatory, and furthermore it is not
the case that at least one other motive for that same course of action must be
present if he is to do his duty. In other words, the morally virtuous person is
sufficiently motivated (in the sense described above) by his recognition that a
certain course of action is morally obligatory.
An advantage of this interpretation is that it allows us to understand
some things Kant says elsewhere. Consider, for example, this passage on self-
knowledge:
For a human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart
so as to be quite certain, in even a single action, of the purity of
his moral intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even
when he has no doubt about the legality of the action. Very'
often he mistakes his own weakness, which counsels him
against the venture of a misdeed, for virtue (which is the
concept of strength) (MM, 392).
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What is this purity of moral intention concerning which we can never
have knowledge? I propose that it is the truth of a certain counterfactual -
namely, that one's recognition that a given action is obligatory would have
been sufficient, without any cooperating motives, to motivate one to perform
the obligatory action. Consider one of Kant's own examples from the
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals:
For example, it certainly accords with duty that a grocer should
not overcharge his inexperienced customer; and where there is
much competition a sensible shopkeeper refrains from so doing
and keeps to a fixed and general price for everybody so that a
child can buy from him just as well as anyone else (GMM, 397).
In this case the grocer's selfish desire for profit motivates him to do his
duty. Let us also suppose that the grocer is in fact motivated to refrain from
overcharging his customers by his recognition that so refraining is morally
obligatory. In such a case, the grocer cannot be certain that if he did not have
this selfish desire to do his duty that nevertheless his recognition that he
ought not overcharge the inexperienced customer would be sufficient by itself
to motivate him to do his duty.44
Just after the passage from The Metaphysic of Morals cited above, Kant
poses this rhetorical question: "[H]ow many people who have lived long and
guiltless lives may not be merely fortunate in having escaped so many
temptations?" (MM, 393). We might envision Kant's imagined grocer at the
end of his life, congratulating himself on a virtuous life, not realizing that
had his selfish motives ever been absent, the thought of the law alone would
44 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant goes on to make the point that we,
observing such a shopkeeper, cannot be certain that he acts from duty at all. But this is a separate
point from the one under discussion; the issue at hand concerns the grocer’s self-knowledge, not
what observers can know about him.
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have been insufficient to motivate him to do his duty. Such a grocer lacks
moral virtue; he has confused his own weakness (desire for profit) with
moral strength (virtue).
The virtuous person, then, is one who is disposed to be sufficiently
motivated to do his duty by the thought of duty. It is consistent with this that
the virtuous person is also motivated to do his duty by desires and
inclinations. But in the virtuous person, such motives are in a certain way
superfluous: the virtuous person would do his duty even without these
inclinations.
2.1.2 Chastity
With this sketch of Kant's account of moral virtue in hand, let us turn
to Kant's discussion of particular moral virtues. Let's begin with Kant's
discussion of the virtue of chastity:
What is now in question is whether.
. .[a person] is authorized to
direct the use of his sexual attributes to mere animal pleasure,
without having in view the preservation of the species. . .the
question here is whether the human being is subject to a duty to
himself with regard to this enjoyment, violation of which is a
defiling.
. .of the humanity in his own person. The impetus to
this pleasure is called carnal lust.
. .The vice engendered through
it is called lewdness; the virtue with regard to this sensuous
impulse is called chastity, which is to be represented here as a
duty of man to himself (MM, 425).
Chastity is a virtue that deals with a specific type of inclination — carnal
lust. Kant holds that engaging in sexual activity only for the purpose of
achieving sexual gratification is morally wrong. Carnal lust is the inclination
toward sexual gratification. Thus, carnal lust is a paradigmatic example of an
inclination that can tempt us to do what is morally wrong. Kant does not
explicitly tell us what chastity is, so we are forced to do some extrapolating.
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Given Kant s account of moral virtue in general, it seems reasonable to
suppose that chastity involves doing duty for duty's sake in some way or
other. The passage above indicates that chastity pertains specifically to carnal
lust, which tempts us to engage in morally wrong behavior of a particular
type. Since all actions of this type (engaging in sexual activity solely for the
purpose of sexual gratification) are morally wrong, refraining from such
activity is morally obligatory. Therefore, we may reasonably attribute to Kant
the following account of chastity:
CHAS: x is chastity if and only if x is the disposition to (i) refrain from
en8a§in8 sexual activity solely for the purpose of sexual gratification (ii)
being sufficiently motivated by the recognition that so refraining is morally
obligatory .45
Chastity, then, is a virtue that relates to a specific type of behavior and a
specific emotion. We might expect Kant's accounts of the other particular
virtues to follow this general pattern, but this is not the case. A quite
different kind of virtue is beneficence.
2.1.3 Beneficence
Kant characterizes beneficence as "the maxim of making others'
happiness one's end" (MM, 452). This is a virtue that involves what Kant
calls "an end that is a duty." Kant's idea is that there are certain ends or goals
such that each human being is morally obligated to pursue the end or goal in
45 Kant appears to hold that all instances of engaging in sexual activity solely for the purpose of
sexual gratification are morally wrong - that the duty to refrain from engaging in sexual activity
solely for the purpose of sexual gratification is a perfect duty.
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question. As Kant sees it, such ends are essential tools in the battle to master
one's wayward inclinations:
For since the sensible inclinations of human beings tempt them
to ends.
. .that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason can in
turn check their influence only by a moral end set up against the
ends of inclination (MM, 381).
The virtue of beneficence is different from the virtue of chastity in an
important way. The virtue of beneficence involves the duty to promote the
happiness of others. But this duty, unlike the duty involved in chastity, is an
imperfect duty. Part of what this means is that this dutv "is only a wide one;
the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or less, and no specific limits can
be assigned to what should be done" (MM, 393).
Kant's idea seems to be that what is morally required of each of us is
that we promote the happiness of others to a reasonable degree, where just
what is reasonable is left unspecified and presumably can vary from person to
person depending on that person's circumstances. Furthermore, each person
has a significant degree of latitude with respect to how, when, where, and
how much she promotes the happiness of others - a degree of latitude that is
not found in, say, the obligation to refrain from engaging in sexual activity
solely for the sake of sexual gratification.
Because of this latitude, not all instances of promoting the happiness of
others are morally obligatory — yet the beneficent person is disposed to
promote the happiness of others. As a result, the beneficent person is
disposed to promote the happiness of others even when such actions are not
morally obligatory. Therefore, the sort of motivation involved in beneficence
must be somewhat different from the sort of motivation involved in chastity'.
What, then, on Kant's view, motivates the beneficent person? One plausible
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answer is that the beneficent person is motivated by the recognition that a
particular course of action promotes one of the ends that each human is
morally obligated to promote to a significant degree (henceforth I shall call
such ends "obligatory ends").
If this is right, then this principle captures Kant's view on the nature of
the virtue of beneficence:
BENF: x is beneficence if and only if x is the disposition to (i) pursue the
happiness of others (ii) being sufficiently motivated by the recognition that
the happiness of others is an obligatory end.
To accommodate virtues that are associated with imperfect duties
rather than perfect duties, we must revise our account of moral virtue as
follows:
KV': x is moral virtue if and only if x is the disposition to perform actions
that either (a) are morally obligatory and are sufficiently motivated by the
recognition that what one is doing is morally obligatory, or (b) promote an
obligatory end and are sufficiently motivated by the recognition that what one
is doing promotes an obligatory end.
There is a complication here. There are some actions that promote
obligatory ends but which also violate a perfect duty and hence are morally
wrong on Kant's view. For example, suppose that I can promote the
happiness of others by lying. Such an action promotes an obligatory end -- the
happiness of others — but also violates the perfect duty to refrain from lying.
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and hence is morally wrong. A virtuous person will not perform actions of
this sort. Therefore, (K\ ) must be revised so as to exclude actions of this sort
as ones that a virtuous person is disposed to perform. The following revision
does this:
KV : x is moral virtue if and only if x is the disposition to perform actions
that (i) are morally right and (ii) either (a) are morally obligatory and are
sufficiently motivated by the recognition that what one is doing is morally
obligatory, or (b) promote an obligatory end and are sufficiently motivated by
the recognition that what one is doing promotes an obligatory end.
2.1.4 Sympathy
Chastity and beneficence are virtues that involve being disposed to
perform actions of a certain type. Kant also discusses a virtue that pertains to
the emotions. This is the virtue of sympathy. Kant writes:
Sympathetic joy and sadness.
. .are sensible feelings of pleasure
or displeasure.
. .at another's state of joy or pain. Nature has
already implanted in human beings receptivity to these feelings.
But to use this as a means to promoting active and rational
benevolence is still a. . .duty (MM, 456).
Sympathy, then, involves the disposition to take pleasure in the
happiness of others and to take pain in the suffering of others (we can call
these sorts of attitudes "sympathetic feelings"). But it is important to notice
that the virtue of sympathy requires that one take pleasure and pain in the
happiness and suffering of others respectively only when it is proper or
rational to do so.
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Kant gives an example of improper sympathetic feeling:
In fact, when another suffers and, although I cannot help him, I
let myself be infected by his pain. . .then the two of us suffer,
though the trouble really.
. .affects only one. But there cannot
possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world (MM, 457).
Taking pain in the suffering of another when one cannot help that
other person is an example of improper or irrational sympathetic feeling.
The virtue of sympathy involves "the capacity and the will to share in others'
feelings.
. .based, on practical reason” (MM 456, my emphasis). A person with
the virtue of sympathy is disposed to feel sympathetic feelings in such a way
that these feelings assist that person in doing his or her duty (with respect to a
certain domain). Such a person will not have sympathetic feelings when
having such feelings would not provide such assistance; this is why a person
with the virtue of sympathy will not have sympathetic feelings for those she
realizes she is incapable of assisting.
The following principle captures Kant's account of sympathy:
SYMP: x is sympathy if and only if x is the disposition to take pleasure in the
happiness of others (when it is rational to do so) and to take pain in the
suffering of others (when it is rational to do so).
According to Kant, "[the impulse toward sympathetic feelings] is still
one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the
representation of duty alone might not accomplish" (MM, 457). How are we
to understand this claim? One possibility is that Kant's idea is that
sympathetic feelings can provide an extra motivation to do one's duty in cases
where the thought of duty alone would be insufficient by itself to motivate
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one to do one's duty. While this is surely true, a person who is disposed to be
motivated m such a fashion - disposed to be motivated both by duty and
sympathetic feeling where duty alone would be insufficient to move the
agent to do his duty - lacks moral virtue. Virtue requires that the agent be
motivated in such a way that the thought of duty by itself would be sufficient
to move the agent to do his duty. It thus seems unlikely that Kant would
commend sympathetic feelings for their role in providing an extra
motivational boost. What, then, might Kant have in mind here?
One clue is Kant's earlier suggestion that sympathetic feeling can
function as "as a means to promoting active and rational benevolence" (MM,
456). The idea here seems to be that sympathetic feelings are somehow
instrumental in bringing it about that an agent be sufficiently motivated by
duty. Kant makes a similar suggestion in the Lectures on Ethics : "[T]he
function of the sensuous motives should be merely that of overcoming
greater sensuous obstacles so that understanding can again bear rule" (LE, 76).
Let's consider an example of what Kant might have in mind. Suppose
I am in the midst of working on my dissertation when an acquaintance of
mine calls me on the telephone. The battery in his car is dead and he needs
me to drive over and help him jump-start his car. Initially I am inclined to
refuse out of selfish motives: I am motivated to continue working on my
dissertation out of a desire to finish a certain section in the dissertation that
day. But now sympathetic feeling wells up in me; I am pained at the thought
of the poor fellow being forced to walk home in the cold. The sympathetic
feeling does not merely provide me with extra motivation to do what I ought
and help the fellow out. It also weakens my desire to continue working on
the dissertation; this desire is not so much overridden as it is snuffed out of
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existence. Thus, when I do in fact act, it is the case that my recognition that I
ought to help the fellow would have been sufficient by itself to overcome my
(weakened) desire to continue working and hence to motivate me to do my
duty. In this way, it is true to say that the sympathetic feeling was
instrumental in "promoting active and rational benevolence."
If this interpretation is correct, then sympathy is related to benevolence
in an important way. A person with the virtue of sympathy is, everything
else being equal, more likely to have the virtue of benevolence than a person
who lacks sympathy since the former person's sympathetic feelings will serve
to weaken certain inclinations to act contrary to duty. In this way, sympathy
functions such that understanding can again bear rule."
It is important to notice that this view is consistent with the claim that
a virtuous person may also be motivated to do her duty by sympathetic
feelings. What is required for virtue is not that the thought of duty be the
only motive but rather that the thought of duty be a sufficient motive in the
way I have described above. But on Kant's view sympathetic feelings are to be
commended not for their role in directly motivating action but rather for
their role in weakening certain inclinations to act contrary to duty.
A second role for sympathy in the Kantian framework is suggested by
Christine Korsgaard. She writes: "[bjeing sympathetic helps us to be aware of
those cases when our assistance or support will be called for" (Korsgaard 1998,
221). A second way sympathetic feeling can function as a means to
benevolent action, then, is by bringing to our attention opportunities for
benevolent action.
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2.1.5 Primary And Secondary Moral Virtues
To this point, we have in hand a Kantian account of moral virtue in
general and some Kantian accounts of specific moral virtues. Can we, on the
basis of these accounts, piece together a Kantian view concerning the mark of
moral virtue? Kant writes: "To think of several virtues (as one unavoidably
does) is nothing other than to think of the various moral objects to which the
will is led by the one principle of virtue" (MM, 406).
This suggests that perhaps on Kant's view, (at least some of) the specific
virtues are all really a single kind of trait operating in different circumstances
or, as Kant puts it, operating with respect to distinct "moral objects." And I
think this is in fact true of many of the particular virtues Kant discusses.
Chastity is moral virtue (in general) as it applies to sexual behavior;
beneficence is moral virtue as it applies to promoting the happiness of others.
Sympathy, however, does not seem to fit this pattern. Sympathy plays a
supportive role; it engenders beneficence. Therefore, I think the best way to
proceed is to distinguish two fundamentally different kinds of moral virtues,
what we can call "primary virtues" on the one hand and what we can call
"secondary virtues" on the other hand.
In connection with Aristotle's account of moral virtue I introduced the
notion of an action and emotion set. Let us introduce a similar although
somewhat more vague notion: the notion of a sphere of conduct. So, action
relating to one's sexual behavior will be a sphere of conduct, and chastity will
be the virtue pertaining to this sphere. Action relating to the happiness of
others will be another sphere of conduct, and beneficence will be the virtue
pertaining to this sphere. Helping ourselves to this notion, we can offer this
account of primary moral virtue:
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PMV: x is a (primary) moral virtue if and only if there is some sphere of
conduct, S, such that x is the disposition to perform actions in S that (i) are
morally right and (ii) either (a) are morally obligatory and are sufficiently
motivated by the recognition that what one is doing is morally obligatory, or
(b) promote an obligatory end and are sufficiently motivated by the
recognition that what one is doing promotes an obligatory end.
As I suggested above, secondary moral virtues play a supporting role.
Each secondary virtue pertains to an attitude of a certain sort, and each
secondary virtue engenders a specific primary virtue (e.g. sympathy
engenders beneficence). It is important to note that not every attitude has a
secondary moral virtue associated with it - the emotion must be of the
appropriate type. The desire for profit, for example, has no virtue associated
with it.
Above I treated sympathy as a single virtue. To accommodate the
general pattern I am suggesting here, it might be better to divide sympathy
into two virtues — one virtue that deals with taking pleasure in the happiness
of others (this virtue will retain the name 'sympathy') and another virtue
that deals with taking pain in the suffering of others (we can call this virtue
'compassion'). This allows us to formulate a general principle concerning
secondary moral virtues:
SMV: x is a (secondary) moral virtue if and only if there is some (appropriate
type of) attitude A, such that x is the disposition to have A when it is rational
to do so.
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2.2 Defending the Interpretation
It might be thought that the view concerning moral virtue that I have
attributed to Kant is inconsistent with things Kant says elsewhere. One
possible source of trouble that springs immediately to mind is Kant's
discussion of sympathy in the first chapter of the Groundwork of the
Metaphysic of Morals. That discussion runs as follows:
[T]here are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that, without
any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner
pleasure in spreading happiness around them and can take
delight in the contentment of others as their own work. Yet I
maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however
right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely
moral worth.
. .for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the
performance of such actions, not from inclination, but from
duty. Suppose then that the mind of this friend of man were
overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all
sympathy with the fate of others, but that he still had the power
to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of
others because sufficiently occupied with his own; and suppose
that, when no longer moved by any inclination, he tears himself
out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any
inclination for the sake of duty alone; then for the first time his
action has its genuine moral worth (GMM, 398).
This passage might be taken as suggesting that Kant holds that only
actions done from the motive of duty alone have moral worth. If this is
correct, then actions that are motivated both by the motive of duty and
sympathetic feelings are morally worthless. Now Kant would surely hold an
odd view if he held that sympathy is a virtue and also that many of the
sympathetic person's actions are morally worthless. Therefore, to the extent
that the passage in question suggests that Kant holds that only actions done
from the motive of duty alone have moral worth, the passage seems to be at
odds with my interpretation of Kant's views on the virtue of sympathy.
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Richard Henson has observed that in the passage in question and other
passages nearby, Kant seems to assume that "whenever one does one's duty,
one does it either (i) just from some inclination, or (ii) just from duty and
against the weight of other inclinations" (Henson 1979, 43). Thus, when Kant
says that the only actions that have moral worth are those that are done "not
from inclination, but from duty", we should understand this principle as
applying only to cases in which the agent acts from a single motive. Actions
done only from inclination are morally worthless; actions done only from
duty have moral worth.
Similarly, at the end of the passage, when Kant says that it is only when
the imagined person acts from duty alone that his action has moral worth, we
should not interpret Kant as claiming that only actions done from duty alone
have moral worth. Barbara Herman has claimed (correctly I think) that we
need to keep in mind that Kant is discussing a specific kind of person in this
passage. Kant is discussing a person who formerly acted only from
sympathetic inclination; then, as a result of becoming "overclouded by
sorrows of his own", the man loses his sympathetic inclinations. Herman
writes:
Of h i m it is then said: only when the inclination to help others
is not available does his helping action have moral worth. For
of him it was true that when he acted with inclination he did
not also act from the motive of duty. This does not imply that
no dutiful action can have moral worth if there is cooperating
inclination (Herman 1981, 378).
I think Herman is exactly right here. The passage from the
Groundwork occurs in a section where Kant is trying to do two things. First,
he is trying to establish that there is such a thing as the motive of duty and
that sometimes that motive is sufficient by itself to move us to act. Second,
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he is trying to shed some light on what the motive of duty is. This is why he
chooses examples where a person does what he ought to do solely from the
motive of duty and against inclinations to do otherwise. Examples like this
show that sometimes the motive of duty by itself is sufficient to move us to
act. Furthermore, such examples shed some light on what the motive of duty
is by showing us what it is not: it is not an inclination of some kind.46
Rather, it is a motive that is fundamentally different from the other motives
that commonly move us.
Once we understand Kant's purposes in this section of the
Groundwork
,
we understand that we need not interpret him as holding that
only actions done from duty alone have moral worth. Understanding Kant's
purposes here can prevent us from making a similar error, one which I think
Robert Audi is guilty of. Audi attributes to Kant the view that an action can
properly be said to be done from duty only if it is done from duty alone. He
bases this interpretation on this passage from the Groundwork : "Now an
action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination
. . .so there is nothing left to determine the will except objectively the law"
(GMM, p. 68). Audi concludes: "This exclusivity requirement rules out any
motive other than duty as actually motivating an action truly performed
from duty" (Audi 1991, 452).
Again, we must keep in mind that the passage Audi cites occurs in a
context in which Kant is concerned exclusively with actions performed from
a single motive. Thus, whenever Kant says that an action done from duty is
such-and-such, the proper way to understand the claim is like this: an action
46 Christine Korsgaard makes a similar point: “Kant chooses to discuss cases of good-willed
motivation in which no inclination is present. . for exactly the reason he says he does, because in
such cases the operation of the moral principle is especially perspicuous” (Korsgaard 1998, 208).
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done from duty (alone) is such-and-such. So when Kant says that an action
done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, we
should understand him as saying that an action done from duty (alone) has to
set aside altogether the influence of inclination.47 in the passage in question
Kant's goal is to explain what the motive of duty is. His point here is simply
that when one acts from the motive of duty - and from no other motive -
one is not motivated by inclination at all. That an action is done from the
motive of duty alone entails that the action is not done out of inclination.48
the conclusion to be drawn and the point Kant is trying to emphasize
throughout the entire section — is that the motive of duty is a motive of a
completely different sort from inclinations. But it is a mistake to infer from
the passage in question that Kant holds that an action is done from the
motive of duty (at all) only if it is done from the motive of duty alone.
2.3 An Alternative Interpretation: Schaller's Account
Compared with the rest of Kant's ethical theory, Kant's discussion of
moral virtue and the particular moral virtues has attracted relatively little
attention from commentators. However, there are commentators who have
attempted to explicate Kant's account of moral virtues. In this section I
critically discuss one such interpretation put forth by Walter Schaller.
The central idea of Schaller's interpretation is contained in the
following paragraph:
47 it might be objected that in the case of actions motivated solely by duty, there are no
inclinations to set aside. But inclinations may be present without functioning as motives for action.
Suppose duty requires me to eat a certain hamburger. Suppose furthermore that I am hungry.
The hunger is an inclination to eat the burger - but it is possible that when I eat the hamburger, I
am motivated entirely by the recognition that duty requires me to eat the burger, and not at all by
my hunger.
48 The point may seem obvious to us -- but this is only because we are already familiar with the
distinction Kant is at great pains to point out!
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[T]he duty to adopt as an end the happiness of others should be
understood as a duty to cultivate certain character-traits, in
particular, to cultivate the virtues of benevolence, gratitude, and
sympathy. That Kant refers to them as "duties of virtue" is thus
no accident: they are. . .duties to cultivate the aforementioned
virtues. One thus adopts the happiness of others as an end by
striving to develop a range of virtuous character traits or
dispositions which may then in turn serve to motivate
beneficent conduct (Schaller 1987, 563).
In this passage, Schaller ascribes to Kant the view that each human is
morally obligated to develop (as much as she can) certain character traits,
including such traits as benevolence, gratitude, and sympathy. Schaller
doesn't say much about how he conceives of the virtues of benevolence,
gratitude, and sympathy, but from what he does say, it is clear that his view
concerning these virtues is quite different from the Kantian view I have
described above. Schaller has this to say about benevolence:
[\V]hen such (benevolent) persons act beneficently, their
intention or end is to benefit the recipient, and not necessarily to
fulfill a duty. . .It is the thought that another human being needs
help, and not (necessarily) the thought that helping other people
is a duty, that motivates their actions. The former would (or
could) motivate them even if beneficence were not a duty
(Schaller 1987, 564-565).
This account of benevolence (or beneficence) is clearly at odds with the
account of beneficence I ascribed to Kant above. On the latter account,
beneficence does require that the person view the helping of others as
contributing to the fulfillment of a duty - and that the thought that helping
other people does this does in fact motivate the person's beneficent actions.
Without the presence of this element, we have not a person who has the
virtue of beneficence but rather one of the spirits of sympathetic temper who
"find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them and can take
94
delight in the contentment of others" (GMM, 398). But Kant explicitly says
that the actions of this person lack moral worth. This indicates that Kant
would not regard benevolence, as it is characterized by Schaller, as a moral
virtue at all. And it would therefore be odd for Kant to hold that each human
is obligated to develop such a trait. Furthermore, given Kant's derisive
comments concerning the spirits of sympathetic temper in the Groundwork
,
it would be surprising for him to claim elsewhere that humans are morally
obligated to make themselves into spirits of sympathetic temper.
A second problem with Schaller's interpretation is that Schaller's
interpretation of Kant's views on particular moral virtues is at odds with
Kant's account of moral virtue in general. For example, recall this passage
from elsewhere in The Metaphysics of Morals
,
cited earlier:
[V]irtue cannot be defined as an aptitude for free actions in
conformity with law unless there is added "to determine oneself
to act through the thought of the law".
. .Only such an aptitude
can be counted as virtue (MM, 407).
Kant here claims that moral virtue is an aptitude for determining
oneself to act through the thought of the law. This strongly suggests that the
virtuous person is always motivated, at least in part, by duty - by the
"thought of the law." 49 On Schaller's interpretation, it is hard to see how to
reconcile Kant's views on the particular virtues with his views on moral
virtue in general.
It would surely be odd of Kant to hold that moral virtue involves
doing duty for duty's sake but that the particular moral virtues involve being
49 Or at least the virtuous person is so motivated when deciding between alternatives which are
not all morally right. Kant does think that concern with the law can be taken too far - see his
comments on “fantastic virtue” (MM, 409).
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motivated by other considerations and not necessarily by the thought of duty
at all. Interestingly, Schaller notes this himself:
II] t would be perverse for Kant to posit.
. .a duty to cultivate
particular character traits, traits which are also motives to act in
certain ways, and then to argue.
. .that the virtuous person.
. .is
never motivated by them, at least insofar as he or she is
virtuous (Schaller 1987, 568).
Schaller offers the following account of how Kant avoids this
"perverse" position:
Kant demonstrates an awareness of the.
. .absurdity of
maintaining that all duty-fulfilling actions — including
beneficent ones should be motivated by duty. After reminding
the reader again that beneficence is a duty, Kant makes the
Aristotelian point that a person who frequently acts beneficently
toward others.
. . comes at last really to love him whom he has
benefited." In other words, acting beneficently from duty is
likely to generate or give birth to a benevolent.
. .disposition.
. .It
would be perverse.
. .for Kant then to insist that the virtuous
person will seek to resist acquiring a benevolent disposition so as
to be able to act beneficently from duty (Schaller 1987, 568).
According to Schaller, then, Kant holds that acting beneficently is likely
to produce in one a benevolent disposition, which Schaller understands as
the disposition to help others because they need help (and not necessarily
because it is one's duty to help them). Given that Kant holds this view, it
would ridiculous if Kant also held that the virtuous person ought to resist
acquiring such a disposition. Schaller' s resolution of the difficulty is that
Kant holds that the virtuous person is obligated to develop the disposition to
help others because they need help (and not necessarily because it is one's
duty to help them).
The first thing to notice here is that the passage in question from The
Metaphysics of Morals does little to substantiate Schaller's interpretation.
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Kant does indeed say that "[i]f someone practices it [beneficent action] often
and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes
actually to love the person he has helped" (MM, 402). But here Kant is
certainly not saying that if a person practices beneficent action often, that
person will develop the disposition to perform beneficent actions merely out
of the love of humanity (and not for the sake of duty at all). Kant is making
the much weaker claim that a person who practices beneficent action
successfully will eventually come to love the person he helps, or, more
generally, will come to love people in general.
Kant does clearly think that coming to love people in general is a good
result. Thus, it seems plausible to suppose that Kant thinks that the love of
others at least could play some important role in virtuous action. I offered an
interpretation of this role above, one according to which feelings of this sort
can serve to weaken or snuff out inclinations to deviate from duty. So
Schaller's inference from the passage in question to the conclusion that Kant
views benevolence (as Schaller characterizes it) as a moral virtue is
unjustified.
Schaller's interpretation strikes me as being particularly forced on this
point. On my interpretation, there is no tension between Kant's account of
moral virtue in general and his account of the particular moral virtues.
Thus, my interpretation is the more plausible one.
2.4 A Comparative Interlude: Kant And Aristotle
2.4.1 Introduction
Much recent work in virtue theory has focused on the relationship
between the views on virtue held by Aristotle and Kant. Indeed, many recent
writers seem to be promoting a sort of rapproachment between these two
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philosophers who are often considered to lie at opposite ends of the
philosophical spectrum (at least with respect to their ethical views). In this
section I will undertake a comparison of the views of Aristotle and Kant on
moral virtue. Along the way I will examine some recent writing on this
topic.
Kant and Aristotle share a common project: the project of providing a
fairly detailed psychological profile of the virtuous person. Each philosopher
attempts to tell us what makes the virtuous person tick - how he thinks,
what motivates him, how he feels, and so on. However, this project occupies
a much more central role in Aristotle's ethical writings than it does in Kant's.
As a result, Aristotle's view is more fully developed than Kant's. Because of
this, 1 think a good way to compare the views of these two philosophers is to
consider the more important elements of Aristotle's view and see if those
elements (or similar elements) can be found in Kant.
2.4.2 Properness And Moral Obligatoriness
As I noted in the previous chapter, at the heart of Aristotle's views on
moral virtue is the notion of properness. On Aristotle's view, each moral
virtue is a disposition, in part, toward proper action. Kant's view has a
related component. On his view, each (primary) moral virtue is a
disposition, in part, toward morally obligatory action (or toward actions that
promote an obligatory end). Thus, both philosophers hold that (at least some
of) the moral virtues are dispositions toward actions of a certain special kind.
Christine Korsgaard notices this point as well: "[Aristotle and Kant]. . .think
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that what gives an action moral value is the fact that it is chosen for its
intrinsic rightness" (Korsgaard 1998, 208).50
However, there are important differences between Aristotle's views on
properness and Kant's views on moral obligatoriness. One difference lies in
how the two concepts are related to happiness, or to the good life (good in the
sense of good for the person who's life it is). On Aristotle's view, proper
actions are crucial constituents of happiness. The best kind of life is one in
which actions of this sort are performed on a regular basis. A life utterly
devoid of proper action is a worthless, miserable life.
On Kant's view, morally obligatory actions are not constituents of a
happy life. Indeed, Kant is painfully aware that the demands of duty often
conflict with what would make one happy. Kant puts the point rather
colorfully in this passage:
The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of
life; it has its own law and also its own court, and even though
one might want to shake both of them together thoroughly, so as
to give them blended, like medicine, to the sick soul, they soon
separate of themselves (CPR, 89).
The disagreement between Kant and Aristotle here might be best
characterized as an axiological one. Kant and Aristotle disagree about the
nature of happiness. Kant reveals his view when he writes that "it is
unavoidable for human nature to wish for and seek happiness, that is,
satisfaction with one's state" (MM, 387). Here Kant identifies happiness with
satisfaction with one's state. Without entering further into the details of this
account, it is plain that this view on the nature of happiness is quite different
from that of Aristotle.
50 The presence of the word ‘intrinsic’ here is a bit puzzling. But the important - and I think
correct -- portion of Korsgaard’s claim here is that both Aristotle and Kant hold that the moral
virtues involve dispositions toward actions of a special kind.
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This axiological disagreement generates a disagreement about the
nature of moral virtue. Aristotle holds that the moral virtues are, in part,
dispositions toward actions which are themselves constituents of happiness.
Kant, by contrast, holds that (at least some of) the moral virtues are, in part,
dispositions toward actions which at best accidentally lead to the happiness of
the agent (and which in many cases not only do not lead to but detract from
the happiness of that agent).
A second important difference between Aristotle's views on properness
and Kant's views on moral obligatoriness relates to the procedure a person
uses to determine which actions have the property in question. Part of Kant's
view is the idea that there is a very specific, straightforward, easily-stated
principle (the Categorical Imperative) that any normal person can use to
determine where his obligation lies in a given situation^ Part of Aristotle's
view is the idea that there is no straightforward, easily-stated principle that
any normal person can use to determine what is proper in a given situation.
Perhaps the greatest evidence for this is the fact that, for all his discussion of
the sort of reasoning the virtuous person carries out, Aristotle never offers
any such principle.
This difference between properness and moral obligatoriness leads to
another disagreement about the nature of moral virtue. On Kant's view, it is
an easy matter to figure out what virtue requires in a given situation -- any
normal person can do it.52 Kant writes:
What is to be done in accordance with the principle of the
autonomy of choice is seen quite easily and without hesitation
51 Of course, just what this procedure is and how straightforward it is is a matter of much debate
- a debate that I thankfully do not need to enter into here
52 | owe this observation to David Solomon.
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by the most common understanding.
. .what duty is, is plain of
itself to everyone (CPR, 36).
On Aristotle's view, by contrast, it is quite often a very difficult matter
to figure out what virtue requires in a given situation. Aristotle writes:
[I]t is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task
to find the middle.
. .it is not easy to determine both how long
and with whom and on what provocation and how long one
should be angry' (NE 1109a20-1109b20).
This is not to suggest that Kant thinks that acquiring the moral virtues
is a relatively easy task whereas Aristotle thinks it is a difficult one. It is quite
clear, I think, that Kant agrees with Aristotle that acquiring the moral virtues
is a difficult task. But the two philosophers disagree as to the source of this
difficulty. Aristotle takes it that a central difficulty, perhaps the central
difficulty, is an epistemological one: it lies in figuring out what virtue
demands in a given situation. Kant thinks that this is no difficulty at all;
indeed, anyone can do it. The difficulty lies in actually bringing oneself to do
what one knows one ought to do — beset as we humans are by constant
inclinations to act contrary to duty. Indeed, at one point Kant suggests that
"[a] good example (exemplary conduct) should not serve as a model but only
as a proof that it is really possible to act in conformity with duty" (MM, 480).
Kant takes it that doing one's duty is so difficult that a proof that it is even
possible is required!
2.4.3 The Choice Component
Christine Korsgaard says that "[Aristotle and Kant] believe that the
moral value of an action is a function of the way in which it is chosen"
(Korsgaard 1998, 203). I think that Korsgaard is right about this but that there
are important differences between the views of the two philosophers here as
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well. Both Aristotle and Kant hold that the virtuous agent selects certain
actions as ones to be performed because those actions have a certain special
property. Both philosophers also hold that the virtuous agent goes through a
certain kind of process in deciding what kinds of actions to perform. The
virtuous agent thinks about what she is doing, and she thinks about it in a
certain way. Of course Aristotle and Kant hold different views concerning the
nature of choice and deliberation in general and hence they also hold
different views concerning the nature of the right kind of deliberation and
choice (the kind the virtuous agent engages in).
According to Aristotle, all practical deliberation has a common starting
point. He writes: "[F]or the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are
things which involve a starting point, viz. 'since the end i.e. what is best, is of
such-and-such a nature/" (NE 1144a31-36). All practical deliberation begins
with a view concerning the nature of the best sort of life a human being can
live. One of the things that distinguishes excellent deliberation (the kind the
virtuous agent engages in) from non-excellent deliberation is the accuracy of
the view concerning the nature of the good life. The virtuous agent begins
her deliberation with a complete and accurate view about the nature of the
good life and her deliberation ends with the selection of a proper action. 5
3
Kant's view concerning deliberation is quite different. On Kant's view,
what (primarily) distinguishes the sort of deliberation the virtuous agent
engages in from other sorts of deliberation is the principle the agent uses to
decide which action to perform. Christine Korsgaard explains this as follows:
According to Kant, our nature presents us with what he calls
'incentives'. . .which prompt or tempt us to act in certain ways
. . .Among these incentives are our ordinary desires and
53 For a more complete discussion of excellence in deliberation and the various ways of
deviating from excellent deliberation, see section 1.1.8 above.
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inclinations. Now the incentives do not operate on us directly
as causes of action. Instead, they are considerations that we takeinto account in deciding what to do. If you decide to act on anincentive, you make it your maxim" to act in the way suggestedby the incentive.
. .Kant suggests that there are two principles of
volition or choice that might govern this decision: morality or
sell-love. If you are operating under the principle of self-loveyour choice is to do.
. .what will satisfy your desires.
. .The personwho acts from duty, by contrast, chooses the action because she
conceives it as one that is required of her (Korsgaard 1998
,
206-
The two principles Korsgaard discusses here are what Kant sometimes
calls "the principle of heteronomy" and "the principle of autonomy" (or the
Categorical Imperative). The former principle is used to determine which of
an agent's alternatives promote the happiness of the agent; the latter principle
is used to determine which of an agent's alternatives are morally right or
morally obligatory. According to Kant, the virtuous agent employs the latter
principle when she deliberates (and not the former).
This important difference between the two views on practical
reasoning might be stated this way: on Aristotle's view, virtuous and non-
virtuous agents are engaged in the same kind of reasoning. What separates
the two sorts of agents is that the former sort of agent carries out this
reasoning well whereas the latter sort of agent carries it out badly. On Kant's
view, by contrast, the virtuous agent engages in reasoning of an entirely
different sort than that engaged in by the non-virtuous agent. The virtuous
agent recognizes the special demands of the moral law upon him and because
of this his reasoning is of a completely different sort from that of the non-
virtuous agent.
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2.4.4 A Point Of Agreement
Having sketched some of the differences between the Aristotelian and
Kantian views about the practical deliberation of the virtuous agent, let us
consider an important similarity between the two accounts, one which
Korsgaard points out. The similarity is that both Aristotle and Kant agree that
a certain familiar sort of person who might superficially appear to be a
virtuous person is not in fact virtuous. The sort of character I have in mind
is described by N.J.H. Dent as follows:
Consider now someone who is moved from time to time by
sympathetic feelings to help this or that person in need, and who
acts upon these feelings. We might, in the light of this, be
inclined to say that he was a kind man.
. .But suppose.
. .that he
never saw anything in relieving the needs of others beyond its
being something to be done if he feels like it, and as something
he may omit to do if he does not feel like it (Dent 1984, 18-19).
Dent imagines a person who often helps others in need out of
sympathy for those others. The person Dent imagines does whatever he feels
like doing; fortunately, he very often feels like helping those in need. But if
he were to stop feeling this way tomorrow - if he were to suddenly lose his
sympathetic feelings — he would no longer be motivated to help others at all.
Furthermore, if he were to undergo this sort of change, he would not be
troubled by the change any more than if his taste in beer changed just as
suddenly.54
There are two claims that might be made about this person which must
be distinguished from each other. The first and weaker claim is that this
person is lacking some moral virtue or other. The claim is not merely that
Dent's description of the person does not imply that the person has all the
54 Dent also draws an analogy between the fellow's taste for beer and his taste for helping
others (see Dent 1984, 18).
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moral virtues, but rather that Dent's description of the person implies that
the person does not have all the moral virtues. The second and stronger
claim is that the person lacks the moral virtue of kindness. Kant and
Aristotle would both endorse both of these claims. I think that the weaker
claim is surely right, but I am not as confident about the stronger claim. So let
us consider the weaker claim.
In Aristotle, the sort of person Dent describes appears as a person who
has what Aristotle calls "natural" virtue but who lacks real virtue. Aristotle
writes:
[A]s practical wisdom is to cleverness - not the same, but like it
-- so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense. For all men
think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in
some sense by nature.
. .but yet we seek something else as that
which is good in the strict sense.
. .For both children and brutes
have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without
reason these are evidently hurtful.
. .as in the part of us which
forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and practical
wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural
virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter
involves practical wisdom (NE 1144M-20).
The person who has merely natural virtue lacks a certain
understanding, a certain reflectiveness, concerning his own actions. More
specifically, he lacks an accurate conception of the good life for humans. The
person Dent describes is like this. He lacks a conception of the good life for
humans according to which helping those in need is an important element in
such a life. A more likely characterization of such a person's views on the
nature of the good life for humans is that such a life consists in doing
whatever one wants to do — and on Aristotle's view, such a view is false and
indicates a lack of virtue.
105
In Kant, the sort of person Dent describes appears as the sympathetic
friend of humanity discussed above who finds "an inner pleasure in
spreading happiness around" but whose actions lack any "genuinely moral
worth". This person is missing some moral virtue or other because he is not
disposed to be motivated by the recognition that what he does is morally
obligatory and thus runs afoul of condition (ii) of both (KV’) and (PMV).
Both Kant's view and Aristotle's view, then, imply that the person
described by Dent lacks moral virtue. And both would agree further that the
reason this person is lacking in moral virtue is that he lacks a certain sort of
understanding concerning his own actions. However, Kant and Aristotle
would disagree concerning the sort of understanding he lacks. Aristotle
would say that he does not see that his actions are constituents in the best
possible sort of life for humans; Kant would say that he does not see that his
actions are required of him by the Categorical Imperative. This lack of
understanding gives rise to non-virtuous motivation: speaking loosely, both
Kant and Aristotle would say that the person Dent describes does what he
should do, but he does it for the wrong reason.
2.5 Criticism Of Kant's Theory Of Moral Virtue
In this section I wish to consider the question of whether the view I
have attributed to Kant is true. Let us consider some objections to the view.
One objection to the view I have ascribed to Kant can be found in this
passage by H.A. Prichard:
An act, to be virtuous, must, as Aristotle saw, be done willingly
or with pleasure; as such it is not done from a sense of obligation
but from some desire which is intrinsically good. . .Thus, in an
act of generosity the motive is the desire to help another arising
from sympathy with that other; in an act which is courageous.
. .
we prevent ourselves from being dominated by a feeling of
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terror, desiring to do so from a
(Prichard 1912, 44).
sense of shame at being terrified
I take it that Prichard’s suggestion here is that actions that are
performed from duty alone are not performed willingly or with pleasure.
Since all v.rtuous actions are performed willingly or with pleasure, it follows
that actions that are performed from duty alone are not virtuous actions.
Consider a person (we can call her Sally) who is very concerned with
doing her duty and hence is disposed to do her duty from the motive of duty
alone. This person lacks any feelings of sympathy, benevolence and the like.
When she helps others she does so only because she recognizes that she
ought to do so; when she faces dangers she does that only because she
recognizes that she ought to do so.
We can use the example of Sally to construct a Prichard-style objection
to Kant's views on moral virtue:
Prichard-Stvle Objection (First Versionl
1. If (PMV) is true, then Sally has some moral virtues.
2. Sally has no moral virtues.
3. Therefore, (PMV) is false.
This objection is hardly threatening. Premise (2) is false. Sally has at
least one moral virtue - this is the virtue of conscientiousness.
Conscientiousness involves doing what one ought to do because one ought to
do so - and Sally is obviously disposed to act in this fashion.
Premise (2) is supported by Prichard's contentions that (i) all virtuous
actions are performed willingly or with pleasure and (ii) no actions
performed from duty alone are done willingly or with pleasure. I think that
both of these claims are dubious. Much depends on what Prichard means by
'willingly' here. One possibility is that he means to use 'willingly' and 'with
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pleasure' interchangeably. If this is the case, both (i) and (ii) are surely false.
Prichard's own description of courageous action seems to throw (i) into doubt;
there is no reason to think that a person who faces danger out of shame at
being terrified is experiencing pleasure of any sort. And (ii) is obviously false;
we can easily imagine that precisely because Sally thinks that doing her duty
is so important she is pleased whenever she does her duty
- particularly in
cases where doing her duty is difficult. So Prichard's reasoning in support (2)
is unconvincing and the existence of the moral virtue of conscientiousness
suggests that the premise is false.
A more refined Prichard-Style objection claims not that Sally has no
moral virtues whatsoever but rather that she lacks certain moral virtues. Let
us focus on one of the virtues alluded to by Prichard in the passage cited
above:
Prichard-Style Objection (Second Version!
1. If (PMV) is true, then Sally has the moral virtue of generosity.
2. It s not the case that Sally has the moral virtue of generositv.
3. Therefore, (PMV) is false.
If the virtue of generosity can be accommodated within the Kantian
framework at all, it is surely as a primary moral virtue. So premise (1) is
plausible.
To avoid the objection, then, the Kantian must attack premise (2).
What is at issue here is whether the moral virtue of generosity includes being
disposed to have certain feelings. The objector might insist that real
generosity requires that the agent feel something for those to whom she gives
-- sympathy, empathy, or compassion, for example.
It seems clear that Sally is missing some moral virtues or other. But
the Kantian can accommodate this claim. The Kantian might suggest that
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there is some secondary moral virtue (or virtues) associated with generosity
and that while Sally has generosity, she is missing these secondary moral
virtues. Thus, the objector must insist not only that Sally is missing some
moral virtues associated with generosity but that she is missing generosity.
My own intuitions here are somewhat underdeveloped. It seems clear
that Sally is missing some moral virtues - she is not as morally virtuous as
she might be - but it is noticeably less clear to me which virtues she is
missing. Thus, the second Prichard-Style objection strikes me as undecisive.
In particular, I am unsure about the truth of premise (2). In fact, Kant's view
implies that Sally is missing certain virtues - she is missing a variety of
secondary moral virtues, such as sympathy and compassion. So Kant's view
accords with our intuitions concerning Sally, at least in this respect.
The intuition at work behind Prichard's objection seems to be that
there is something morally suspect about a person who is always or almost
always motivated to act by the thought of duty alone. An often-cited (or at
least often alluded-to) passage by Bernard Williams goes some way toward
fleshing out this intuition. Discussing an example in which a man can either
save his wife from danger or save a total stranger from the same danger,
Williams says:
But something more ambitious.
. .is usually intended, essentially
involving the idea that moral principle can legitimate his
preference, yielding the conclusion that in situations of this kind
it is at least all right (morally permissible) to save one's wife
. . .But this construction provides the agent with one thought too
many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his
wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be
the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that
in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife
(Williams 1976, 214-215).
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Obviously this passage does not contain a full-blown objection to the
Views on moral virtue that 1 have ascribed to Kant, but i, may contain the
seeds of some such objection (or objections). We can read Williams as
making an implicit comparison between two people each of which faces the
Situation described by Williams. The first of these persons. Bill, save his wife
and is motivated to do so merely by the thought that it is his wife who is in
danger. Let us suppose that Bill doesn't even consider the issue of where his
moral obligations lie in this situation. Jack, by contrast, gives at least some
thought to this issue, since he recognizes that in situations of this sort, it is
morally permissible to save one's wife. He also saves his wife, in part because
it is his wife who is danger, but also in part because saving her in this
situation is morally permissible.
One thing to notice immediately here is that when a person is faced
with two morally permissible alternatives, it is simply impossible that the fact
that one of these alternatives is morally permissible provides one with any
reason to perform that action rather than the other.55 So let us suppose
(perhaps somewhat implausibly) that in the imagined example, it is morally
obligatory to save one's wife, and that it is this thought that, at least in part,
motivates Jack when he acts.
Williams suggests that Jack thinks "one thought too many", and hence
reveals himself to be morally inferior in some way to Bill. Is this correct?
The answer is that it depends on how we flesh out the example. There
are many different ways of fleshing out the example; in some of these ways,
55 Barbara Herman makes this point: “The motive of duty cannot, by itself.
.
prompt merely
permissible actions, for it is, by definition, a matter of moral indifference whether they are
performed” (Herman 1981, 374).
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Jack's conduct is morally suspect and in other ways it is not .56 Suppose for
instance, that while Jack was in fact motivated both by the thoughts that (i) it
is his wife who is in danger, and (ii) rescuing one's wife in this situation is
morally obligatory, (i) would have been sufficient by itself to motivate Jack to
rescue his wife. If this is the case, there seems to be no reason to conclude that
Jack's conduct is morally suspect.
On the other hand, suppose that (i) carries very little weight with Jack;
it offers him only the slightest motivation to rescue his wife. Let us suppose
further that he finds himself motivated to rescue the stranger; the stranger
looks wealthy, and Jack suspects a reward might be in the offing. Let us
suppose that (i) by itself would not be sufficient to motivate Jack to rescue his
wife - (ii) is required as well. Now it is more plausible to claim that there is
something morally suspect about Jack's conduct. Jack reveals a despicable lack
of concern for his wife and a selfish concern for a reward.
How does this bear on Kant's views on moral virtue? I think this
passage by Marcia Baron sheds light on the answer to this question:
[A]ny ethical theory would be seriously flawed if it held that
someone who is so dependent on the motive of duty can still
qualify as perfectly moral. A person S is morally deficient if S is
so motivationally depleted that, for actions to which most of us
would be moved by sympathy, fellow-feeling, or affection for a
particular person (the list is not exhaustive), the only sufficient
motive S has is his belief that morality recommends (or
requires) this act (Baron 1984, 206).
Earlier I discussed the case of Sally, the person who is disposed to do
her duty for the sake of duty alone but who lacks any feelings of benevolence
or sympathy and the like. It might be supposed that Kant's theory of moral
virtue implies that Sally is perfectly virtuous. Although it is far from clear
56 Marcia Baron makes this point; see (Baron 1984).
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Wha ‘ eXaCtly iS reiluired for a Person to be perfectly virtuous, surely one
necessary condition is that the person have all the moral virtues .57 So it
might be supposed that Kant's theory of moral virtue implies that Sally has
all the moral virtues. The passage cited above suggests that Baron would
claim that any theory that implies that Sally has all the moral virtues is false
These considerations suggest the following objection to Kant's theory:
Baron-Style Objection
1. If (PMV) & (SMV) are true, then Sally has all the moral virtuesL Jt s not the case that Sally has all the moral virtues.
3. Therefore, it's not the case that (PMV) & (SMV) are true.
However, premise (1) is plainly false. Part of the story is that Sally lacks
any feelings of benevolence, sympathy, and the like. For this reason, (SMV)
implies that Sally lacks various secondary moral virtues - for instance, those
secondary moral virtues involving feelings of benevolence and sympathy. So
(PMV) & (SMV) do not imply that Sally has ah the moral virtues; indeed,
they imply that she lacks certain moral virtues. The objection fails.
Thus far we have considered objections that accuse Kant of setting a
standard that is too low. A different sort of objection might accuse Kant of
setting a standard that is too high.
In the previous chapter I objected to Aristotle's account of moral virtue
on the grounds that it implies that in order to have any particular moral
virtue a person has to be disposed to take virtuous activity as her ultimate
end. I think that a similar objection can be leveled against Kant's account of
moral virtue.
57 Or at least that there is no virtue that the person lacks and which she could have without
losing some other virtue (perhaps there are some virtues v and v’ such that it is logically impossible
that a person have both v and v’).
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Once again, I would like to ask the reader to consider a person (call her
Lucy) who believes that the well-being of human beings is intrinsically good
- valuable for its own sake. This person is disposed to try to increase the
well-being of those around her in various ways - and, she very often succeeds
m her attempts to improve the lives of other people. She considers the fact
that a given course of action would promote the well-being of others as a
reason for performing that action. Of course this is not to say that she
considers the well-being of others to be more important than anything else m
the world. For instance, she would not commit a heinous crime simply in
order to bring about some small increase in the well-being of a few other
people (even if the crime would not result in a decrease in the well-being of
some other person or persons).
Suppose further that when Lucy performs benevolent actions, she is
not at all motivated by the thought that what she is doing is morally
obligatory (or even by the thought that what she is doing promotes an
obligatory end). Rather, she is motivated simply by the thought that acting as
she does promotes the well-being of others.
Consider the sphere of conduct associated with the Kantian primary
moral virtue of beneficence. It is plausible to suppose that Lucy performs the
very same actions in this sphere that a person with Kantian beneficence
would. The difference between Lucy and the Kantian is what motivates each
of them. The person with Kantian beneficence is sufficiently motivated by
the recognition that what she does promotes an obligatory end; the person I
described above is not so motivated.
Thus, (PMV) implies that Lucy lacks the virtue associated with the
sphere of conduct in question - whether we call it "beneficence" or
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"benevolence." But this is simply false. The person I have described is
morally impeccable in both her behavior and her motivation with respect to
the sphere of conduct in question. Whatever we call the virtue associated
with this sphere, she surely possesses it. Therefore, (PMV) is false.
Is there a revised version of (PMV) that avoids this difficulty? In her
discussion of the value of acting from the motive of duty, Barbara Herman
distinguishes between (the thought of) duty as a primary motive of action and
(the thought of) duty as a limiting motive of action. She describes how (the
thought of) duty can function as a limiting motive in these lines:
(I]n acting from the motive of duty the agent sets himself to
abide by the moral assessment of his proposed actions. Supposeyou have something you want (for whatever reason) to do.
What the motive of duty provides is a commitment to do what
you want only if the maxim of your action is judged morally
satisfactory.
. .The difference introduced by the motive of duty is
that one would not have acted on the original (nonmoral)
motive had the maxim of action it prompted been morally
unsatisfactory (failed the categorical imperative) (Herman 1981
,372 ) *
The last sentence of the quoted passage suggests a revised version of
(PMV). We might conceive of the primary moral virtues as requiring not
that one be disposed to actually be motivated by the thought of duty, but
rather as requiring merely that one is disposed to refrain from doing what is
morally wrong because it is morally wrong (because it violates the
requirements of duty). On this view, the motive of duty functions as a
limiting motive that prevents one from doing that which one recognizes as
morally wrong. Thus, we can revise (PMV) as follows:
114
PMV: x is a (prima^) moral virtue if and only if there is some sphere of
conduct, S, such that x is the disposition to perform morally obligatory actions
in S from some motive or other, such that had it been the case that one's
action were morally wrong, then one would have refrained from performing
that action. 5 ^
In moving from (PMV) to (PMV'), we are allowing that a morally
virtuous person might be disposed to act primarily from motives other than
the motive of duty. So (PMV') does not imply that Lucy lacks the virtue of
beneficence. In describing Lucy, I claimed that she would not perform a
morally wrong action in order to promote the well-being of others. The
Kantian can claim that the explanation of this fact is that in such cases Sally's
recognition that the action violates the requirements of duty would prevent
her from performing that action.
Unfortunately, (PMV') still sets too high a standard - or perhaps it is
more accurate to say that it sets too narrow a standard. For suppose now that
Lucy accepts roughly the Aristotelian account of moral virtue that I described
in the previous chapter. Suppose that whenever Lucy performs benevolent
actions, her ultimate aim is not (as I suggested above) the well-being of others
but rather virtuous activity itself. We may even suppose that Lucy has done
what Anscombe famously said we all ought to do:
[T]he concepts of obligation, and duty -- moral obligation and
mora
l
duty, that is to say — and of what is morally right and
wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought", ought to be jettisoned
if this is psychologically possible (Anscombe 1958, 1).
58 For simplicity I ignore the complication of virtues involving imperfect duties.
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Lucy never thinks of her actions in terms of moral rightness and
wrongness. Rather, she conceives of them as being virtuous or non-virtuous.
And she is devoted to performing the virtuous ones, in virtue of the fact that
she takes virtuous activity as her ultimate end. Focusing on the sphere of
conduct associated with Kantian beneficence, Lucy, as I have just described
her, lacks the virtue associated with this sphere. She does not satisfy the
nght-hand side of (PMV') with respect to this sphere; no matter what
happens, Lucy will not refrain from doing what is morally wrong because it is
morally wrong, she simply doesn't think of actions in such terms. Yet it is
clear that Lucy has the virtue in question - whether it is beneficence or
benevolence. Therefore, (PMV') is false.
\ATiat this shows is that Kant's theory of moral virtue, tied as it is to the
concept of moral duty, is irreparably narrow. Indeed, there is a larger moral to
be drawn here. Kant and Aristotle's accounts of moral virtue go wrong in
similar ways: each is too narrow. Kant and Aristotle each put forward a
specific moral exemplar, and declare that a person like that is morally
virtuous, and no other sort of person is. It seems to me that each describes
one sort of morally virtuous person but fails to recognize that there might be
other, dramatically different kinds. Indeed, the exemplar put forth by each
shows that the exemplar put forth by the other is too constraining. We can
see that Aristotle's account is too narrow because Kant describes a completely
different sort of person who is morally virtuous; we can see that Kant's
account is too narrow because Aristotle describes a completely different sort of
person who is morally virtuous.
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2.6 Conclusion Of This Chapter
In this chapter I have presented an interpretation of Kant’s views on
moral virtue and have defended these views as a correct interpretation of
Kant. I have also tried to point to some important similarities and differences
between Kant's views on moral virtue and those of Aristotle, discussed in the
previous chapter. Finally, I have argued that Kant's views on moral virtue
are false. Furthermore, it has turned out that Kant and Aristotle make a
common mistake: each offers an account of moral virtue that is too narrow.
In the next chapter I will examine several contemporary accounts of
moral virtue. Many of these accounts owe much to those of Kant and
Aristotle. Having examined in some detail the views of Kant and Aristotle,
we are now in a position to examine the contemporary accounts with an
appreciation of the historical roots of those accounts.
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CHAPTER 3
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I take up the examination of what I take to be the most
interesting and/or influential accounts of moral virtue that have been given
by western philosophers in the last thirty-or-so years. I will discuss the views
of G.H. von Wright, Philippa Foot, Judith Thomson, Linda Zagzebski, and
Thomas Hurka. I will examine the views in roughly chronological order,
beginning with G.H. von Wright's book The Varieties of Goodness, and
ending with Thomas Hurka's soon-to-be-published book Virtue and Vice: A
Perfectionist Account.
3.2 G.H. von Wright's Moral Virtuousity Project
3.2.1 The Role Of the Virtues
G.H. von Wright's discussion of virtue, found in his book The
Varieties of Goodness
,
is almost entirely devoted to the Moral Virtuosity
Project. Following Aristotle, von Wright asserts that all moral virtues are
states of character. And, like Aristotle, von Wright thinks that the moral
virtues are closely connected with choice, action, and emotion. But von
Wright's view concerning the natures of these connections is quite different
from that of Aristotle.
We can begin our examination by considering von Wright's comments
on the role of the moral virtues:
The role of a virtue, to put it briefly, is to counteract, eliminate,
rule out the obscuring effects which emotion may have on our
practical judgment. . .[the virtuous person] has learnt to conquer
the obscuring effects of passion upon his judgments of good and
evil, i.e. of the beneficial and the harmful, in situations when he
is acting (von Wright 1963, 147).
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The role of a moral virtue, according to von Wright, is to prevent a
particular sort of difficulty that people often confront. This difficulty arises
with respect to judgments about the values of alternative courses of action.
Tet's call judgments of this sort "value judgments." Value judgments are
typically made when a person is trying to decide what to do - when a person
is engaged in the process Aristotle calls "deliberation."
The difficulty von Wright has in mind occurs when one's emotional
experiences distort or obscure" one's value judgments. Von Wright
elaborates on what it is for an emotional experience to obscure a value
judgment in this passage:
To call the influence 'obscuring' is to say that it induces us to
make wrong choices, i.e. choices which we later have reason to
regret and of which we can subsequently say 'had I surveyed the
situation and its implications clearly, I should have acted
differently' (von Wright 1963, 150).
This passage might lead us to think that the notion of a value
judgment being obscured by an emotional experience is to be analyzed
counterfactually:
OS1: S's emotional experience, e, obscures S's value judgment in situation s
=df. If S had surveyed s clearly, then S would have done otherwise than S
actually did in s.
But this won't do, for, as von Wright immediately points out, "the
mistake we made can, e.g., have been a 'purely intellectual' mistake about the
consequences of our actions" (von Wright 1963, 150). A person might fail to
survey a situation clearly simply because he is careless or in a hurry, not as a
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result of the influence of an emotional experience he is having. Such a
person could satisfy the right side of Ol without it being the case that any of
his value judgments are obscured (as von Wright understands obscurement).
So Ol is unsatisfactory.
What, then, does von Wright have in mind? The phrase 'to obscure' is
sometimes used to mean to block out' -- this is the sense in which the moon
may be obscured by clouds. Perhaps von Wright holds that both value
judgments and emotional experiences may affect the choice a person makes.
To say that an emotional experience obscures a value judgment, then, might
be to say that the emotional experience has more influence (or perhaps is the
only influence) on the person's choice. The emotional experience 'blocks out'
the value judgment as an influence on the choice. This interpretation is
supported by von Wright's claim that an emotional experience sometimes
"'contends' in the choice of the right course of action with our rational insight
into good and evil. It tends to obscure or eclipse our judgment" (von Wright
1963, 147). And a bit later, von Wright adds that "[ajction in accordance with
virtue may thus be said to be the outcome of a contest between 'reason' and
'passion'" (von Wright 1963, 147). Each virtuous action indicates a victory of
reason over passion.
Von Wright's use of the word 'contest' suggests that obscurement
occurs only if there is conflict between a person's value judgment and her
emotional experience -- when the former favors one course of action, and the
latter favors a different course of action. When the two favor the same course
of action, there is no contest, and thus no possibility of the emotional
experience obscuring the value judgment. At any rate, von Wright's
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comments here suggest that obscurement occurs just in case (i) there is a
conflict between passion and reason, and (ii) passion wins out.
But the following passage on fear suggests a different way in which an
emotional experience can obscure a person's value judgments:
[Wjhat then does the brave man's conquest of fear amount to?
Here we have to note the fact that men's conduct, when facing
danger, is often influenced by fear. Fear can paralyse a man so
that he becomes unable to do anything to meet the danger. Or it
makes him run away panic-stricken.
. .He who has conquered
fear has learned not to let fear paralyse him, not to get panic-
stricken, not to lose his head because of fear, but to act coolly
when facing danger (von Wright 1963, 147-148).
When a person runs away panic-stricken, or loses his head as a result
of fear, usually what has happened is not that his fear has won out over his
value judgments. It is not that he has judged that the best thing for him to do
is to stay, but he runs away in spite of this judgment (although this may
sometimes happen). Rather, what has often happened is that the person's
fear has prevented him from making any value judgment at all - the fear
drives him into action before reason even gets a chance to get to work.
Thus, von Wright seems to have in mind at least two ways in which
an emotional experience may obscure a value judgment. First, an emotional
experience may exert more influence over a person's choice than a competing
value judgment. Second, an emotional experience may prevent the person
from forming any value judgments in the first place. What do these two
kinds of cases have in common? The answer is that in both cases, the person
has an emotional experience that prevents her from acting on the basis of her
value judgments.
In an ideal process of deliberation, a person arrives at a judgment about
what the best course of action available to her is, all things considered. Let us
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call this kind of a value judgment an "all things considered judgment." And,
at least sometimes, the person actually performs the course of action she
believes to be the best available. An agent acts on the basis of her value
judgments just in case she performs the course of action she believes to be the
best of those available to her. And for an emotional experience to obscure
one s value judgments is for that emotional experience to prevent one from
acting on the basis of one's value judgments. This gives us the following
account of obscurement:
02 : An emotional experience of S's, e, obscures S's value judgments =df. e
prevents S from performing an action that S judges to be the best course of
action available to S, all things considered.
Still, 02 is not entirely adequate. For there is yet a third way in which
an emotional experience may influence a value judgment.59 Consider a
person who is panicky in a frightening situation. The person tries to figure
out what to do and comes to the conclusion that the best available course of
action in the situation is to flee. It turns out, however, that the best available
course of action in the situation is really to stand and fight — and had the
person been less panicky, he would have recognized this. The person's fear
does not overpower his (correct) judgment about which of his alternatives is
the best one, nor does it prevent him from making such a judgment at all.
Instead, it distorts his judgment about which course of action is best. Such a
person might later truthfully say, "had I surveyed the situation and its
implications clearly, I should have acted differently" (von Wright 1963, 150 ).
59 | owe this point to Fred Feldman.
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His fear prevented him from surveying the situation and its implications
clecnly. This sort of influence seems to be a variety of obscurement — a variety
which is not captured by 02. A final revision should do the trick:
03: An emotional experience of S's, e, obscures S's value judgments =df. e
prevents S from (i) performing an action that S judges to be the best course of
action available to S, all things considered or (ii) recognizing which of S's
alternatives is in fact the best course of action, all things considered.
According to von Wright, the function of the moral virtues is to
prevent a person's emotional experiences from obscuring his value
judgments. Furthermore,
In the case of every specific virtue there is some specific passion
which the man of that virtue has learnt to master. In the case of
courage, for example, the passion is fear in the face of danger. In
the case of temperance it is lust for pleasure (von Wright 1963,
147).
Every moral virtue is associated with some emotion. Possession of the
virtue consists in "mastery" of the associated emotion. If a person has
mastered a given emotion, then his value judgments are never obscured by
emotional experiences of that type. To capture this idea, it may be useful to
think of each moral virtue as a disposition to make value judgments that are
not obscured by emotional experiences of a given type. Thus, von Wright
holds:
123
VW1: x is a moral virtue only if there is some emotion (type) E, such that x is
the disposition to make value judgments that are not obscured by emotional
experiences of type E.
(VW1) does not fully capture von Wright's Moral Virtuousity Project;
it provides only a necessary condition for a thing's being a moral virtue. To
see this, suppose that there is a state of character called "fear immunity." A
person with this state of character is simply incapable of feeling fear.
Therefore, no one with this state of character will ever have his value
judgments obscured by fear. Is fear immunity a moral virtue?
Not according to von Wright. He writes:
The conquest of passion presupposes that one has been
susceptible to its influence - at least to some extent. If this
condition is not fulfilled, one's conduct in the relevant
situations may be exactly similar to the virtuous man's conduct.
Yet one could not be said to possess virtue. . .A man who is
totally insensitive to the temptations of pleasure could not be
temperate, and a man with no amorous passions could not be
chaste. . .Halfwits, who do not grasp danger as normal men do,
can show the most astonishing fearlessness, e.g., in battle. But
there need not be any false resentment behind the hesitation we
naturally feel to call such men brave (von Wright 1963, 149-150).
On von Wright's view, possession of a moral virtue implies that a
person is still capable of experiencing the emotion associated with that virtue.
To accommodate this feature of von Wright's view, we should understand
each virtue as consisting of two parts: a disposition of the sort described
above, and a capacity to experience emotional experiences of a certain type.
Adding this condition to (VW1) gives us this principle:
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VW2: x is a moral virtue only if there is some emotion (type) E, such that x
consists of (i) the disposition to make value judgments that are not obscured
by emotional experiences of type E, and (ii) the capacity to experience
emotional experiences of type E.
3.2.2 The Value Of the Moral Virtues
(VW2) does not yet capture von Wright's view. According to von
Wright, "[vjirtues.
. .are needed in the service of the good of man" (von
Wright 1963, 140). Von Wright holds that there is an important connection
between the moral virtues and quality of the life of a person possessing those
virtues. Von Wright specifies the connection in these lines: "The virtues are
needed, absence of virtue is a bad thing for us. The goodness of the virtues is
that they protect us from harm" (von Wright 1963, 151).
This is a vague claim. Is a moral virtue a state of character such that it
is always bad tor anyone to fail to have the state of character? Does this
include all possible situations? If so, then surely no state of character is a
moral virtue, since, for any purported virtue, one can always imagine a
situation in which possession of it makes its possessor worse off than she
would be otherwise.60 Perhaps von Wright means to limit the relevant cases
to only actual cases. Still, it seems unlikely that there is a putative moral
virtue such that having failing to have it is always in fact bad for the one who
lacks it.
In one place, von Wright compares the virtues with what he calls the
"faculties": "Virtues, like faculties, are needed in the service of the good of
60 Consider an arbitrary state of character, C. Suppose the aliens come down and torture
everyone with C and reward everyone without C. Having C makes those who have it worse off
than they would be otherwise.
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man" (von Wright 1963, 140). The faculties include the five senses as well as
reason. It does seem to be true that in general, a person deprived of a given
faculty is worse off than he would be with that faculty (although of course we
can always imagine situations in which this is not the case). Perhaps von
Wright holds a similar view about the virtues: in general, a person without a
given virtue is worse off than he would be with the virtue.
But there is another feature of von Wright's view that must be taken
into account. He writes:
[J]ust as the contingencies of life can make a man more
dependent upon some of his faculties than upon others, in a
similar manner can contingencies make the acquisition of one
virtue be of the utmost importance to a man and the possession
of another of relatively little value. Sometimes the factors,
which determine the relative utility of the various virtues, have
the character of contingencies in the history of society or of
mankind rather than the life of individual men. In a warlike
society. . .courage is more important for the individual man
than, say, chastity or modesty (von Wright 1963, 140).
Here, von Wright suggests that the since the usefulness of a given state
of character can vary from society to society or from age to age, the importance
of the virtues can similarly vary. But if von Wright allows for this possibility,
he must surely also allow that a given state of character might be typically
useful in one age or society and typically detrimental in another. So, he must
allow that a given state of character might be a virtue in one age or society but
not another. A later passage confirms this interpretation:
Changes in the religious outlook of an age need not affect its
conception of what a virtue is. But they may influence the
estimation of the importance of various features of character to
the good life and therewith also its conception of what is a virtue
(von Wright 1963, 152).
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One way of capturing this "relativistic" feature of von Wright's view is
like this:
VW3: x is a moral virtue relative to society S if and only if (A) there is some
emotion (type) E, such that x consists of (i) the disposition to make value
judgments that are not obscured by emotional experiences of type E, and (ii)
the capacity to experience emotional experiences of type E, and (B) in society S,
it is generally true that a person without x is worse off than he/ she would be
with x.
However, a little reflection reveals that (VW3) cannot be what von
Wright intends. His view is clearly that a virtuous person is one who has the
capacity to experience various emotions but who has mastered each of these
emotions in such a way that his experiencing of these emotions does not
interfere with his practical reasoning. To determine whether a given state of
character is a virtue, we must consider whether this mastery of a given
emotion tends to make those who have it better off than they would be
otherwise (in a given society). That is, this test is to be applied not to the
disposition-capacity combination described above, but rather simply to the
disposition. The following principle captures this idea:
VW4: x is a moral virtue relative to society S if and only if (A) there is some
emotion (type) E, such that x consists of (i) the disposition to make value
judgments that are not obscured by emotional experiences of type E, and (ii)
the capacity to experience emotional experiences of type E, and (B) in society S,
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it is generally true that a person with (ii) but without (i) is worse off than
he/ she would be with both (i) and (ii).
(VW4), then, captures von Wright's theory of the moral virtues.
3.3 Criticism Of G.H. von Wright's Moral Virtuousity Project
3.3.1 Transparency-Fear Immunity
G.H. von Wright's view about the nature of moral virtue is refuted by
the simple observation that mastery of one's emotions is woefully
insufficient for goodness of character. The following example will make this
clear.
Imagine a society in which almost everyone is what Derek Parfit calls
"transparent" -- almost everyone is unable to lie convincingly (Parfit 1987, 18).
The reason most people in this society are transparent is that most of them
have an overwhelming fear of lying. If they even think about lying, they
begin to tremble. They are so afraid that they are unable to even attempt to lie
(and if they do make the attempt, their trembling usually makes it clear that
they are lying). Because almost everyone is transparent, the members of this
society are very trusting.
As a result of this fact, the few members of the society that are not
transparent tend to do much better than the transparent masses. The non-
transparent few take full advantage of the transparency of the many, lying
easily when it suits their interest.
Consider the character trait we might call "transparency-fear
immunity" (tfi). Persons with this character trait have mastered their fear of
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lyingci - their value judgments are never obscured by their fear of lying.
Nevertheless, these people still sometimes experience the fear of lying - but
they have conquered this fear. Furthermore, people in the imagined society
that have tfi tend to be better off than those that lack tfi. This is because
people with tfi are non-transparent and are able to take advantage of those
that are transparent.
(VW4) implies that tfi is a moral virtue in the society I have described,
since tfi satisfies the right side of (VW4). But this is an absurd result; tfi is
obviously not a moral virtue. This example shows that von Wright's account
is too broad — it implies that some obvious non-virtues are virtues.
3.3.2 Benevolence
A more mundane example reveals that von Wright's account is also
too narrow.6 2 It fails to pick out all the actual virtues. Consider the virtue of
benevolence. Is there some emotion that a benevolent person has mastered?
We can easily imagine a person who is simply indifferent toward other
people (as well as the suffering of other people). There is no difficulty in
supposing as well that this person has mastered all of his emotions. His
value judgments are never obscured — but since he simply doesn't care about
other people, he lacks the virtue of benevolence. There is more to
benevolence than mastering some emotion; yet, benevolence is a moral
virtue. This example shows that von Wright's account of moral virtue is too
narrow: it excludes benevolence, a paradigmatic moral virtue.
61 Perhaps it will be objected that fear of lying is not a true type of emotion. But I think we can
simply suppose that the people I describe have mastered their fear in general, and the example
works just as well.
62 Edmund Pincoffs also makes this point; see (Pincoffs 1986, 94). See also (Carr 1984, 49-
53).
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Von Wright's Moral Virtuousity Project fails in two ways: it is both too
narrow (failing to give necessary conditions for a thing's being a moral
virtue), and it is too broad (failing to give sufficient conditions for a thing's
being a moral virtue). Let us turn to Philippa Foot’s view.
3.4 Philippa Foot's Moral Virtuousity Project
Like von Wright, Foot is engaged in the Moral Virtuousity Project.63
In her essay Virtues and Vices,” Philippa Foot endorses what we might call a
"corrective" theory of the virtues. She says that "[virtues] are corrective
,
each
one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or
deficiency of motivation to be made good" (Foot 1978, 8).
On Foot s view which traits are moral virtues depends on certain facts
about human nature:
As things are we often want to run away not only where that is
the right thing to do but also where we should stand firm; and
we want pleasure not only where we should seek pleasure but
also where we should not. If human nature had been different
there would have been no need of a corrective disposition in
either place, as fear and pleasure would have been good guides
to conduct throughout life. . .On this view of the virtues and
vices everything is seen to depend on what human nature is like
(Foot 1978, 9-10).
The idea here is that it is part of human nature to have certain
dispositions. Many of these dispositions are defective in that they are either
(i) dispositions to have a particular sort of motivation to a greater degree than
one ought to, or (ii) dispositions to have a particular sort of motivation to a
lesser degree than one ought to. Let's call the former kind of dispositions
"temptation dispositions," and the latter kind of dispositions "deficiency
dispositions." More formally we can say:
63 indeed, she suggests that the English word ‘virtue’ means the same as ‘moral virtue’: “The
virtues’ to us are the moral virtues” (Foot, 2).
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TEM: x is a temptation disposition toward m if and only if (i) x is the
disposition to have motivations of type m to a greater degree than one ought
to, and (ii) it is part of human nature to have x.
DEF: x is a deficiency disposition toward m if and only if (i) x is the
disposition to have motivations of type m to a lesser degree than one ought
to, and (ii) it is part of human nature to have x.6 4
The disposition toward fear is a temptation disposition because
humans naturally tend to experience fear to a greater degree than they
should. The disposition toward the desire for pleasure is a temptation
disposition because humans naturally tend to desire pleasure to a greater
degree than they should. And the disposition to be attached to the good of
others is a deficiency disposition because humans tend to have such
attachment to a lesser degree than they should.
Virtues are states of character that correct these defects in human
nature. Julia Driver characterizes Foot's view as the view that "[vjirtues are
solutions to design flaws in human beings" (Driver 1996, 112). Some virtues
are dispositions to resist motivations that humans naturally tend toward too
much. For instance, courage is the disposition to resist the influence of fear.
Other virtues are dispositions to "make good" motivations that humans
naturally tend toward too little. The expression "make good" is quite vague.
64 These principles may seem to imply that we are obligated to have certain motivations -- a claim
which some may find objectionable. But I think it will turn out that what Foot has in mind is that it is
part of human nature to be disposed to have motivations of a certain type such that these
motivations move us to do what we ought not do (temptation disposition), and it is part of human
nature not to have motivations of a certain type such that we lack the motivation to do what we
ought to do (deficiency disposition).
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Perhaps what Foot has in mind is that some virtues are dispositions to have
motivations that humans naturally tend toward too little. For instance,
benevolence is the disposition to care about the well-being of others. Here,
then, is Foot's account of the virtues:
PF1: x is a moral virtue if and only if (i) there is some temptation disposition
toward m and x is the disposition toward resisting motivations of type m, or
(n) there is some deficiency disposition toward m and x is the disposition
toward having motivations of type m.
Each moral virtue is associated with either a temptation disposition or
a deficiency disposition. The following chart summarizes Foot's views about
which disposition each virtue is associated with:
^ir.lme Temptation Disposition toward
Courage fear
Temperance desire for pleasure
According to Foot, "industriousness, or temperance, is not a virtue in
some" (Foot 1978, 17). When do these dispositions fail to be virtues? When
they have "a systematic connexion with defective action rather than good
action" (Foot 1978, 17). Presumably Foot means "defective" in some
normative sense. Thus, her view seems to be that virtues are "systematically
Industriousness
Hope
idleness
despair
Benevolence
Justice
Deficiency Disposition toward
attachment to the good of others
concern about others' rights
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connected" with morally right actions.os We should then revise (PF1) like
this:
PF2: x is a moral virtue in some person S if and only if (i) [(a) there is some
temptation disposition toward m and x is a disposition toward resisting
motivations of type m, or (b) there is some deficiency disposition toward m
and x is a disposition toward having motivations of type m], AND (ii) x
typically leads S to perform morally right actions.
Foot's view makes use of a novel idea. To this point, we have assumed
that being a moral virtue is a property that attaches primarily to types of traits
and derivatively to trait tokens. For example, courage (a type of trait) is a
moral virtue, and particular tokens of courage - Bob's courage, Sue's courage,
and so on — are moral virtues because they are tokens of a type of trait
(courage) which is a moral virtue. Foot rejects such a picture. On her view,
being a moral virtue is not a property of types of traits at all, but rather only of
trait tokens. So, it might be the case that Bob's courage is a moral virtue but
Sue's courage is not. And it is simply not the case that courage (a type of trait)
is a moral virtue.
65 This interpretation is supported by Foot’s earlier description of the “design flaws” in humans
that the virtues are needed to correct. For instance, she writes: “we often want to run away not
only where that is the right thing to do but also where we should stand firm; and we want pleasure
not only where we should seek pleasure but also where we should not” (Foot 1978, 9, my
emphasis). The most natural interpretation of these comments has it that this is the moral ‘should’,
which suggests that the design flaws prevent humans from doing what is right: presumably the
correctives (the moral virtues) incline us back toward morally right action.
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We can make this idea clearer if we restate (PF2) as follows:
PF3: x is a moral virtue in some person S if and only if (i) [(a) there is some
temptation disposition (type) toward m and x is a disposition (token) toward
resisting motivations of type m, or (b) there is some deficiency disposition
(type) toward m and x is a disposition (token) toward having motivations of
type m], AND (ii) x typically leads S to perform morally right actions.
In (PF3), x ranges over things like Bob's disposition toward caring
about the well-being of others, and Sue's disposition toward not experiencing
fear.
3.5 Criticism Of Philippa Foot's Moral Virtuousity Project
Imagine a brilliant scientist bent on improving the human race. He
intends to redesign the human race in such a way that all humans will be
perfectly virtuous. The scientist develops a procedure that can be used on
developing human fetuses. The procedure has the result that the fetus will
naturally tend to care about the well-being of others, will tend not to
experience fear, and so on. In short, the procedure yields fetuses that will
grow into adults who lack any temptation dispositions or deficiency
dispositions.
Now imagine that the procedure becomes widely available. Over some
period of time, it comes about that the procedure is routinely used on all
developing human fetuses. As time goes on, and the procedure is more and
more widely used, human nature changes. Eventually there comes a time at
which all living humans were exposed to the procedure as fetuses. Let us
suppose that a further effect of the procedure is that it produces beings who
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will pass on their virtue-endowing genetic material to their offspring. Thus,
after awhile, the procedure becomes unnecessary. All humans are born
naturally completely virtuous — they grow up disposed to care about the well-
being of others just enough, to feel fear when and only when they should,
and so on. It seems that the scientist's dream of redesigning the human race
so that humans are tend to be virtuous has been realized.
But on Foot's view, this is not the case. Ironically, the scientist has
failed by succeeding. Recall that on Foot's view, which traits are moral
virtues depends on facts about human nature. There are moral virtues only
if there is at least one temptation disposition or deficiency disposition. But in
the scenario I have described, there are no temptation dispositions or
deficiency dispositions, because no dispositions of the required sort are part of
human nature. That is, no disposition that satisfies condition (i) of either
(TEM) or (DEF) also satisfies condition (ii) of those principles. At one point.
Foot writes:
Elope is a virtue because despair too is a temptation; it might
have been that no one cried that all was lost except where he
could really see it to be so, and in this case there would have
been no virtue of hope (Foot 1978, 9).
In the imagined situation, it is true that no one cries that all is lost
except where he can really see it to be so. Therefore, in the imagined
situation, hope is not a moral virtue. It is the same for all "virtues." Foot's
view implies that in the situation I have described, not a single person has a
single moral virtue. But this is absurd.
It might be objected that what determines what are temptation
dispositions and deficiency dispositions are human beings' natural
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tendencies. In the case above, the tendencies of humans are unnatural in that
they have been produced by the scientist - the tendencies are manmade.
But we can easily imagine that instead of the imagined completely
virtuous humans arising as a result of the scientist’s efforts, they arose simply
as a result of evolution. That is, imagine a world in which naturally virtuous
humans simply evolved. Foot’s view mistakenly implies that these humans
are not virtuous at all.
Another way of putting the criticism is as follows. Intuitively, it seems
perfectly possible for it to be the case that all humans naturally tend to be
virtuous. But on Foot's view, this is logically impossible, because of the
nature of the moral virtues. A particular human can have a moral virtue
only if humans in general naturally tend toward moral viciousness (or at
least away from virtuousness). And this is simply not the case.
3.6 Judith Thomson's Moral Virtuousity Project
A number of philosophers have declared that the virtues are connected
in some important way with good consequences. Julia Driver writes: "a
moral virtue is a character trait which produces good consequences for
others" (Driver 1996, 113). Linda Zagzebski says that "nothing is a virtue
unless it benefits both the possessor and others in the typical case" (Zagzebski
1996, 100).
There are a number of ways of developing the basic idea here. I will
not explore all the possibilities here. Instead, I will examine one recent way of
developing this basic idea.
Recall von Wright's claim that "[vjirtues, like faculties, are needed in
the service of the good of man" (von Wright 1963, 140). Von Wright's view is
136
that the moral virtues are beneficial or helpful to the individuals who have
those virtues. But a slightly different view is suggested by Peter Geach:
Men need virtues as bees need stings. An individual bee may
perish by stinging, all the same bees need stings; an individual
man may perish by being brave or just, all the same men need
courage and justice (Geach 1977, 17).
Geach s idea is that the virtues are good not necessarily for each
individual who has the virtues but rather for humans in general. This idea
has recently been defended by Judith Thomson. She writes:
What I have in mind is the idea that the fact of there being
people who possess the virtues is good for us. On some views
something stronger is the case, namely, that a person's
possessing a virtue is good for that very person. Perhaps that
stronger idea is correct. Even if not, however, there being people
who possess the virtues is plainly good for the rest of us
(Thomson 1997, 282).
Both Geach and Thomson admit the possibility that possession of the
moral virtues may not be good for the one who possesses them. But each
holds that possession of the moral virtues is good for people in general
even if it is not good for every single person who actually possesses the
virtues. There seem to be a number of ways this idea might be developed. In
what follows, I will examine the idea as it is developed by Judith Thomson.
The first step is to identify what Thomson takes to be the genus of
moral virtue. According to Thomson, every moral virtue is a disposition
(her term is "proneness") toward actions of a certain sort:
I shall take the noun phrase 'being generous' to refer to what all
generous acts have in common, generous people being generous
only derivatively, in the sense that they are prone to performing
generous acts. I shall take the noun 'generosity' to refer to the
character trait that consists in proneness to performing generous
acts. Similarly for 'being kind' and 'kindness', and so on
(Thomson 1997, 281).
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Thomson holds that generosity is the disposition to perform actions
that are generous, kindness is the disposition to perform actions that are kind,
courage is the disposition to perform actions that are courageous, and so on
for each alleged moral virtue. Let us call each disposition to perform actions
of a particular type “dispositional traits".
Thomson holds that every moral virtue is a dispositional trait, but she
denies that every dispositional trait is a moral virtue. Which dispositional
traits are moral virtues? Thomson lays out the criterion in these lines:
[A] trait is a virtue just in case whatever else may be true of the
people among whom we live, it is better for us that they have
the trait than that they not have it (Thomson 1997, 284).
Consider some arbitrary person, S. Consider the people among whom
S lives ~ call the set consisting of these people the set of S's neighbors.
Consider some dispositional trait, T. Call the state of affairs in which all the
members of the set of S's neighbors have T the “total possession of T by S's
neighbors." Call the state of affairs in which none of S's neighbors have T the
“total lack of T by S's neighbors." If T is a moral virtue, then S would be better
off in the total possession of T by S's neighbors than S would be in the total
lack of T by S's neighbors. And if T is a moral virtue, this will be true for any
person S whatsoever. So Thomson's view can be stated like this:
Tl: x is a moral virtue if and only if (i) x is a dispositional trait, and (ii) for any
person S, S would be better off in the total possession of T by S's neighbors
than S would be in the total lack of T by S's neighbors.
Thomson divides the moral virtues into two kinds — the reliance
virtues and the virtues of concern. Both sorts of virtues satisfy (Tl); what
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distinguishes the kinds from each other is the explanation of why a virtue of
that kind satisfies (Tl). Reliance virtues satisfy (Tl) in virtue of their role in
enabling people to form communities. Justice is an example of such a virtue.
Thomson characterizes justice and its connection with communities in this
passage:
[It is a] proneness to doing what one owes to others - whether in
the way of keeping one's word, or refraining from taking
advantage of the weakness or ignorance of others, or carrying
one's fair share of the community's burdens, and so on. . .it is
better for us that the people among whom we live be just than
that they not be just. Indeed, this is not merely better for us, but
essential to us, since we can form a community at all - and
thereby obtain benefits which are essential to us and which only
community can provide — only if a substantial number of those
among whom we live are just (Thomson 1997, 282).
Thomson appeals to the widely-held view that people are better off
when they live in communities than they are when they do not live in
communities. Perhaps the most vociferous defender of this view is Thomas
Hobbes, who declares the life of a person living outside of a community to be
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1651, 85). The state of affairs
in which one's neighbors are just is a state of affairs in which one gets the
benefits that come with belonging to a community; the state of affairs in
which no one is just is a state of affairs in which one lacks these benefits.
Therefore, each person would be better off if all of her neighbors were just
than she would be if none of them were just.
The virtues of concern, on the other hand, are all "pronenesses to
doing what is good for others at a cost, at most, to their possessors" (Thomson
1997, 283). Examples include generosity and kindness. It is precisely because
these dispositions have the feature Thomson specifies that these dispositions
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satisfy the right side of (Tl), and hence it is because they have this feature that
they are moral virtues.
3.7 Criticism Of Judith Thomson's Moral Virtuousity Project
As it stands, (Tl) is a principle about actual persons and those persons'
actual neighbors. But surely there is in fact at least one person who has no
neighbors - who doesn't live among any other people at all. If this is true,
then (Tl) implies that there are no moral virtues. Consider the person with
no neighbors — call him "The Hermit." For any arbitrary dispositional trait T,
the Hermit is exactly as well off in the total possession of T by S's neighbors as
he is in the total lack of T by S's neighbors. In fact, the Hermit is in both of
these states of affairs as things stand. So no trait T will satisfy the right side of
(Tl), and hence (Tl) implies that there are no moral virtues.
This technical glitch can be remedied if we revise (Tl) as follows:
T2: x is a moral virtue if and only if (i) x is a dispositional trait, and (ii) for any
person S, S if S had at least one neighbor, then S would be better off in the
total possession of T by S's neighbors than S would be in the total lack of T by
S's neighbors.
In the case of a person who actually lives among other people, (T2)
simply asks us to compare the state of affairs in which each of that person's
neighbors have a given trait with the state of affairs in which each of that
person's neighbors lacks the trait. In the case of a person who has no
neighbors, (T2) asks us to consider the nearest world in which that person has
at least one neighbor, and then to compare the state of affairs in which that
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person's neighbors all have a given trait to the state of affairs in which that
person's neighbors all lack the trait.
Ironically, the strongest objection to Thomson's view is given by
Thomson herself. Thomson points out that many traits that are traditionally
considered to be moral virtues do not come out as moral virtues on her
account. Courage is an example. Thomson writes:
if the people among whom we live are just, then all is well, it is
better for us that they also be courageous. But if they are unjust,
then it is (much!) better for us that they be cowards (Thomson
1997
,
284 ).
Thus, Thomson's view implies that courage is not a moral virtue.
According to Thomson, her view also implies that industriousness, loyalty,
and conscientiousness all fail to be moral virtues. She further concludes that
these traits are in fact not moral virtues after all, widespread belief to the
contrary notwithstanding.
There is an old saying in philosophy that one man's modus ponens is
another man's modus tollens.66 Thomson notes that her view implies that
courage, industriousness, loyalty, and conscientiousness are not moral
virtues and concludes that these traits are in fact not moral virtues. I think
that a more reasonable conclusion is that her view is false.
If we are interested in providing an account of the common-sense
notion of moral virtue, then we must operate within certain constraints. One
of these constraints is that we give much credence to the pre-theoretical
notion that certain traits are moral virtues. Any account which implies that a
number of these traits are not moral virtues after all is in serious trouble. Of
course, it is always open to a philosopher to simply stipulate a new sense of
66 Of course man’ here means person’.
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the word 'virtue/ or the expression 'moral virtue'. But this goes no way
toward explicating the concepts more commonly expressed by these terms.
The fact that Thomson's view excludes so many traits that pre-theoretically
are taken to be moral virtues counts heavily against her view. If we are
looking for an account of the ordinary notion of moral virtue, we must look
elsewhere.
A good place to look is in Linda Zagzebski's recent book Virtues of the
Mind. It is to this work that we turn next.
3.8 Linda Zagzebski's Virtuousity Project
3.8.1 Introduction
Linda Zagzebski takes up the Virtuousity Project in her recent book
Virtues of the Mind. Zagzebski's primary goal in that book is to present and
defend what might be called a "virtue-based epistemology." But a sizable
portion of the book is devoted to a discussion of virtue.67 Although
Zagzebski gives an account of virtue simpliciter (as opposed to moral virtue),
it is clear that while she is developing that account, she has primarily those
traits that are traditionally taken to be moral virtues in mind.
Furthermore, Zagzebski's account of virtue would, if correct, shed a
tremendous amount of light on the Moral Virtuousity Project. This is
because Zagzebski thinks that all the virtues are traits of the same
fundamental kind.68 One of her main goals is to show that the traditional
distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is misguided; according to
Zagzebski, the "intellectual virtues are best viewed as forms of moral virtue"
(Zagzebski 1996, 139). Thus, while Zagzebski is not strictly speaking writing
67 Part II of the book, “A theory of virtue and vice,” is nearly two hundred pages long.
68 with the notable exception of phronesis
,
which Zagzebski treats separately.
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on precisely the topic that this dissertation is concerned with, Zagzebski's
view is directly relevant to that topic. Moreover, her view is novel and
interesting. It is for these reasons that I include a discussion of Zagzebski's
view here.
One of the virtues of Zagzebski's book is its clarity. After developing
her account of moral virtue, she summarizes the account as follows:
A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired
excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to
produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing
about that end (Zagzebski 1996, 137).
This account contains several distinct components. I will examine
these various components in turn. My method will be as follows. First, I will
attempt to state clearly each individual component. When this project is
complete, we should have a clear formulation of Zagzebski's Virtuosity7
Project. Then I will turn to criticism of the resulting formulation. I will
argue that certain components of Zagzebski's account are problematic. As it
turns out, many of these components can simply be dropped from the
account, leaving behind what can be described as an account of the structure
of the virtues. I will argue that even this latter account is subject to difficulty.
3.8.2 A Deep And Enduring Acquired Excellence
According to Zagzebski, "[t]he central idea that virtue is an excellence
has never been seriously questioned" (Zagzebski 1996, 85). Moreover, "the
concept of excellence is clearer than is the concept of virtue" (Zagzebski 1996,
84). I am unsure of this second claim. I confess to lacking a clear idea of the
concept of excellence. Perhaps the idea is that virtues are admirable states of
character. If this is the idea, then it is surely right.
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At any rate, part of Zagzebski's view is that every virtue is an excellence
(whatever exactly this comes to). Another component of the view is the
claim that "virtue.
. .is a property that we attribute to the person in a deep and
important sense. We think of a person's virtues as closely associated with her
very identity" (Zagzebski 1996, 85). Again, it is not clear exactly what this
comes to. In part, it seems to be the Aristotelian idea that virtues are "settled"
states they are character traits that are not easily dislodged. A person cannot
have the virtue of courage only for one day (under normal circumstances); if
a coward acts courageously for a single day and then returns to his cowardly
ways for the remainder of his life, we would not say that he had the virtue of
courage for a day. Rather, we would say that he acted out of character for a
day.
A clearer (and, as we shall see, more controversial) component of
Zagzebski's view is the claim that the virtues are all acquired. This claim is
straightforward: a trait is acquired just in case a person has the trait and there
is some earlier time at which the person existed and lacked that trait.
We need to distinguish two claims here. First is the claim that under
the normal circumstances of human life, humans must acquire any virtues
that they possess. A stronger claim is that it is part of the very concept of
virtuosity that virtues are acquired traits — that necessarily, x is a virtue only
if x is an acquired trait. By asserting that it is part of the definition of 'virtue'
that virtues are acquired, Zagzebski endorses the latter stronger claim.
One might wonder at the motivation behind such a view. Zagzebski
holds this view because she thinks that "[vjirtues are qualities that deserve
praise for their presence and blame for their absence" (Zagzebski 1996, 104).
Thus, virtues are traits that a person is responsible for having and "[bjeing
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acquired is not sufficient for being a quality for which we are responsible, but
it is certainly necessary" (Zagzebski 1996, 103). Zagzebski's motivation for
holding that (necessarily) virtues are acquired traits is captured by the
following argument:
1. S s trait x is a virtue only if S is praiseworthy for having x.
2. S is praiseworthy for having x only if S is responsible for having x.
3. S is responsible for having x only if S acquired x.
4. Therefore, S s trait x is a virtue only if S acquired x.69
The initial motivation for this view is that virtues are traits that are
praiseworthy. Thus, we should include this in our final formulation of
Zagzebski's view.
3.8.3 Motivation To Produce a Certain Desired End
Zagzebski defines 'motive' as “an emotion or feeling that initiates and
directs action towards an end" (Zagzebski 1996, 131). She adds that “[w]e
generally speak of a motive as an occurrence used to explain a particular act"
(Zagzebski 1996, 132). Zagzebski understands motives as particulars that
initiate, direct, and (at least sometimes) explain actions. An example of a
motive is someone's feeling of thirst on a particular occasion. An example
more relevant to the discussion of the virtues might be someone's feeling of
compassion on a particular occasion. This feeling might initiate an action -
e.g. giving a cold person a coat. We can define 'motive' like this:
Dl. x is a motive =df. x is a particular emotion or feeling that initiates and
directs action toward some end.
69 Notice that this argument concerns not trait types but rather trait tokens. It will turn out that
Zagzebski is committed to the Footian (Footish? Footy?) view that being a moral virtue is a
property not of trait types but rather of trait tokens.
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Zagzebski uses her definition of 'motive' to define 'motivation'. She
says that a motivation is "a persistent tendency to be moved by a motive of a
certain kind" (Zagzebski 1996, 132). This gives us:
D2. x is a motivation =df. there is some kind of motive, K, such that x is the
persistent disposition to perform actions out of motives of kind K.
How are motives divided into kinds? Zagzebski addresses that
question in these lines:
A courageous person is motivated out of emotions characteristic
of the virtue of courage to face danger when something of
importance is at stake. The courage.
. .includes.
. .the aim to
protect something of value.
. .A fair person is motivated out of
emotions that make him want to see others treated equitably,
and this leads him to want to produce a state of affairs in which
the relations among people have this characteristic.
. .an open-
minded person is motivated out of delight in discovering new
truths (Zagzebski 1996, 131).
Every virtue involves a disposition to try to bring about a particular
end. The end associated with courage is the protection of things of value, and
the end associated with fairness is the equitable treatment of persons. A
courageous person tries to protect valuable things; a fair person tries to bring
it about that persons are treated equitably.
It is important to notice, however, that being disposed to try to bring
about the end associated with some virtue is not sufficient for having that
virtue. Recall the example from the Introduction involving Archie, the
person who is under the delusion that he is constantly being watched by a
Moral Observer. It is plausible to suppose that Archie is disposed to be
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motivated to protect valuable things (the end associated with courage). More
specifically, he is disposed to experience the following sort of motivations:
being afraid that the Moral Observer will torture him if he does not protect
valuable things. He is disposed to try to bring about the end associated with
courage - but the motives he experiences that aim at this end are all feelings
of fear. But Archie is not courageous; ironically, his cowardice drives him to
try to protect things of value.
Zagzebski s view handles this case nicely. On her view, each virtue is
associated not only with some end, but also with some type of emotion. Each
virtue is (in part) the disposition to have motives that both aim at the
relevant end, and which are instances of the appropriate emotion. For
instance, in the passage cited above, Zagzebski suggests that the emotion
associated with open-mindedness is delight. While Archie is disposed to
pursue the ends associated with various virtues, he is not disposed to pursue
them out of proper motives. Thus, for all I have said about Archie, it is
consistent with Zagzebski' s view that Archie has no moral virtues.
Motives, then, may be classified on the basis of two variables: the ends
at which they aim, and their emotional types. Appealing to this taxonomy of
motives, we can revise our earlier definition of 'motivation' to this:
D2'. x is a motivation =df. there is some end, E, and some type of emotion, T,
such that x is the persistent disposition to perform actions out of motives of
type T that aim at E.
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3.8.4 Reliable Success In Bringing About That End
On Zagzebski's view, having the relevant motivation is not sufficient
for having a particular virtue. Zagzebski declares that "[v]irtue possession
requires reliable success in attaining the ends of the motivational
component" (Zagzebski 1996, 134). She elaborates on this point a bit later:
"Virtue" is a success term.
. .A person does not have a virtue
unless she is reliable at bringing about the end that is the aim of
the motivational component of virtue.
. .a fair person acts in a
way that successfully produces a state of affairs that has the
features fair persons desire. A kind, compassionate, generous,
courageous, or just person aims at making the world a certain
way, and reliable success in making it that way is a condition for
having the virtue in question (Zagzebski 1996, 136, my
emphasis).
Gregory Trianosky briefly discusses an example involving a well-
intentioned bumbler, "whose persistent efforts to help nearly always make
things worse" (Trianosky 1987, 130). Let us flesh out the example a bit.
Zagzebski has this to say about benevolence:
the virtue of benevolence involves the tendency to be moved by
benevolent motives, which is to say, it involves a disposition to
have characteristic emotions that direct action in a particular
direction, probably the well-being of others. A benevolent
motivation is, therefore, a disposition to have a benevolent
motive (Zagzebski 1996, 132-133).
Imagine a person who is disposed to be motivated to bring about the
well-being of others. Such a person has the disposition involved in the
moral virtue of benevolence. But suppose further that the person is a
bumbler — his benevolent motives almost invariably have disastrous
consequences. He often tries to help others, but he rarely succeeds.
Trianosky's verdict on the well-intentioned bumbler is that "[h]is
defects. . .neutralize his virtues" (Trianosky 1987, 130). Trianosky would say
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of the person described above that he does indeed possess the virtue of
benevolence, but the bumbler's benevolence is "neutralized". Zagzebski, on
the other hand, would say that since the bumbler is not reliably successful in
bringing about the end associated with benevolence, he is not benevolent at
all. He lacks this virtue altogether.
Let us introduce the concept of a reliably successful disposition-.
D3. x is a reliably successful motivation =df. (i) there is some end, E, and
some type of emotion, T, such that x is the persistent disposition to perform
actions out of motives of type T that aim at E, and (ii) x reliably leads to
actions that actually bring about E.
Before we can formulate Zagzebski's account of virtue, there is a certain
complication that must be addressed. The complication arises from the fact
that Zagzebski includes as components of virtue properties that seem to be
accidental, as opposed to essential, features of dispositions (disposition types,
that is). I have in mind here (i) the property of being acquired and (ii) the
property of reliably leading to actions of a particular kind. Intuitively, it is
logically possible that person A has a given disposition type D and person B
has D as well, but A acquired D whereas B has had D as long as B has existed.
Similarly, it is possible that A and B both have D and in A, D leads to actions
of a particular kind whereas in B, D does not lead to actions of that kind.
If this is correct, then we must understand Zagzebski's account of
virtue as applying not to disposition types but rather to disposition tokens.70
70 At one point, Zagzebski seems to realize this. Discussing the intellectual virtues, she says:
“an agent does not possess an intellectual virtue unless the trait as possessed by him is truth
conducive in the long run” (Zagzebski 1996, 186).
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To accommodate this move we can revise D3 as follows:
D3\ x is a reliably successful motivation for S =df. (i) there is some end, E, and
some type of emotion, T, such that x is S's persistent disposition to perform
actions out of motives of type T that aim at E, and (ii) x reliably leads S to
perform actions that actually bring about E.
We are now in a position to state a principle that captures Zagzebski's
Virtuousity Project:
ZV: S's (token) character trait x is a virtue if and only if (i) x is a deep and
enduring acquired excellence of S for which S is praiseworthy and (ii) x is a
reliably successful motivation for S.
3.8.5 Virtue And Responsibility
Earlier I attributed the following bit of reasoning to Zagzebski:
1. S's trait x is a virtue only if S is praiseworthy for having x.
2. S is praiseworthy for having x only if S is responsible for having x.
3. S is responsible for having x only if S acquired x.
4. Therefore, S's trait x is a virtue only if S acquired x.
Suppose we have two intrinsically identical persons. The first person
has many virtues — he is courageous, honest, benevolent, and so on. Suppose
that he acquired these virtues gradually over time, and that he is at least
partially responsible for having each virtue. The second person, on the other
hand, was produced "as is" in a futuristic person-producing factory.
On Zagzebski's view, we must conclude while the first person has
some actual virtues, the second person has some states of character that are
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intrinsically identical to the first person's states of character, except that the
second person s states of character are not virtues. This is surely an odd view;
it seems much more natural to say that both persons are virtuous.
I think that Zagzebski's view has an even more unwelcome
consequence. We have seen that because Zagzebski holds (1), she also holds
that a given trait is a virtue in a person only if the person is (at least partially)
responsible for having that trait. This requirement leads her to the following
conclusion:
At some time in a person's development there must be a
realistic possibility that she will develop a certain vice rather
than the associated virtue.
. .it is compatible with the nature of
the person that she develop in the way that leads to vice rather
than the way that leads to virtue. This means that both virtues
are vices are compatible with human nature, and, indeed, with
the nature of any particular human being (Zagzebski 1996, 105).
Many philosophers used to think (and some still do think) that a
person is morally responsible for an action of his only if he could have
performed some other action instead. 171 Zagzebski's view leads her to invoke
a similar principle about states of character: a person is responsible for having
a given state of character only if he could have had some other state of
character instead. Together with (1) and (2), this principle implies that a
person's state of character is a virtue only if that person could have had some
other state of character instead.72
It is plausible to suppose that one of the goals of the moral education or
moral training of children is the production of virtuous adults. If this is
71 This principle was famously criticized by Harry Frankfurt in his “Alternate Possibilities and
Moral Responsibility”.
72 States of character typically take a long time to develop. Thus, the principle should be
understand is: Some person, S’s, state of character, x, is a virtue only if there is some time, t,
such that it is true at t that S can develop some distinct state of character, x’, instead of x.
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right, then one of the measures of the effectiveness of a given kind of moral
education is the likelihood of that kind producing virtuous adults. The
higher this likelihood is, the better the kind of education is (everything else
being equal ~ there may be other goals of moral education). Thus, the best
kind of moral education (again, everything being equal) is one which is
virtue-guaranteeing - it always produces virtuous adults - there is n o chance
that it will produce a non-virtuous adult.
Suppose we are trying to perfect a particular kind of moral education.
As time passes, the approach gets closer and closer to be a virtue-guaranteeing
approach. Suppose it finally becomes virtue-guaranteeing. On Zagzebski's
view, the bizarre conclusion that follows is that as soon as the approach
(apparently) becomes virtue-guaranteeing, it becomes an approach that can
never produce any virtuous adults. This is because once the approach
becomes virtue-guaranteeing, there is no longer a realistic possibility that a
person subjected to this process will fail to develop the states of character the
process aims at developing.73 And once this happens, Zagzebski's view
implies that the states of character produced by the process are not virtues.
This result is surely not correct. Being virtuous is a matter of being a
certain kind of person, and the best kind of moral education is one that
cannot fail to produce persons of this sort. Are we seriously to believe that
moral education can produce virtuous persons only if that education could
fail to produce only virtuous persons?
73 it might be objected that at some time before each student’s moral education begins, there is
a time at which there is a realistic possibility that the person might fail to develop the various virtues
-- namely, by failing to begin the process of moral education. But this loophole is easily closed by
simply stipulating that the moral education in question is mandatory - and that this policy is strictly
enforced. There is no realistic chance that a given person, let us suppose, can fail to undergo the
process of moral education. This added stipulation closes the aforementioned loophole, and
does not, as far as I can see, in any way detract from the virtuousness of the resulting adults.
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Neither of these objections is decisive. I can imagine someone
responding, not implausibly, that one of the two intrinsically identical
persons discussed above has actual virtues whereas the other merely has
traits that are intrinsically just like actual virtues, but which are not
themselves virtues. Similarly, it could be replied that the foolproof moral
education I imagine could produce at best persons who are "just like"
virtuous persons in some sense but who are not themselves virtuous — who
lack real virtue.
I have no knock-down reason for thinking that such a view is false. It
simply seems to me that it is more natural simply to say that the intrinsically
identical persons are both virtuous and that the perfect moral education I
describe above is guaranteed to produce virtuous persons.
Even if my objections here are good, these objections are not
devastating with respect to Zagzebski's Moral Virtuousity Project. For we can
simply drop the problematic clause and revise Zagzebski's view as follows:
ZV': S's character trait x is a virtue if and only if (i) x is a deep and enduring
excellence of S and (ii) x is a reliably successful motivation for S.
3.8.6 The Case Of Virtus
I wish to turn now to criticism of the reliable success component of
Zagzebski's account. Like Descartes, I shall make use of an evil demon.
Consider the case of Virtus, an extremely virtuous person. Virtus is
courageous, benevolent, honest, fair, generous, kind, and so on. He has all
the virtues you may care to name. Virtus is greatly admired by (almost) all
who know him, and he is responsible for many great and virtuous deeds.
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Through his virtue, Virtus improves both the world and the lives of those
around him.
Enter Vice - the Evil Demon. Vice does not admire Virtus at all. In
fact, Vice downright despises Virtus. Vice is a demon with quite remarkable
powers. One day. Vice decides to put a stop to Virtus' good deeds. He decides
not to confront Virtus directly, but rather to undermine Virtus in a more
insidious fashion.
Erom that day forward, whenever Virtus sets about to perform some
virtuous deed. Vice interferes in some subtle and undetectable fashion to
make things go awry. As a result of Vice's interference, Virtus' attempts to
achieve some worthwhile end never seem to succeed. In fact, these attempts
often have the opposite result from the one Virtus intended. When it comes
to bringing about the ends associated with the moral virtues, Virtus is not
only not reliably successful, he is never successful - he always fails. Through
his interference. Vice has made Virtus into a well-intentioned bumbler.
What does Zagzebski s account imply about this case? The answer is
clear: on Zagzebski's view. Vice has, through his interference, turned Virtus
from a virtuous person into a person without a single virtue. Since Virtus is
no longer reliably successful in bringing about any of the ends associated with
virtue, he has no reliably successful motivations (at least, none that are
involved in virtue). Therefore, (ZV') implies that Virtus does not have any
virtues.
It is clear, I think, that this is a mistake. After all, Virtus has not
undergone any change in his character. But if this is true, then it is hard to
see how he could have changed from a rather virtuous person into a
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completely un-virtuous one. The moral of the story is that reliable success
simply is not a component of virtue.
Zagzebski might reply to this sort of objection by pointing out that the
circumstances in the story I just told are extraordinary ones. She might go on
to suggest that the reliable success condition ought to be understood such that
the virtues are reliably successful under ordinary circumstances
7
4 My
response is that this sort of reply seems plausible to me. But it will turn out, I
think, that there are deeper problems with Zagzebski's view - problems that
are independent of the reliable success component of her view. For this
reason, I propose that we drop the reliable success component of her view for
the purposes of examination of what we might characterize as the
psychological component of her view. Nothing I say in what follows depends
on whether we include the reliable success component of Zagzebski's view; I
will drop that component for simplicity.
3.8.7 Zagzebski's Structural Account Of the Virtues
If we drop the reliable success component of Zagzebski's view, what
remains is a a view about the structure of virtue — that is, a view that specifies
what kinds of traits the virtues are, psychologically speaking. That view can
be formulated as follows:
ZV": x is a virtue if and only if (i) x is a deep and enduring excellence and (ii)
x is a motivation.
On this view, each virtue is deep and enduring excellent disposition to
pursue a certain end out of motives of a certain emotional type. Notice that
74 Fred Feldman suggested this sort of response.
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this view can be taken as applying to disposition types rather than disposition
tokens.
Unfortunately, (ZV") has problems as well. Let's suppose with
Zagzebski that fair persons try to bring about states of affairs in which people
are treated equitably (Zagzebski 1996, 131). I can imagine two different kinds
of people, both of whom have the virtue of fairness.
The first of these two fair persons, Ed, gets very angry when he believes
that others are not being treated equitably. Ed feels a sort of moral outrage
which drives him to try to rectify the unfair treatment. He is disposed to be
motivated by anger to bring about the equitable treatment of others.
The second fair person, Fred, does not respond with anger to the
perceived inequitable treatment of others. Instead, he feels sympathy for
those that are being treated unfairly. Like Ed, Fred is driven to try to rectify
the unfair treatment of others, but he is driven to do so not by anger but by
sympathy. He is disposed to be motivated by sympathy to bring about the
equitable treatment of others.
According to (D2'), Ed and Fred have distinct motivations. This is
because (D2') implies that if one motivation involves an emotion of some
type Tl, and another motivation involves an emotion of some distinct type
T2, then the two motivations themselves are distinct. Since (ZV") implies
that each virtue is associated with just one motivation, on Zagzebski' s view,
fairness must be identified with either the motivation that Ed has or with the
motivation that Fred has (or with some third motivation). Therefore, (ZV")
implies that it is not the case that Fred and Ed are both fair. Yet it is clear that
both are in fact fair.
156
One way to avoid this problem would be to hold that what is essential
to a virtue is that it involves being disposed to pursue a certain end. Earlier 1
noted that Zagzebski adopts a taxonomy of motives according to which a
given motive is identified and distinguished from other motives by two
factors: the end the motive is directed toward, and the emotional type of the
motive. Now I am suggesting that we adopt a more rough-grained taxonomy
of motives according to which a given motive is identified and distinguished
from other motives by a single factor: the end the motive is directed toward.
To accommodate this idea, we can revise the definition of 'motivation' as
follows:
D2". x is a motivation =df. there is some end, E, such that x is the persistent
disposition to perform actions with the aim of bringing about E.
On this revised view Ed and Fred are both fair since each is disposed to
perform actions with the aim of bringing about the equitable treatment of
others. Each is disposed to be moved by motives of the same type, and hence
the two share a common disposition — fairness.
The problem with this revised view is that it implies that Archie, our
old friend from the Introduction, has a wide range of virtues. Archie is
motivated by his fear of the Moral Observer to pursue the equitable treatment
of others, so he has the virtue of fairness; he is motivated by his fear of the
Moral Observer to pursue the well-being of others, so he has the virtue of
benevolence, and so on.
Perhaps it will be objected that Archie's dispositions are not deep and
enduring since they are contingent on his belief in the Moral Observer. But
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this objection is easily avoided by supposing that Archie's belief in and fear of
the Moral Observer are deeply rooted in his character - neither can be easily
dislodged.
Perhaps it will be objected that Archie's motivations are not
excellences. But this objection is untenable. Given our new taxonomy of
motivations, Archie has the very same motivations that an actually virtuous
person has. It is true that Archie lacks many excellences that the virtuous
person has, but since he has the same motivations as the virtuous person, the
difference in excellence between the two must lie not in the motivations
themselves but elsewhere.
There is yet another change that could be made to avoid this problem.
There is a familiar distinction between pursuing a thing for its own sake and
pursuing it for the sake of something else. Archie does not pursue the well-
being of others for its own sake; rather, he pursues it out of fear of the Moral
Observer. It might be held that this is what distinguishes Archie from a
virtuous person. The virtuous person pursues the well-being of others not
out of some ulterior motive but rather for its own sake. We can capture this
idea by making a further revision to our definition of 'motivation':
D2". x is a motivation =df. there is some end, E, such that x is the persistent
disposition to perform actions with the aim of bringing about E for its own
sake.75
But by abandoning any reference to emotions whatsoever we have left
out an important component of virtue. Aristotle was surely right to think
75 At this point we have clearly abandoned any ordinary concept of motivation. But this is no
problem. (D2”’) is purely stipulative; ‘motivation’ functions as a technical term in this context.
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that virtue involves not merely proper action but also proper emotional
responses. To see this we need only compare a truly virtuous person with a
person who shares the virtuous person's ends, and pursues these ends for
their own sakes, but does so coldly and emotionlessly — a purely rational end-
seeker whose ends happen to be those of a virtuous person. It is no objection
to claim that we have never run across such a person or that such a person
would be mentally defective in some way. It is clear that the existence of a
person like this is possible, even if there never has been and never will be
such a one. And it is equally clear that such a person lacks a wide range of
virtues — compassion, sympathy, hope, and the like.
There is a further difficulty here. In Chapter One, we saw that Aristotle
seemed to endorse this claim: there is some end E, such that for any virtue V,
if a person S has V, then S is disposed to pursue E for its own sake. Aristotle
identified the end in question as virtuous activity. The revised version of
Zagzebski's view can be understood as switching the order of the quantifiers
in Aristotle's view. That is, the revised view holds that for any virtue V,
there is some end E, such that if a person S has V, then S is disposed to pursue
E for its own sake. I argued in Chapter One that the Aristotelian view is false:
what about the Zagzebskian principle?
Consider courage. On the revised version of Zagzebski's view under
consideration, there is some end such that courage involves being disposed to
pursue that end for its own sake. But it is doubtful that there is any such end.
According to Zagzebski, the end associated with courage is "to protect
something of value" (Zagzebski 1996, 131).
It seems clear that a person might have the virtue of courage without
being disposed to be motivated to pursue this end -- the protection of valuable
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things — for its own sake. For example, we might imagine a religious person
who believes that God wants him to live by a certain set of rules. Very often,
adhering to these rules requires facing danger. We may even suppose that
the rules often require him to protect valuable things, so he will be disposed
to protect valuable things. The person I have in mind succeeds in following
the rules he believes God wants him to follow — even when doing so requires
him to face danger. The person experiences fear but overcomes that fear. But
when this person faces danger, the end he pursues for its own sake is the
fulfillment of God's will — not the protection of valuable things. To the
extent that he pursues the protection of valuable things, he pursues it merely
as a means to the fulfillment of God's will.
The revised version of Zagzebski's view under consideration implies
that this person does not have the virtue of courage since he does not have
the disposition to pursue the protection of valuable things for its own sake.
But this is a mistake. The person I have described is clearly courageous.
Perhaps we have merely failed correctly to identify the end associated
with courage. But this is doubtful. It seems unlikely that there is an
particular end such that all courageous persons are disposed to pursue that
end for its own sake. Different courageous persons might be disposed to
pursue completely different ends.
It seems to me, therefore, that even assuming (D2"), (ZV") is false. I
don't think that Zagzebski has offered a successful account of the structure of
the moral virtues.
3.8.8 Conclusion
I have argued that Zagzebski's account of virtue is false. I have also
argued that various revised versions of that account are false as well. But this
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does not mean there is nothing of value in Zagzebski's account. On the
contrary, I think she has identified the basic pattern exhibited by certain moral
virtues. I have in mind virtues like benevolence and fairness. It seems
correct that these virtues essentially involved being disposed to pursue
certain states of affairs. In the next section I wish to consider a view that, like
Zagzebski's view, takes this idea as its starting point, but which takes off from
there in a novel and exciting direction.
3.9 Thomas Hurka's Moral Virtuousity Project
3.9.1 Introduction
One of the most interesting contemporary discussions of the virtues is
contained in Thomas Hurka's book Virtue and Vice. A Perfectionist Account.
Unlike many of the authors whose works we have examined so far, Hurka's
work wears its central project on its sleeve: "My aim in this book is to give an
account of the intrinsic goodness of moral virtue and the intrinsic evil of
moral vice" (Hurka, 1, 1)76 It is clear from this passage that Hurka is
concerned exclusively with moral virtue and moral vice. Although his stated
aim is to provide an account of the intrinsic goodness of moral virtue (and
the intrinsic evil of moral vice), he also tries to provide an account of the
nature of moral virtue in general (and moral vice as well). In short, Hurka is
working on the Moral Virtuousity Project.
The core of Hurka's account of moral virtue consists of five principles:
(BG) Pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are intrinsically good (Hurka, 1,
10 ).
76 in references to Hurka’s book the first number indicates the chapter and the second number
indicates the page number of that chapter.
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(BE) Pain, false belief, and failure in the pursuit of achievement are
intrinsically evil (Hurka, 1, 17).
(LG) If x is intrinsically good, loving x (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure
in x) for itself is also intrinsically good (Hurka, 1, 14).
(HE) If x is intrinsically evil, hating x (desiring or pursuing x's not obtaining,
or being pained by x's obtaining) for itself is intrinsically good (Hurka, 1, 18).
(DV) The moral virtues are those attitudes to goods and evils that are
intrinsically good, and the moral vices are those attitudes to goods and evils
that are intrinsically evil (Hurka, 1, 23).
(BG) and (BE) are "base-clauses" — they assert that certain things are
intrinsically good and intrinsically evil. Hurka points out that the particular
claims made by (BG) and (BE) "are not crucial for our purposes and could be
replaced by others" (Hurka, 1, 11). The three remaining principles are the
more important and interesting components of Hurka' s view. (LG) and (HE)
are "recursion clauses" -- they assert that loving (hating) a thing that is
intrinsically good (evil) for itself is intrinsically good (evil).
Notice that the attitudes involved in (LG) and (LEE) are loving and
hating a thing for itself respectively. According to Hurka, "[t]o love a state x
'for itself' means to love x apart from its consequences, or for its own sake,
that is, to love instances of x because they are instances of x" (Hurka, 1, 13).
So, if I pursue my friend's pleasure because I think that if she feels pleasure
she will be in a better mood and hence I will be better off, (LG) is silent on the
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issue of whether such pursuit is intrinsically good .77 On the other hand, if I
pursue my friend's pleasure simply because it is pleasure, (LG) implies that
such pursuit is intrinsically good .78
(DV) kills two birds with one stone: it gives an account of moral virtue,
and it gives an account of the intrinsic goodness of the moral virtues. It is the
first of these two projects that I am concerned with. According to (DV), the
moral virtues are attitudes toward goods and evils that are themselves
intrinsically good. (HG) and (LE) specify that certain attitudes meet this
condition and hence are moral virtues.
Immediately we can see that there is a problem with (DV). The
problem is that (DV) identifies the virtues with attitudes. But this seems to be
at odds with our common sense views about the virtues, according to which
the virtues are states of character, not attitudes. Fortunately, (DV) can easily
be changed to accommodate this idea. Let us introduce the following
technical term:
D4. x is an evaluative attitude =df. x is an instance of (i) loving a thing or (ii)
hating a thing.
77 Hurka also suggests further principles pertaining to loving and hating things instrumental^,
or as means. I will not discuss these further principles.
78 There are type/token issues here. Strictly speaking, Hurka’s five clauses apply to types
:
yet
the example I give involves a particular instance of pursuit, which would seem to be a token of
some sort. We can avoid such issues by supposing that the fundamental bearers of value are
states of affairs. So, that Sue is experiencing pleasure to a certain degree on a certain occasion is
intrinsically good; that Bob knows a certain proposition is intrinsically good; that Erik is pursuing his
friend’s pleasure because it is pleasure is intrinsically good, and so on.
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(DV) can then be modified as follows:
(DV ) x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a disposition toward having
intrinsically good evaluative attitudes.79
Making this change will require us to "translate" much of what Hurka
says elsewhere from talk about attitudes into talk about dispositions toward
attitudes. Of course in doing this, I have, strictly speaking, abandoned
Hurka s own view. But I think that the corresponding dispositional view is a
more plausible view, and is one that can include all the advantages and
insights of Hurka's actual view.
In Chapter 4 of his book, Hurka applies this general account to specific
moral virtues. I wish to examine what Hurka says about a number of these
virtues. I think that a couple of things will become clear. First, Hurka does
not stick to (DV) exactly as it is stated, and thus we will have to make some
revisions to (DV') to accommodate these changes. Second, Hurka's general
account provides an accurate picture of particular moral virtues with varying
degrees of success; in many cases the account works nicely, but in other cases
it seems to fail. In what follows, I will try to expose some of these failures.
3.9.2 The Simple Virtues
Hurka divides the moral virtues into three groups: the simple virtues,
the virtues of proportion, and the virtues of self-control. I will examine each
of these groups in turn, starting with the simple virtues.
79
I have dropped the clause of (DV) pertaining to moral vice, as I want to focus on Hurka’s
account of moral virtue.
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According to Hurka, "[t]he simple virtues involve a single attitude that
is appropriately oriented" (Hurka, 4, 16). A paradigmatic example of such a
virtue is benevolence: "[a] benevolent person desires, pursues, and takes
pleasure in others' good, for example, in their pleasure, knowledge, and
achievement" (Hurka, 4, 16). Thus, on the dispositional account, we can say
that benevolence is the disposition to desire, pursue, and take pleasure in
others good (for its own sake). This seems to me to be a plausible account of
benevolence. One nice feature of Hurka's account here is that it explains why
benevolence is a virtue, whereas other psychologically similar dispositions,
such as the disposition to desire, pursue, and take pleasure in the suffering of
others, are not. Benevolence is a virtue because it is directed at things that are
intrinsically good; the second disposition mentioned above is not because it is
directed at things that are intrinsically bad (and hence is a vice on Hurka's
view).
Hurka's account works very nicely with respect to many of the simple
virtues. But others are more problematic. Consider what Hurka says about
truthfulness, which he classifies as a simple virtue:
A further simple virtue. . .is truthfulness, which involves the
desire that others not believe or come to believe what is not true.
This virtue involves hatred of false belief; the stronger virtue of
candour or openness supplements this hatred with a positive
desire that others come to know relevant truths (Hurka, 4, 18).
(BE) identifies false belief as being intrinsically evil. Notice that Hurka
says that truthfulness "involves hatred of false belief." But on Hurka's view,
truthfulness must not merely involve hatred of false belief; it must in fact be
hatred of false belief. Or, on the dispositional account, it must be the
disposition to hate false belief for its own sake. That is:
165
H TRUTHFULNESS: x is truthfulness if and only if x is the disposition to
desire or pursue the absence of false belief for its own sake, or take pain in
false belief for its own sake.
It seems to me that (H-TRUTHFULNESS) is false in both directions: it
fails to specify either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a thing's being
truthfulness. Consider a person who is very concerned to do what is morally
right and who believes that all instances of truth-telling are morally right.
This person is indifferent to false belief in itself; what he cares about is doing
what is right. Such a person will be disposed to tell the truth whenever he
can, and, I submit, possesses the virtue of truthfulness. Yet (H-
TRUTHFULNESS) implies that this person lacks truthfulness. This example
shows that (H-TRUTHFULNESS) fails to specify a necessary condition on a
thing's being truthfulness.
Consider a second person who is indeed disposed to desire and pursue
the absence of false belief for its own sake, and to take pain in false belief for
its own sake. But this person pursues the absence of false belief in a
somewhat unorthodox fashion. Suppose that someone asks him a question
to which he knows the answer. It is true that he will not lie; but he will not
answer the question either. What he will do depends on the situation;
sometimes he will run away, other times he may try to kill his interlocutor if
he thinks that the interlocutor may acquire a false belief as a result of the
interlocutor's question going unanswered. Furthermore, if this person I am
imagining discovers that a certain person has many false beliefs, his way of
rectifying this fact is to murder the false believer. In general, the person is
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disposed to pursue the absence of false belief for its own sake - but he never
pursues it by telling the truth. It seems clear that such a person lacks
truthfulness; yet, (H-TRUTHFULNESS) implies that he has truthfulness.
The example exploits fact that telling the truth is only one way of
pursuing the absence of false belief. There are other more radical means one
might take to this end - and one can take such means without being truthful.
This example shows that (H-TRUTHFULNESS) fails to provide a sufficient
condition for a given thing's being truthfulness.
What can we conclude from all of this? First, it is clear that Hurka's
Truthfulness Project fails. But the implications of this failure for Hurka's
Moral Virtuousity Project are not clear. The reason is that it is not clear that
truthfulness is actually a virtue at all. Truthfulness seems to be simply the
disposition to tell the truth. Yet, as the example involving the Moral
Observer discussed earlier makes clear, a person might have this disposition
without having any moral virtues whatsoever. Thus, it seems plausible to
suppose that truthfulness is not a virtue, and so the fact that Hurka's general
account of moral virtue cannot accommodate truthfulness does not imply
that the general account is false.
3.9.3 The Virtues of Proportionality
The second group of virtues Hurka discusses are the virtues of
proportionality. In explicating this group of virtues, Hurka makes use of a
principle that he introduces in chapter 3:
(PP) If x is m/n times as intrinsically good as y, loving x for itself more than
m/n times as intensely as one loves y for itself is intrinsically evil (Hurka, 3,
25).
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Notice that (PP) is a principle concerning not individual attitudes but
rather combinations of attitudes. The principle is introduced to handle cases
like the following:
Imagine that A is extremely selfish, caring much more about his
own lesser goods than about the greater goods of other people,
for example, his own mild pleasure than others* immense
pleasure (Hurka, 3, 23).
Intuitively, A's selfishness is a vice, which means that, on Hurka'
s
view, it is intrinsically evil. But A's selfishness involves not just one but two
attitudes: loving his own pleasure and loving the pleasure of others.
According to (BG), pleasure is intrinsically good, and so A's selfishness
consists of two instances of loving the good — each of which, according to
(LG), is intrinsically good. Without (PP), Hurka's account implies that A's
selfishness involves two attitudes that are intrinsically good, and so his
account cannot accommodate the intuition that A's selfishness is a vice.
(PP) allows us to evaluate the two attitudes that comprise A's
selfishness as a combination. In this example, A loves a lesser good (his own
mild pleasure) much more than he loves a greater good (the greater pleasure
of others). (PP) implies that this disproportionality itself is intrinsically evil.
To calculate the total intrinsic value of A's attitudes, we need to take
the sum of three things: the intrinsic value of A's love of his own pleasure,
the intrinsic value of A's love of the pleasure of others, and the intrinsic
value of these two attitudes considered as a combination. If the disvalue of
the third attitude is greater than the sum of the values of the first two
attitudes, then the overall value of the combination will be negative, and
hence the overall combination will be intrinsically evil. On the other hand, if
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the disvalue of the third attitude is less than the sum of the values of the first
two attitudes, then the overall value of the combination will be positive, and
hence the overall combination will be intrinsically good.
Thus, concerning the example involving A, Hurka writes:
[M]ild selfishness, or loving one's own good a little more than
other people's, involves just a small intrinsic evil, whereas
extreme selfishness involves a great intrinsic evil. This in turn
implies that some disproportionate combinations of loves can be
on balance intrinsically good while others are on balance
intrinsically evil. If A is just mildly selfish, the disproportion
between his loves is to a small degree evil, and this evil may be
outweighed by the positive goods in his loves considered on
their own. As his selfishness becomes more extreme.
. .the evil
increases until eventually his combination of attitudes is on
balance evil (Hurka, 3, 26).
Let us say that the total intrinsic value of a pair of attitudes, al and a2,
is equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of each of al and a2 plus the
intrinsic value of al and a2 considered as a combination (this last value is
given by (PP)). Hurka' s view, then, is that some virtues are not individual
attitudes but rather combinations of attitudes -- specifically, combinations of
attitudes whose total intrinsic value is greater than zero. On the dispositional
view, we can say that some virtues are dispositions toward combinations of
attitudes whose total intrinsic value is greater than zero (subsequently I will
describe such combinations simply as intrinsically good combinations). To
account for this new kind of virtue, we can revise (DV') as follows:
(DV") x is a moral virtue if and only if x is (i) a disposition toward having
intrinsically good evaluative attitudes or (ii) a disposition toward having
intrinsically good combinations of evaluative attitudes.
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I want to begin to focus on Hurka's account of courage. The account is
somewhat complicated as Hurka identifies two forms of courage. The first
form of courage is a virtue of proportion, and Hurka accordingly calls it
proportional courage." Here is what he says about it:
A coward.
. .cares much more about his safety or comfort than
about some greater good he could achieve by risking these. A
person with proportional courage.
. .cares sufficiently about the
greater good that his attitudes are on balance virtuous, with the
result that he acts without hesitation to pursue the greater good.
Though he feels some fear, it is not intense enough to prevent
or even hinder his acting as is best. Not just any proportioned
response to danger is courageous in this sense, but only a
response to significant danger (Hurka, 4, 22).
Proportional courage is a virtue involving two evaluative attitudes.
The first attitude is loving one's own comfort or safety. The second attitude is
loving some greater good, where this greater good could could be achieved
only by risking one's own comfort or safety. In order for these attitudes to be
involved in courage, the degree to which one risks one's comfort or safety by
pursuing the greater good must be substantial - as Hurka notes, "[w]e do not
call someone courageous who without hesitation accepts the small risk
involved in driving a car" (Hurka, 4, 22).
Which of the three forms of loving are involved in proportional
courage? Surely merely taking pleasure in or desiring the greater good is not
sufficient for courage. So proportional courage must involve pursuit.
Hurka's comments suggest that he thinks that it also involves desire.
Considering an example where the greater good is one hundred times as good
as one's own safety, Hurka says:
Imagine that in the above example the person cares only twice as
much about the 100-times greater good. His division of concern
is sufficient to make him pursue the greater good without
hesitation but not sufficient for courage. Though he acts as the
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courageous person does, he does so with cowardly attitudes
(Hurka, 4, 22).
Here, Hurka adopts the Aristotelian view that (one kind of) courage
requires not only proper action but proper emotional responses. Hurka's
view is that proportionate courage involves both desiring and pursuing the
greater good. This means that proportional courage is a complicated sort of
thing. Before stating a principle explicating proportional courage, it will be
useful to introduce some definitions.
D5. x is a courageous end for y =df. (i) x is intrinsically good, (ii) y could bring
about x, and (iii) by trying to bring about x, y would be risking his own
comfort or safety to a substantial degree.
PROP-COURAGE: x is proportional courage if and only if x is the disposition
to have two kinds of intrinsically good combinations of evaluative attitudes,
the first combination consisting of (i) desiring one's own comfort or safety
and (ii) desiring y, where y is a courageous end for oneself, and the second
combination consisting of (i) desiring one's own comfort or safety and (ii)
pursuing y.so
(PP) ensures that these two combinations of attitudes will be
intrinsically good only if they are properly proportioned (or sufficiently close
to being properly proportioned). On Hurka's view, proportional courage is
only one kind of courage. The second kind of courage is in the third group of
80 There are a total of three attitudes involved in proportional courage, where one of the
attitudes - desiring one’s own comfort or safety - belongs to two combinations of attitudes.
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virtues that Hurka identifies: the virtues of self-control. To understand
Hurka's full account of courage, we must examine this third group of virtues.
3.9.4 The Virtues Of Self-Control
The virtues of self-control, like the virtues of proportion, involve
combinations of attitudes. These attitudes have a very specific structure:
The virtues of self-control.
. .involve a combination of attitudes,
but in this case the attitudes are not both good. Instead, one is
evil and the other is a higher-level attitude that seeks to reduce
the intensity of the first and prevent it from issuing in action. If
the higher-level attitude is strong enough to achieve its aim, it
can make the combination of attitudes on balance virtuous
(Hurka, 4, 24).
Thus, the virtues of self-control all involve cases of conflicting desires -
- cases of internal struggle where an agent is seeking to suppress an attitude
that she recognizes as evil. The second kind of courage Hurka identifies is a
virtue of this sort. He calls this second kind of courage "self-controlling
courage":
In self-controlling courage a person does care, at least initially,
too much about his safety. He is fearful, and to a degree that if
unchecked will prevent him from pursuing the greater good.
But he also has a higher-level desire to control or reduce his fear,
and this desire can again be in two ways good. He can desire to
reduce his fear in order to achieve the greater good or because in
itself the fear is disproportionate. Either way, his desire is good
and with sufficient strength can make his attitudes on balance
good (Hurka, 4, 25).
The passage indicates that there are in fact two kinds of self-controlling
courage. Let's examine these in turn, starting with the second of the two
kinds Hurka describes, which we can call "intrinsic self-controlling courage."
Given Hurka's earlier characterization of self-controlling virtues as
combinations of attitudes, one attitude being intrinsically evil and the other
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attitude being a hatred of this intrinsically evil attitude, we might be inclined
to think that intrinsic self-controlling courage involves an attitude of fear
which is intrinsically evil and a desire to reduce this fear which is
intrinsically good.
However, this is not Hurka's view. In private correspondence Hurka
has said that the intrinsically evil object involved in self-controlling courage
"is not a single attitude but a disproportion between attitudes." So intrinsic
self-controlling courage involves a rather complicated combination of
attitudes. First, we have a cowardly combination of attitudes - desiring one's
own safety, let's say, and desiring some greater good, where one desires the
safety more than the greater good. If this combination of attitudes is
sufficiently disproportionate, the combination will be intrinsically evil
overall. Second, we have a higher-order desire to be rid of this
disproportional combination of attitudes. Since this higher-order desire is
hatred for what is intrinsically evil (the disproportional combination), this
desire is intrinsically good. When the combination of all of these attitudes is
intrinsically good on balance, intrinsic self-controlling courage is present.
Here, then, is a dispositional account of intrinsic self-controlling courage.
ISC-COURAGE: x is intrinsic self-controlling courage if and only if x is the
disposition to have intrinsically good combinations of attitudes consisting of
(i) a combination of (a) desire for one's own comfort or safety and (b) desire
for a greater good, where (i) is an intrinsically evil combination, and (ii) a
hatred of (i) for its own sake.
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The other kind of self-controlling courage, which we can call "extrinsic
self-controlling courage", also involves the intrinsically evil combination of
attitudes involved in intrinsic self-controlling courage. But in extrinsic self-
controlling courage, the agent does not hate this evil combination of
attitudes. Instead, she hates the excessive fear because it prevents her from
bringing about a greater good.
In the first chapter of his book, Hurka suggests some clauses assigning
values to attitudes toward instrumental goods and evils. He suggests that a
thing is instrumen tally good "if it prevents intrinsic evil" (Hurka, 1, 20). This
suggests that he also holds that a thing is instrumentally evil if it prevents
intrinsic good. If this is correct, then the excessive fear involved in self-
controlling courage is instrumentally evil since it prevents the agent from
bringing about an intrinsic good. According to Hurka, it is "intrinsically good
to hate as a means what is instrumentally evil" (Hurka, 1, 20). Desiring to be
rid of one s excessive fear because it prevents one from achieving some
greater intrinsic good is a case of hating as a means what is instrumentally
evil, and hence this attitude is intrinsically good. When the combination of
this attitude and the excessive fear is intrinsically good on balance, extrinsic
self-controlling courage is present. Here is a dispositional account of extrinsic
self-controlling courage:
ESC-COURAGE: x is extrinsic self-controlling courage if and only if x is the
disposition to have intrinsically good combinations of attitudes consisting of
(i) a excessive desire for one's own comfort or safety and (ii) a desire to be rid
of (i) because it prevents one from achieving some greater intrinsic good.
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We can give an account of self-controlling courage by appealing to (ISC-
COURAGE) and (ESC-COURAGE) as follows:
SC-COURAGE: x is self-controlling courage if and only if x is intrinsic self-
controlling courage or x is extrinsic self-controlling courage.
Having explicated the two kinds of courage Hurka discusses, it is now a
simple matter to explicate Hurka's account of courage:
H-COURAGE: x is Hurka courage if and only if (i) x is proportional courage
or (ii) x is self-controlling courage.
3.10 Criticism Of Hurka's Moral Virtuousity Project
Has Hurka provided an adequate account of courage? I think that (H-
COURAGE) provides a sufficient condition for a thing's being courage. Hurka
courage is a kind of courage.8 ! But has Hurka provided a necessary condition
for a thing's being courage? Might a person be courageous without having
Hurka courage?
One putative case of such a person is the case of the "courageous" Nazi
— our old friend from Chapter One -- is not courageous. The Nazi is disposed
to risk his comfort and safety for an evil end. Since every variety of Hurka
courage involves pursuing or desiring an intrinsic good, the Nazi lacks
Hurka courage; yet it seems to me that he has courage. Of course, as I pointed
out earlier, the case of the "courageous" Nazi is a hard case, and so the fact
81 More precisely, proportional courage, intrinsic self-controlling courage, and extrinsic self-
controlling courage are all kinds of courage.
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that Hurka's view implies that the Nazi lacks courage is not a devastating
objection to his view.
However, a more serious objection involves a person who has what
we might call "Kantian courage." Consider a person who takes himself to
have various moral obligations and who takes these obligations very
seriously. He tries his best to fulfill his obligations faithfully, even when, as is
often the case, these obligations require him to face danger. We may even
suppose that the obligations sometimes require him to bring about some
intrinsic good in such a way that requires him to face danger. But when he
carries out these obligations, his ultimate aim is not to bring about the
intrinsic good, but rather to do what is morally right — to do his duty. But this
implies that he lacks Hurka courage, since each form of Hurka courage
involves desiring or pursuing an intrinsic good for its own sake. But the
fellow I am imagining pursues such goods only as means to doing his duty.
So it appears that a person can have the virtue of courage without having
Hurka courage, and hence that Hurka's Courage Project is unsuccessful.
Is there any way Hurka s view can take account of Kantian courage?
Not as it stands. The reason is that the fundamental idea underlying Hurka's
view is that all the moral virtues can be understood as involving dispositions
to love the good or hate the evil and hence will involve dispositions to have
some sort of intentional attitude toward things that are good or evil. But
Kantian courage is not like this at all; it is a disposition (in part) to have
certain intentional attitudes toward things that are morally right.
These considerations bring to mind another moral virtue that it is hard
to see how Hurka's view could accommodate: conscientiousness. In a later
chapter, Hurka points this out himself. He writes:
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Imagine that a person performs an action because he believes it
moralty right or, having failed to perform this action, feels
guilt at having acted wrongly. His conscientiousness, to use thatterm for love of the right and hatred of the wrong, seems
intuitively to be a virtue. But conscientiousness is directed at
rightness or wrongness rather than at intrinsic goodness or evil
Its value, therefore, seems not to be captured by the recursive
account, which is in that respect incomplete (Hurka, 7, 27-28).
Suppose that conscientiousness is the disposition to love the morally
right and hate the morally wrong (that is, it is the disposition to love morally
right actions as they are morally right and to hate morally wrong actions as
they are morally wrong). Intuitively, conscientiousness is a moral virtue; yet
on Hurka' s view it is not. This is a problem for Hurka's view.
Hurka s proposed resolution of the problem is straightforward:
[C]aphiring the virtue of conscientiousness requires a non-
consequentialist extension to the recursive account, one saying
that loving what is right and hating what is wrong are, like
loving good and hating evil, intrinsically good (Hurka, 7, 28).
We can incorporate conscientiousness into the dispositional account by
adding these two principles:
(LR) If x is morally right, then loving x (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure
in x) for its rightness is intrinsically good.
(HW) If x is morally wrong, then hating x (desiring or pursuing x's not
occurring, or being pained'by x's occurring) for its wrongness is intrinsically
good.
Hurka's revised view, then, consists of the above two principles
together with the five stated earlier:
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(BG) Pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are intrinsically good (Hurka, 1,
10 ).
(BE) Pain, false belief, and failure in the pursuit of achievement are
intrinsically evil (Hurka, 1, 17).
(LG) If x is intrinsically good, loving x (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure
in x) for itself is also intrinsically good (Hurka, 1, 14).
(HE) If x is intrinsically evil, hating x (desiring or pursuing x's not obtaining,
or being pained by x's obtaining) for itself is intrinsically good (Hurka, 1, 18).
(DV') x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a disposition toward having
intrinsically good evaluative attitudes.
Does the addition of (LR) and (HW) give us the materials to provide
adequate accounts of conscientiousness and Kantian courage? Let's consider
conscientiousness first. Hurka' s comments suggest this view:
H-CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: x is Hurka conscientiousness if and only if x is the
disposition to love morally right actions for their moral rightness and to hate
morally wrong actions for their moral wrongness.
But consider a person who wants very much to do the right thing but
whose will is weak in various ways. The person is disposed to desire morally
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right actions for their moral rightness, but is not disposed to perform morally
right actions. It seems to me that such a person lacks the virtue of
conscientiousness; yet he has Hurka conscientiousness. Therefore, Hurka
conscientiousness is not conscientiousness.
There is a more plausible account of Hurka conscientiousness in the
neighborhood:
H-CONSCIENTOUSNESS': x is Hurka conscientiousness if and only if x is the
disposition to perform morally right actions for the sake of their moral
rightness.
This may be an accurate account of conscientiousness, and (DV') and
(LR) imply that the disposition specified by (H-CONSdENTOUSNESS') is
indeed a moral virtue. So perhaps Hurka' s view can accommodate the virtue
of conscientiousness if we revise it in the way Hurka suggests.82
What about Kantian courage? The following principle seems to do the
trick:
HK-COURAGE: x is Hurka-Kantian courage if and only if x is the disposition
to perform morally right actions (when doing so requires one to face danger)
for the sake of their moral rightness.
Hurka-Kantian courage, then, is a form of conscientiousness, and (DV')
and (LR) imply that the trait described in (HK-COURAGE) is a moral virtue.
82 This may also suggest a way of providing a more plausible account of truthfulness than the
one Hurka actually provides.
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Therefore, it seems that by introducing (LR) and (HW), Hurka is able to
handle virtues that involve attitudes toward moral rightness and wrongness
rather than toward intrinsic goodness and evil.
But are (LR) and (HW) plausible in their own right? The answer
depends, in part, on what the correct normative ethical theory is. Let us
consider a view we can call "Ideal Act Utilitarianism/' which can be
formulated as follows:
IAU: An action, a, is morally right if and only if a would result in an outcome
at least as good as any outcome that would result from any of the alternatives
to a.8 3
Suppose Bill is in a situation in which he has two alternatives, which
we can simply refer to as al and a2. Suppose we want to apply (IAU) to
determine the moral statuses of these two actions. Suppose Bill is disposed to
try to perform morally right actions because they are right. Consider al. If
Bill were to perform al, he would perform al because he believed al was
morally right. Thus, if al is morally right, then included in the outcome of
Bill's performing al would be the fact that Bill performed a morally right
action because it is morally right. This would be a case of loving what is
morally right for its rightness, and hence, according to (LR), would be
intrinsically good. For simplicity, let's suppose that this attitude has an
intrinsic value of +10. Now suppose that, leaving aside the intrinsic value of
this attitude, the total intrinsic value of the outcome of al is +80. Now a
question arises: what is the actual total intrinsic value of al? More
83 in this principle ‘a’ ranges over action tokens.
180
specifically, is it +80 or +90? If al is morally right, then the total intrinsic
value of the outcome of al is +90; if al is morally wrong, then the total
intrinsic value of this same outcome is +80.
Now notice that if Bill were to perform a2, he would perform a2
because he believed that it was morally right. So if a2 is morally right, then
included in the outcome of a2 would be the fact that Bill performed a morally
right action for its rightness. As before, this would be a case of loving what is
morally right for its rightness, and hence, according to (LR), would be
intrinsically good. Again, suppose that this attitude has an intrinsic value of
+10. Finally, suppose that, leaving aside the intrinsic value of this attitude,
the total intrinsic value of the outcome of a2 is also +80.
Now we are in a pickle. Consider this question: is al morally right?
The answer is that it is if al's outcome is at least as intrinsically good as a2's
outcome. So consider this question: is al's outcome at least as intrinsically
good as a2's outcome? The answer is that it is if al is morally right. Thus, in
order to answer the question "is al morally right?" we need to first answer
the question "is al morally right?" Therefore, if (LR) is true, then (LAU) does
not provide an answer to the question "is al morally right?" Similar
considerations apply with respect to a2.
Any adequate normative ethical theory must be complete, where this
means that for any possible action, the theory assigns a particular normative
status to this action. But if (LR) is true, then (IAU) is incomplete, since it does
not assign any particular normative status to al (or to a2). And it should be
clear that there is nothing particularly unusual about al or a2, so it seems
plausible to suppose that (IAU) is seriously incomplete — it assigns no
particular normative status to a wide range of actions.
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Thus, (LR) and (IAU) make poor bedfellows. This result is particularly
damaging to Hurka's project, which he states in the very first sentence of
chapter 1
. My aim in this book is to give an account of the intrinsic goodness
of moral virtue and the intrinsic evil of moral vice that is consistent with the
structure of consequentialist moralities" (Hurka, 1, 1). Since (IAU) is a
consequentialist morality, by endorsing (LR), Hurka undermines his own
project.
Thus, Hurka appears to be on the horns of a dilemma. On the one
hand, he needs something relevantly like (LR) in order to account for moral
virtues like conscientiousness and Kantian virtue. On the other hand, by
endorsing (LR), he undermines his own project.
In this section I have tried to point to some problems with Hurka's
view. But these problems should be kept in perspective. Of all the views
discussed in this chapter, Hurka's is by far the most plausible and insightful.
Moreover, Hurka's book contains excellent discussions on a number of topics
that I have not examined here. However, I think that while Hurka's account
of the nature of moral virtue can account for a wide range of virtues, it runs
into trouble with respect to virtues relating to morally right actions.
3.11 Conclusion of this Chapter
In this chapter I examined a total of five recent theories concerning the
nature of moral virtue. I argued that none of these theories is completely
successful. In the next chapter I will offer what I take to be a novel account of
moral virtue.
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CHAPTER 4
ADMIRABILITY AND VIRTUE
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will describe and go some way toward defending what I
take to be a novel theory about the nature of moral virtue. I will attempt to
provide an account of moral virtue that appeals to the concept of
admirability. The first step, naturally, is to say a bit about what admirability is.
4.2 What Is Admirability?
I will not try to provide an analysis of admirability, but I think a bit can
be said positively about this concept. To say that a thing is admirable is to say
that the thing is a worthy or appropriate object of admiration. Things that are
admirable are excellent, outstanding, or remarkable. Michael Jordan's
basketball prowess is admirable, as is Mother Teresa's generosity and David
Lewis's philosophical skill.
Opposed to admirability is disadmirability. Now 'disadmirability' is a
word that, as far as I know, I have invented, so I need to explain what it
means. There are two ways a thing might be disadmirable: the thing might be
contemptible or it might be pathetic.
Consider a person who takes great glee in making others suffer. This
person goes out of his way to insult and offend other people just because he
enjoys seeing other people offended and insulted. He is obnoxious, offensive,
and thoroughly unpleasant. This person has a contemptible or despicable
character — he has a character that is a worthy or suitable object of contempt or
hatred (at least in a certain respect).
By contrast, consider a person who devotes his life to mastering chess.
He reads books on chess, he plays chess whenever he can, he studies classic
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games of chess, he watches chess on TV — he lives and breathes chess.
Nevertheless, his efforts are all for naught. His dreams of being a good chess
player - or even a decent chess player - are destined to remain mere dreams.
He remains an awful chess player despite a lifetime of effort. There is
nothing contemptible about this person; rather, he is pathetic or pitiful. He is
a worthy or suitable object of pity (at least in a certain respect).
These two examples illustrate the two ways in which a thing may be
disadmirable - by being contemptible or by being pathetic. With this sketch of
admirability in hand, we are now in a position to distinguish the concept
from various closely related concepts.
4.3 Admirability And Moral Responsibility
Admirability does not imply moral responsibility. More precisely, it is
not the case that if a person has an admirable state of character then that
person is morally responsible for having that state of character. Similarly, it is
not the case that if a person has a disadmirable state of character then that
person is morally responsible for having that state of character. In at least
some contexts the terms 'praiseworthy' and 'blameworthy' express concepts
that are tightly linked with moral responsibility. In such contexts, the claim
that a person has a blameworthy state of character does imply that the person
is morally responsible for having that state of character.
Consider Michael Slote's discussion of a serial killer:
We may know of a psychopathic killer that he was beaten and
tortured as a child by his parents and so believe that through the
accident of birth and as a result of treatment he had no control
over, he. . .became a vicious killer. But. . .this needn't commit
us to seeing him as blameworthy for being what he is or for
acting accordingly. . .When we call a dog vicious or claim
someone is a vicious killer or psychopath we are clearly
evaluating in a non-superficial and important way. . .The
vicious killer may not be able to help being as he is or acting as
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he does, but in characterizing him as we do, we are expressing a
highly negative opinion about him. We are saying that one way
he (centrally or deeply is) is a terrible way to be (Slote 1992, 120).
Slote here is discussing viciousness, but his point holds as well with
respect to admirability
. We may know that a particularly benevolent,
generous, and kind person is the way she is because her parents instilled
certain values in her from a very young age. It may be solely through
accident of birth that she has the character she has, but this needn't prevent us
from making highly positive judgements about her. In particular, it needn't
prevent us from pointing out the admirability of various of her states of
character.
4.4 Admirability Is Not Desirability
That admirability and desirability are distinct concepts may be seen
from the fact that there are some things that are desirable but that are not
admirable. Consider this state of affairs: Erik experiences a nice bit of pleasure
at time t. This state of affairs is a desirable state of affairs, but there doesn't
seem to be anything particularly admirable about it 84 This is not to say that
there is anything disadmirable - contemptible or pitiful - about this state of
affairs. The state of affairs seems to be neither admirable nor disadmirable.
So admirability is distinct from desirability.
4.5 Admirability Is Not Intrinsic Goodness
That admirability is distinct from intrinsic goodness may be seen by the
fact that there are some things that are intrinsically good but are not
admirable. Consider again the state of affairs that Erik experiences a bit of
pleasure at time t. It seems to me that this state of affairs is an intrinsically
84 Slote makes this point as well -- see Slote 1992, 184.
185
good one, but, as before, there doesn't seem to be anything particularly
admirable about it.
Perhaps it will be objected that this argument relies on a false
axiological claim - specifically, on the claim that pleasure is intrinsically
good. A plausible axiology, the objector might continue, will imply that
admirability and intrinsic goodness are co-extensive. But any plausible
axiology will imply that certain states of affairs are intrinsically good that are
not admirable. For example, consider the view that what is intrinsically good
are states of affairs in which people get what they deserve. But consider the
state of affairs of a vicious (and morally responsible) killer experiencing much
deserved pain. On the view in question, this state of affairs is intrinsically
good, but again, there is nothing particularly admirable about this state of
affairs.8 ^
There is one axiological view that might not be subject to this sort of
argument: the view that all and only virtuous states of character are basically
intrinsically good.86 But this view is plainly false. Compare two possible
worlds: a world in which a thoroughly virtuous person endures a certain
amount of pain, and a world in which a thoroughly vicious person endures
the very same amount of pain. Suppose that nothing else happens in these
two worlds. The view in question implies that the first world is better than
the second, but this is plainly false. So admirability is distinct from intrinsic
goodness.
85 There may be admirable states of affairs associated with it -- perhaps the killer faces his
punishment admirably. But there is nothing admirable about the fact that the killer experiences
deserved pain.
86 Basic intrinsic goods, roughly, are the simplest intrinsic goods. Other things -- for example
worlds -- may also be intrinsically good. But the values of the more complex items are determined
by the intrinsic values of the basic intrinsic goods and evils contained in them.
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I hope at this point that we have a rough grasp on the concepts of
admirability and disadmirability. In what follows I will attempt to provide an
account of moral virtue (and vice) that appeals to these two concepts.
4.6 Admirability And Admirability-Makers
Virtues and vices fall into the ontological category of dispositions.
There are disposition types and disposition tokens. Virtues and vices are
disposition types. Disposition types are properties. When we talk about
courage, we are talking about an abstract object - a disposition type that may
be instantiated by various persons. Courage is a property — the property of
being disposed to act and feel certain ways (in certain circumstances).87
Because virtues and vices are dispositions, it may be useful for what
comes later to say a bit about the metaphysics of dispositions. It seems to me
that the most natural way to individuate dispositions is on the basis of
stimulus-response pairs. Each disposition, D, is associated with a certain
stimulus, S, and a certain response, R. D is the disposition to give response R
when stimulus S is present (the stimulus and response are themselves types
as well). So if we want to pick out a particular disposition, the best way to do
so is in terms of the stimulus and response pair associated with that
disposition. Consider, for example, the disposition to break when struck.
Here, being struck is the stimulus and breaking is the response.88
In ordinary discourse, we often pick out a disposition solely in terms of
the response, leaving the stimulus implicit. This is particularly common in
discourse (even philosophical discourse) concerning the virtues. A rough-
87 Of course, we may also talk about a particular person’s courage -- say Bob's courage In this
case we are talking about a disposition token.
88
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will not enter into the debate concerning how exactly to analyze the concept of a
disposition.
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and-ready account of charity might be this: the disposition to give to needy
causes. No stimulus is specified, but presumably the speaker has in mind a
stimulus along the following lines: when it is appropriate or permissible to
give to charity . We can see this by noting that there are many dispositions
with the specified response that are clearly not charity. Some examples
include: the disposition to give to needy causes when one believes that doing
so will spite one's enemies, and the disposition to give to needy causes when
one wins a million dollars in the lottery.89
I said earlier that virtues and vices are all dispositions toward certain
actions, emotions, desires, beliefs, or attitudes (or toward some combination
of these). So those dispositions that are virtues or vices all have actions,
emotions, desires, beliefs, attitudes, or some complex combination of these as
their responses. This gives us some idea of what kind of things virtues and
vices are, but this observation does not tell us how to distinguish a virtue
from a vice, and it may not even tell us how to distinguish virtues and vices
from every other thing (perhaps there are dispositions of the relevant sort
that are neither virtues nor vices). In this section I will introduce the notions
of admirability-makers and disadmirability-makers and say a bit about how
the admirability and disadmirability of dispositions of the relevant sort (the
sort just described) are related to admirability-makers and disadmirability-
makers. Later, I will provide some principles that, I maintain, allow us to
distinguish virtues and vices from everything else and to distinguish a virtue
from a vice.
89 At least, these dispositions are not charity as it is commonly understood. Perhaps these are
deviant forms of charity; we might call the first disposition “spiteful charity” and the second “lottery-
winner charity.”
188
When a given disposition has the property of being admirable, it has
this property in virtue of having some other property or properties.
Similarly, when a given disposition has the property of being disadmirable -
of being either contemptible or despicable - it has this property in virtue of
having some other property or properties. We can say that the admirability
and disadmirability of dispositions supervenes on other properties of those
dispositions. All the facts about these underlying properties of a given
disposition entail all the facts concerning the admirability or disadmirability
of that disposition. The relevant underlying properties may be divided into
two groups - the first group consisting of those properties I will call
"admirability-makers", and the second group consisting of those properties I
will call 'disadmirability-makers." The following pair of principles specifies
some important relationships between these two groups of properties as well
as one way in which admirability-makers are related to admirability (and one
way disadmirability-makers are related to disadmirability):
AM: If a disposition, D, has some admirability-maker, and D has no
disadmirability-makers, then D is an admirable disposition.
DM: If a disposition, D, has some disadmirability-maker, and D has no
admirability-makers, then D is a disadmirable disposition.
Admirability-makers and disadmirability-makers, then, function with
respect to admirability and disadmirability in a way similar to the way in
which W.D. Ross' prima facie duties function with respect to moral
obligatoriness. Ross writes:
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I suggest ‘prima facie duty'. . .as a brief way of referring to the
characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper)
which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind.
. .of being
an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same
time of another kind which is morally significant (Ross 1930, 19).
When a given disposition has an admirability-maker, we can say that
the disposition is prima facie admirable; when a disposition has a
disadmirability-maker, we can say that the disposition is prima facie
disadmirable.9 o
I will not attempt to analyze the concept of an admirability-maker or a
disadmirability-maker. Instead, I will discuss the properties that I think are
admirability-makers and disadmirability-makers and attempt to construct an
account of moral virtue by appealing (in part) to these properties and the two
principles stated above.
4.7 Difficulty
Many writers on virtue have pointed out that moral virtue often
involves the resolution of a struggle internal to the virtuous agent. George
Henrik von Wright, for example, takes the mastery of one's emotions to be
the essence of moral virtue:
In the case of every specific virtue there is some specific passion
which the man of that virtue has learnt to master. In the case of
courage, for example, the passion is fear in the face of danger. In
the case of temperance it is lust for pleasure (von Wright 1963,
147).
Kant at one point characterizes moral virtue as the "capacity and
considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust opponent" (MM, 380).
90 This is a terminological point only: the point is that “d has an admirability-maker” and “d is
prima facie admirable” are synonymous (similarly for the corresponding expressions involving
disadmirability).
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This element of internal conflict and successful resolution of that conflict is
present in the Nicomachean Ethics as well:
[YV]e must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is
something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and
opposing it. . .Now even this seems to have a share in the
rational principle — and presumably in the temperate and brave
man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters,
with the same voice as the rational principle (NE 1102b25-30).
There is substantial agreement, then, that virtue often involves the
resolution of internal struggle. More specifically, it involves the familiar
struggle between a person's reason or intellect and that person's passions or
emotions. I have suggested that moral virtue is closely related to
admirability. Is there a connection between admirability and the internal
struggle discussed by von Wright, Kant, and Aristotle?
The answer is yes. I think that the connection is this: being disposed to
do what is difficult — difficult in the sense of requiring significant effort or
struggle — is prima facie admirable. Moreover, giving in to one's emotions is
easy, whereas overcoming them is difficult. The virtuous person is disposed
to overcome his emotions; hence she is disposed to do what is difficult and
therefore has a prima facie admirable disposition.
Let us say that an action type is difficult in the sense specified above
when it is such that action tokens of that type typically require much effort or
struggle on the part of their agents. Consider this type of action: getting on an
airplane when one has a fear of flying. Getting on an airplane typically
requires great effort and struggle when one has a fear of flying. We can also
say that action tokens of a difficult type are themselves difficult.
Notice that an action token may be difficult in this sense even when
the performance of that action token does not require much struggle or effort
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on the part of the agent. This may be the case with respect to a certain kind of
courageous person - one who experiences strong fear but who is very good at
controlling this strong fear. It may be rather easy for such a person to
overcome his strong fear; nevertheless particular instances of him
overcoming strong fear are difficult because they are of a difficult type.
Difficulty, then, gives rise to the following admirability-maker: being a
disposition to perform actions of a difficult type. We can specify this property
a bit more carefully. It is the property a disposition has just in case the
disposition's response is (or includes) an action type that is difficult.
So, the disposition to successfully overcome one's fear (when one is
afraid) is prima facie admirable. Fear typically requires struggle and effort to
overcome, at least when it is powerful. So the disposition in question
includes in its response overcoming powerful fear, a difficult action type.
It sometimes happens that horrific actions require a tremendous
amount of effort on the part of their agents. Because of this fact, horrific
actions are, in some cases, evidence that those who perform such acts have a
prima facie admirable disposition.
A particularly striking example of this appears in Francis Ford
Coppola's film Apocalypse Now. Toward the end of the film, the renegade
Kurtz tells the following story:
"I remember when I was with special forces. It seems a thousand
centuries ago. We went into a camp to inoculate some children.
We left the camp after we had inoculated the children for polio
and this old man came running after us and he was crying, he
couldn't say. . . We went back then and they had come back and
hacked off every inoculated arm. There they were in a pile, a
pile of little arms. And I remember, I, I, I cried. I wept like some
grandmother. I wanted to tear my teeth out, I didn't know what
to do. . .And then I realized, like I was shot, like I was shot with a
diamond, a diamond bullet right through my forehead. And I
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thought, my God, the genius of that. The genius, the will to do
that. Perfect, genuine, complete, crystalline, pure. And then 1
realized they were stronger than we because they could -
understand that these were not monsters, they were men,
trained cadres. These men fought with their
hearts, who have families, who have children, who are filled
with love but have the strength, the strength to do that."
On Kurtz's interpretation of this incident, the men who performed the
horrific act of severing the arms of the inoculated children exhibited an
incredible strength of will. Precisely because, according to Kurtz, the
perpetrators of this act were not monsters but rather ordinary men "filled
with love", it would have required extraordinary effort on the part of these
men to bring themselves to perform such horrific actions. In this case, the
men must struggle to overcome their own feelings of compassion for the
children. Thus, these horrific actions are evidence of a disposition in each of
the perpetrators to perform difficult actions. In this way, horrific actions are
evidence of a prima facie admirable disposition in each of the perpetrators.
It is worth noting that the kind of difficulty I have identified here is, at
least in some cases, had contingently by those action types (and tokens) that
have them. Consider this action type: running a marathon. This action type
is difficult. But had certain contingent facts about human nature been
different, this action type would not have been difficult. It is logically possible
that the typical human being could run a marathon with little training and
with little effort. In such a world, running a marathon would not be difficult
(in the sense specified above). As a result, the disposition to run marathons is
in fact prima facie admirable (in this respect) but only contingently so.
The possibility of dispositions having an admirability-maker (or
disadmirability-maker) contingently opens up the possibility that a
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disposition might be contingently admirable (or disadmirable). And this
opens up the possibility that a given disposition might be a virtue (or vice)
but only contingently so.
This result is interesting and perhaps surprising but I do not think that
it is a problem. Which dispositions are virtues and vices depends, in a
limited way, on what the typical human being is like.
4.8 Skill
Robert C. Roberts has emphasized the extent to which certain virtues
are “skill-like" (Roberts 1984, 227). He calls these virtues the “virtues of will
power" and includes among them such virtues as courage and temperance.
Roberts says: "People can be more or less skilled in the management of their
own inclinations, and these skills are an important part of the virtues of will
power" (Roberts 1984, 238).
Of course a person might have the capacity to manage his own
inclinations and yet not be disposed to do so, just as a person may be skilled at
basketball but refuse to play. A person who is skilled at managing his own
fear but who allows his fear to control him rather than exercising his fear-
management skills lacks the virtue of courage. So there is more to the class of
virtues Roberts identifies than mere capacities. To be virtuous, a person must
not merely have the capacity to manage his own inclinations — he must also
be disposed to do so.
Being a disposition to exercise a skill is an admirability-maker. A
person who is skilled at something is good at doing that thing. So another
way to put this point is like this: being a disposition to do something well is
an admirability-maker. The disposition to control one's fear well is prima
facie admirable: it is the disposition to exercise the skill of fear-management.
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Of course some skills are more impressive than others. The
impressiveness of a skill is in direct proportion with the difficulty typically
involved in acquiring that skill. The skill of fear-management is more
impressive than the skill of using a toilet properly; most normal humans can
learn the latter skill, whereas many normal humans cannot learn the former.
So the disposition to manage one's fear is more prima facie admirable than
the disposition to use a toilet properly.
4.9 Goodness, Importance, And Moral Rightness
A second admirability-maker relates to positive evaluative properties,
such as intrinsic goodness, importance, and moral rightness.9i Various
things possess these properties to varying degrees. It seems to me that there
are two related kinds of admirability-makers here. The first is being a
disposition to act for the sake of something that one believes (perhaps falsely)
to have properties of the sort listed above. A disposition D has this property
just in case there is some thing, x, such that D's response is (or includes) (i)
believing that x is intrinsically good (or important or morally right) and (ii)
acting for the sake of x. There is surely something admirable in being
disposed to try to bring into being that which one takes to be good, important,
or right. There is a corresponding disadmirability-maker: being a disposition
to act for the sake of something that one believes (perhaps falsely) to be
intrinsically evil, trivial, or morally wrong.
The second admirability-maker here is being a disposition to act for the
sake of something that is in fact intrinsically good, important, or morally
91 Others may wish to add further properties to this list, such as truth and beauty; I will focus on
intrinsic goodness, importance, and moral rightness for the sake of simplicity. Thomas Hurka has
proposed an account of moral virtue and moral vice that seeks to explicate all virtues and vices in
terms of their relationship to intrinsic goodness and intrinsic evil. While I think his account is
ultimately unsuccessful, I will not attempt to show that here. My comments in this section owe
much to Hurka’s account.
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right. A disposition D has this property just in case there is some thing, x,
such that (i) x is intrinsically good (or important or morally right) and (ii) D's
response is (or includes) acting for the sake of x.
The disposition to act for the sake of justice is prima facie admirable
because justice is intrinsically good. The disposition to tell the truth when it
is morally right to do so because it is morally right to do so is prima facie
admirable because telling the truth when it is right to do so is morally right.92
On the other hand, dispositions to act for the sake of things that are
intrinsically evil, trivial, or morally wrong are prima facie disadmirable. The
disposition to act for the sake of the suffering of others is contemptible
because the suffering of others is intrinsically evil.
The existence of admirability-makers and disadmirability-makers of
this sort implies that our judgements about what is intrinsically good,
intrinsically bad, morally right, morally wrong, trivial, and important will
influence our views about which traits are admirable. I maintain that such
relationships do in fact exist.
Consider the disposition to do philosophy well — the disposition to
succeed at various philosophical tasks (when the opportunity to take up such
tasks arises). Most philosophers (and perhaps only philosophers) would
maintain that philosophy is important, and so these philosophers would also
maintain that the disposition in question is an admirable one. But many
others would maintain that philosophy is nothing more than “mental
masturbation," and for this reason is trivial, and hence that the disposition in
question is disadmirable (probably by being pathetic - although extremists
may maintain that it is contemptible).
92 | take it that when one tells the truth because it is right to do so, one is acting tor the sake of
something that is morally right.
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4.10 Appropriate Attitudes
Some psychological attitudes are appropriate or proper; others are
inappropriate or improper. The person who takes pleasure in the suffering of
others has an inappropriate psychological attitude whereas the person who is
pained by the suffering of others has an appropriate psychological attitude.
Aristotle recognized that having an excellent character is as much a
matter of being properly affected - of being disposed to have excellent or
appropriate emotions — as it is a matter of acting properly or excellently.
Aristotle's insight points us to another admirability-maker. If a given
disposition is a disposition toward attitudes that are appropriate, then that
disposition is prima facie admirable. The admirability-maker here is: being a
disposition such that the disposition's response is (or includes) having an
appropriate attitude. If a given disposition is a disposition toward attitudes
that are inappropriate, then that disposition is prima facie disadmirable. The
disposition to take pain in the suffering of others is prima facie admirable,
whereas the disposition to take pleasure in the suffering of others is prima
facie disadmirable.
Of course there are differing views about just which attitudes are
appropriate. And disagreement about which attitudes are appropriate
generates corresponding disagreement about which traits are admirable.
Consider, for instance, Aristotle's description of the trait megalopsychia
(which Ross translates as 'pride') — a trait which Aristotle considers to be a
moral virtue:
Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks himself worthy
of great things, being worthy of them. . .For he who is worthy of
little and thinks himself worthy of little is temperate, but not
proud. . .On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of
great things, being unworthy of them, is vain. . .The man who
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thinks himself worthy of less than he is really worthy of is
unduly humble (NE 1123a35-1123bl0).
Compare that discussion of pride and various associated vices with
Julia Driver's account of modesty (which she considers to be a moral virtue):
[T]he modest person underestimates his self-worth. If he speaks,
then he understates the truth, but he does so unknowingly. This
entails that the modest person is ignorant, to a certain degree,
with regard to his own self-worth. He underrates himself, and
therefore only takes a portion of the credit due him (Driver 1989,
376).
What is striking about these two passages is that the trait that Driver
picks out as a virtue - the disposition to underrate oneself - is a trait that
Aristotle picks out and identifies as a vice. What is at issue here, it seems to
me, is the proper attitude to take toward one's own accomplishments and
character. Driver's view is that the proper attitude is one of under
appreciation, whereas Aristotle's view is that the proper attitude is one of
accurate recognition. Because Driver thinks that the former attitude is
proper, she thinks that the disposition toward attitudes of this sort is an
admirable one (and hence is a virtue), whereas Aristotle thinks that the
disposition toward attitudes of this sort is disadmirable (and hence is a vice).
4.11 The Nature Of Moral Virtue
To this point I have described what I take to be the admirability and
disadmirability-makers of dispositions of the sort relevant to virtue, and I
have tried to shed some light on how prima facie admirability and
disadmirability are related to admirability and disadmirability simpliciter.
The goal of the present section is to appeal to what has come before to provide
an account of virtue and vice, and ultimately of moral virtue and vice.
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I think that the correct move to make is simply to identify virtues with
admirable dispositions and vices with disadmirable dispositions. This move
yields some surprising and arguably problematic consequences, but I think
that the move is the right one. To see the surprising consequences in
question, consider the disposition to pursue justice for its own sake (when it
is morally right to do so and when it is between noon and sunset on a
Sunday). According to the view I have outlined, this disposition is prima
facie admirable since its response includes acting for the sake of an
intrinsically good thing. It does not seem to be prima facie disadmirable in
any respect. Therefore, (AM) implies that the disposition is admirable. If
virtues just are admirable dispositions, then this disposition is a virtue. Yet it
does not appear to be any of the commonly recognized virtues. If it is any of
the commonly recognized virtues, it is justice. But suppose a person has this
disposition together with the disposition to pursue injustice for its own sake
(when it is not between noon and sunset on a Sunday). We would hardly
describe such a person as just. So it seems implausible to maintain that the
disposition under discussion is justice. Therefore, the disposition under
discussion is not any of the commonly recognized virtues.
But this should not lead us to conclude that it is not a virtue at all. It
should come as no surprise that there are virtues other than the commonly
recognized ones. In fact the view I am proposing implies that there are
infinitely many such virtues, and while this may be surprising, I find nothing
particularly objectionable about it. That the commonly recognized virtues are
commonly recognized is a matter of convention — it is a function of our
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interests and concerns.93 There are a number of factors that may contribute
to a particular virtue being a commonly recognized virtue. One such factor is
familiarity. Virtue-terms are often used to commend or describe certain
dispositions that (i) are relatively familiar and (ii) are not included in some
other familiar disposition. Justice is a familiar disposition which does not
seem to be included in some other familiar disposition. But the disposition
discussed in the preceding paragraph, which we can call "Sunday afternoon
justice," is part of the more familiar disposition of justice. Indeed, it would be
quite odd for there to be a person who had Sunday afternoon justice but not
justice.
So the view I am endorsing implies that there are infinitely many
more virtues than there are commonly recognized virtues, but this result
should not concern us. Which virtues are commonly recognized is simply a
matter of convention; the fact that a view about virtue implies that there are
a multitude of virtues in addition to the commonly recognized virtues is no
objection to the view in question.
We are now prepared to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions
for the something's being a virtue (as well as for something's being a vice).
VR: x is a virtue if and only if x is an admirable disposition.
VC: x is a vice if and only if x is a disadmirable disposition.
By reflecting on the stimuli and responses associated with various
commonly recognized virtues and vices, we discover an explanation of the
93 The claim here is not that the fact that the commonly recognized virtues are virtues is a matter
of convention, but rather that the fact that the commonly recognized virtues are commonly
recognized is a matter of convention.
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common view that certain virtues are forms of other virtues (and similarly
for the vices). We can even specify the conditions under which one virtue is
a form of another virtue:
Virtue v is a form of virtue v* if and only if (i) Vs stimulus is a sub-type of
v 's stimulus, and (ii) v's response is a sub-type of v*'s response.
Consider, for example, generosity and benevolence. Generosity is a
form of benevolence. The stimulus associated with generosity is a sub-type of
the stimulus associated with benevolence. The stimulus associated with
benevolence is something along these lines: being in a situation in which the
foreseeable consequences of one's actions will affect the well-being of others.
The stimulus associated with generosity is something like: being in a
situation in which the foreseeable consequences of one's distribution of goods
will affect the well-being of others.
Furthermore, the response associated with generosity is a sub-type of
the response associated with benevolence. The response associated with
benevolence is helping others; the response associated with generosity is a
particular way of helping others -- helping others financially.
We also discover an explanation of the common view that certain
virtues and vices go together as opposites -- courage and cowardice, for
example. A virtue and a vice are opposites when the two have the same
stimulus. One sort of courage is the disposition to overcome one's fear and
do what is morally right when doing what is right is dangerous; the opposed
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variety of cowardice is the disposition to succumb to one's fear and fail to do
what is morally right when doing what is right is dangerous.
Many philosophers have drawn a distinction between the moral
virtues and the intellectual virtues. Some might wish to distinguish still
other kinds of virtues — aesthetic virtues and athletic virtues are two
candidates that come to mind. I think that the best hope for distinguishing
kinds of virtues (and kinds of vices) lies in the stimuli. These stimuli come
in various varieties. Some stimuli are moral stimuli -- facing fear
(particularly in battle), being confronted with food, drink and sex, handling
monetary transactions with others — these are all moral matters, and hence
the virtues that pertain to these things are moral virtues .94 Other stimuli are
intellectual stimuli; still others may be aesthetic or athletic stimuli .95
I am not prepared to put forth a principle that picks out all and only
moral stimuli. The most I can say here is that I think we do have an intuitive
sense that certain sorts of situations are moral ones and others are not —
certain situations reveal something about the moral character of a person in
that situation, others tell us nothing. For example, knowing that a person
would choose a banana over an apple given a choice between the two tells us
little about that person, morally speaking. But knowing that a person would
choose to eat a banana himself rather than give it to a starving friend (when
he himself was not starving) tells us quite a bit about that person, morally
speaking. The latter situation is a moral stimulus; the former is not.
94 | do not mean to suggest that these stimuli are exclusively moral stimuli. The stimulus ot
handling monetary transactions with others, tor example, is also - perhaps primarily - a financial
stimulus.
95 This is not to say that there is a stimulus which is the moral stimulus; rather, each of the
members of a certain group of stimuli has the property of being a moral stimulus.
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The thesis I am proposing is simply that whether or not a given virtue
is a moral virtue depends on whether the sorts of circumstances in which the
virtue is activated are moral circumstances; whether a virtue is an
intellectual virtue depends on whether the sorts of circumstances in which
the virtue is activated are intellectual circumstances, and so on.
I do not mean to suggest that these categories are exclusive. It may be,
for instance, that every intellectual stimulus is also a moral stimulus.96 My
claim is not that there is one correct way of dividing up stimuli into kinds
and that any other division is somehow illegitimate. My claim is rather that
there is a certain group of stimuli - a certain familiar way of dividing up
human life — that comes to mind when we are concerned with moral virtue.
A distinct set of stimuli is conjured up when we are concerned with
intellectual virtue.
Here, then, are the long-awaited accounts of moral virtue and moral
vice:
MVR: x is a moral virtue if and only if there is some moral stimulus S such
that x is an admirable disposition whose stimulus is S.
MVC: x is a moral vice if and only if there is some moral stimulus S such that
x is a disadmirable disposition whose stimulus is S.
4.12 Paradigm Cases
We are confronted with a wide range of character traits. Some of these
are clearly moral virtues; others are clearly moral vices; and a significant
96 if this is true, then it substantiates Linda Zagzebski’s view that the set of intellectual virtues is
a subset of the set of moral virtues (Zagzebski 1996, 139).
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number are hard cases — it is unclear whether we are dealing with a vice, a
virtue, or neither. In what follows, I will discuss many of these hard cases
and try to explain their hardness.
But first, let us consider some paradigmatic cases of virtue — examples
of traits of character that are obviously moral virtues. Traits of this sort are
dispositions that are admirable. In many cases it seems to be the case that a
particular virtue name - for instance 'benevolence' - picks out not just a
single admirable disposition but rather a group of loosely related dispositions.
Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that 'benevolence' has various senses,
and depending on its sense it will pick out one of these loosely related
dispositions. In what follows I will discuss various particular virtue terms
and specify some of the dispositions that are associated with each term. Each
of these dispositions is some virtue or other; which of them has most claim
to bear the virtue term under discussion is not terribly important and is an
issue I will not discuss. If we wish to be more precise, we can introduce new
virtue terms to pick out each disposition (I will indicate these terms in
parentheses).
Various admirable dispositions are associated with the term
'benevolence'. One of these is the disposition to pursue the well-being of
others when it is permissible to do so (Action Benevolence). Since the well-
being of others is intrinsically good /important, this disposition is admirable.
Other admirable dispositions include the disposition to take pleasure in the
well-being of others when one is aware of others who are well off (Pleasure
Benevolence) and to desire the well-being of others when it is permissible to
pursue the well-being of others (Desire Benevolence). These two dispositions
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are admirable because each is a disposition to have attitudes that are
appropriate.
Courage, in its most complete form, involves these admirable
dispositions: the disposition to overcome excessive fear for the sake of
something intrinsically good, important, or morally right, when pursuing
such ends requires one to overcome excessive fear (Fear Mastery Courage)
and the disposition to experience the appropriate emotion when facing
danger (Proper Emotion Courage). The first disposition is admirable for three
reasons. First, because instances of overcoming excessive fear typically
require significant effort. Second, because the disposition is a disposition to
exercise a skill - the skill of fear management. Third, because it is a
disposition to act for the sake of something intrinsically good, important, or
morally right. The second disposition is admirable because it is a disposition
to have appropriate psychological attitudes.
Conscientiousness, in its most complete form, involves this admirable
disposition: the disposition to perform morally right actions because those
actions are morally rights This disposition is admirable because it is a
disposition to act for the sake of things that are morally right (the morally
right actions themselves).
With these paradigm cases in hand, let us examine some of the hard
cases.
4.13 Courage In the Service Of Evil
The “courageous Nazi" is a character found in many discussions of
moral virtue. As I see it, the courageous Nazi is a commonly discussed case
because it is a particularly striking way of drawing our attention to this
97 This virtue may be unique in that its stimulus encompasses all possible situations (assuming
moral dilemmas are impossible).
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question: could there be a person who is courageous and who pursues evil for
its own sake? Is "courage" in the service of evil really courage — is it a moral
virtue?
This is a question about what is metaphysically possible. The question
is whether it is metaphysically possible that there be a person who is
courageous and yet pursues evil for its own sake. Some people take it as
obvious that there could such a person; others take it as equally obvious that
there couldn't be such a person. Intelligent, morally respectable persons have
widely differing intuitions here.
The explanation of this fact, I think, is that the question forces us to
consider "mixed" dispositions — dispositions that are both prima facie
admirable and prima facie disadmirable. The question forces us to come to an
"all-things-considered" judgement concerning the admirability or
disadmirability of such mixed dispositions. Different people may give
different weights to various admirability and disadmirability-makers and
hence may arrive at differing all-things-considered judgement. And this may
lead to disagreement about whether the virtue of courage is present in a
given case.
Courage involves facing danger. Therefore, if there could be a person
who is courageous and who pursues evil for its own sake, then there could be
a person who pursues evil for its own sake and who is disposed to face danger
(at least under certain conditions). Consider the case of the "courageous"
villain. Let us suppose that the villain is disposed to act for the sake of
various intrinsically evil ends. He takes pleasure in and seeks to bring about
the suffering of others, for example. Bringing about the suffering of others
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often requires him to face danger - for instance, the danger of being arrested
or perhaps even killed by the police.
Let us focus on a particular disposition of the villain's: the disposition
to overcome fear for the sake of the suffering of others (when he must do so
to bring about the suffering of others). This disposition is obviously not
paradigmatic courage — but surely no one disputes this point. Indeed, the case
is interestingly precisely because it involves a case of putative courage that is
not paradigmatic courage.
The disposition in question is prima facie admirable because its
response includes a type of action that is difficult — overcoming fear. The
disposition is prima facie disadmirable because it is a disposition to act for the
sake of something that is intrinsically evil — the suffering of others. The
disposition is a mixed disposition — it is both prima facie admirable and
prima facie disadmirable.
There is a dissimilarity between admirability and disadmirability on
the one hand and moral rightness and wrongness on the other. Rightness
and wrongness do not admit of degrees, but admirability and disadmirability
do. What we have is a continuum, with admirability at one extreme and
disadmirability at the other. Between these two extremes there is a middle
ground. Some dispositions seem to be neither admirable nor disadmirable
but simply neutral. So one possibility is that the disposition of the
courageous villain is neither admirable nor disadmirable. If this is the case, it
is not a virtue and hence is not courage. But how are we to decide whether
the disposition in question is admirable or not?
Ross has this to say concerning the relationship between prima facie
rightness or obligation and rightness or obligation simpliciter:
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[R]ight acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being
those which, of all those possible for the agent in the
circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness,
in those respects in which they are prima facie right, over their
prima facie wrongness, in those respects in which they are prima
facie wrong. . .For the estimation of the comparative stringency
of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I
can see, be laid down (Ross 1930, 41).
The view Ross endorses in this passage seems to go roughly as follows.
Any possible action has a certain balance of prima facie rightness over prima
facie wrongness. We may think of this numerically: each action has a certain
prima facie rightness rating (call this its pr-value) as well as a certain prima
facie wrongness rating (call this its pw-value). The balance of prima facie
rightness over prima facie wrongness for a given action, then, is the pr-value
of that action minus its pw-value. An action is right simpliciter just in case it
has a higher balance of prima facie rightness over prima facie wrongness than
any alternative to it has.
Similarly, we might think of each disposition (of the relevant sort) as
having a prima facie admirability rating as well as a prima facie
disadmirability rating. However, as I see it, admirability and disadmirability
simpliciter are related to prima facie admirability and disadmirability in a way
somewhat different from the way in which, as Ross sees it, rightness
simpliciter is related to prima facie rightness and wrongness. Admirable
dispositions are those whose balance of prima facie admirability over prima
facie disadmirability is significantly high. Disadmirable dispositions are those
whose balance of prima facie admirability over prima facie disadmirability
significantly low. Of course this leaves open the possibility that the balance of
prima facie admirability over prima facie disadmirability of a given
disposition is neither significantly high nor significantly low — for example.
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this balance might be zero. In this case the disposition in question is neither
admirable nor disadmirable, but rather neutral (and hence is neither a virtue
nor a vice).
The two principles introduced earlier, (AM) and (DM), tell us how to
calculate these balances in the easy cases — those cases where the weight is all
on one side. But in the more difficult cases, cases like the one at hand, where
a disposition is both prima facie admirable and prima facie disadmirable, I can
do no better than Ross: I cannot lay down any general rules for determining
the comparative weights of the prima facie admirability and prima facie
disadmirability.
In fact, I think that to endorse any general principle here would be to
endorse a view that goes beyond the evidence. It is disagreement concerning
these relative weights that generates conflicting intuitions in cases like the
one at hand.
Those who maintain that the fact that (i) the disposition is a
disposition toward actions that are difficult carries more weight than the fact
that (ii) the disposition is a disposition to act for the sake of an intrinsically
evil end will conclude that the disposition is admirable overall and so is a
virtue. People who hold this view might then conclude that the disposition
is in fact courage (or a kind of courage). Those who think (ii) carries more
weight than (or just as much weight as) (i) will conclude that the trait is not
admirable and hence is not a virtue. Such people might conclude further that
if any of the villain's dispositions are courage, then this one is; since it isn't,
the villain is not courageous.
If the villain's disposition is disadmirable, this means that the villain
has a vice. Which vice might he have? One plausible answer is that he has
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the vice of foolhardiness. He is disposed to risk his own life and safety for the
sake of an intrinsically evil end, and hence he is disposed to act in a foolhardy
fashion.
Thus, my view does not provide a clear answer to this question: could
there be a courageous villain? But this is no objection to the view. Instead,
the view offers an explanation of why well-informed, intelligent, morally
respectable persons may disagree on the correct answer to this question.
4.14 The "Benevolent" Bumbler
Gregory Trianosky briefly mentions the case of the well-intentioned
bumbler, "whose persistent efforts to help nearly always make things worse.
His defects neutralize his virtues, rendering the latter useless to those around
him" (Trianosky 1987, 130).
Consider a person who has all three forms of benevolence I
distinguished above: Action Benevolence, Pleasure Benevolence, and Desire
Benevolence. But suppose that this person is a bumbler: his attempts to help
others typically go awry. There seems to be something counterintuitive about
the claim that he has the virtue of benevolence. If this is right, then it follows
that my account of benevolence is, at best, incomplete: there is a sort of
benevolence that the well-intentioned bumbler lacks.
I think it is useful to distinguish two sorts of well-intentioned
bumblers. We will want to say different things about different kinds of
bumblers. The following question provides the basis of the distinctions
among kinds of bumblers: why is the well-intentioned bumbler a bumbler?
Suppose, for example, that the bumbler bumbles because, unbeknownst
to him, an extremely powerful evil demon is interfering with the bumbler's
attempts to help in a subtle and undetectable fashion. Surely this fact in no
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way affects what sort of character the bumbler has, and hence in no way affects
whether or not he has the virtue of benevolence. A bumbler of this sort is
indeed a benevolent bumbler.
A different sort of bumbler is one who just isn't very good at figuring
out how to help other people. Perhaps he is socially inept, or poor at reading
the emotions of those around him. He constantly misjudges the situation,
says the wrong thing, and so on. Contrast this person with one who is good at
figuring out how to help other people. Everything else being equal, the latter
sort of person is more admirable overall than the former. But it does not
follow from this that the latter has the virtue of benevolence while the
former lacks it. Indeed, the difference between the two lies not in their
respective moral virtues but rather in their respective intellectual virtues.
The latter person has a sort of practical wisdom that the former lacks. This is
the difference that accounts for the fact that the latter is more admirable
overall than the former.
I conclude that both sorts of bumblers have as much claim to the virtue
of benevolence as anyone does. One final consideration may help to soothe
the intuitions of those holdouts who doubt the benevolence of the bumbler.
To the extent that the bumbler has the three forms of benevolence I
identified, he will stop trying to help others when he realizes that his
attempts to help are in fact generally harmful to others.
One area of controversy relating to moral virtue is between the "virtue
internalists" on the one hand and the "virtue externalists" on the other.
Virtue internalists hold, roughly, that whether a person is virtuous is
determined entirely by what goes in inside that person -- being virtuous is a
matter of having one's heart in the right place. It is mental items such as
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beliefs, desires, and intentions (or dispositions to have entities of this sort)
that determine the virtuousness (and viciousness) of any given individual.
Such a view is suggested by some comments Kant makes in The Groundwork
of the Metaphysic of Morals:9 ^
Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly
endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking
in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still
accomplishes nothing.
. .even then it would still shine like a
jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in
itself (GMM, 62).
Virtue externalists, by contrast, place a significant degree of importance
on the extent to which a person with virtuous mental states is successful in
acting in the world. Linda Zagzebski holds such a view. She writes:
"Virtue" is a success term. . .A person does not have a virtue
unless she is reliable at bringing about the end that is the aim of
the motivational component of virtue. . .a fair person acts in a
way that successfully produces a state of affairs that has the
features fair persons desire. A kind, compassionate, generous,
courageous, or just person aims at making the world a certain
way, and reliable success in making it that way is a condition for
having the virtue in question (Zagzebski 1996, 136, my
emphasis).
As should be clear, the view I have proposed is an internalist view: it
implies that the benevolent bumbler really does have the virtue of
benevolence.
4.15 Excessive Virtue
In an insightful article Gary Watson discusses the phenomenon that he
calls "virtue in excess." He discusses the case of excessive generosity,
imagining a person who is so generous that she gives away too much of her
own time, energy, and possessions in the attempt to help others (Watson
98 Though it should be clear, in light of chapter two, that Kant does not in fact subscribe to an
extreme version of internalism.
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1984, 57). Presumably the idea here is that the person gives away the
aforementioned items to such a degree that she inflicts significant harm, or
loss of goods, on herself. A question arises concerning such extreme
generosity: is it a virtue?
In order to sharpen our intuitions concerning this case (as much as it is
possible to do so in such cases), let us get clear on the exact nature of the case
under consideration. We may begin by clarifying what is meant by 'excessive
generosity.' Watson's idea is that there is a disposition, generosity, which
comes in various degrees. One of these degrees of generosity (or, more
plausibly, a range of these degrees) is what we can call "excessive generosity."
A rough-and-ready account of generosity is this: the disposition to act for the
sake of the well-being of others by assisting them financially, when it is
morally permissible to do so. What distinguishes excessive generosity from
moderate or paradigmatic generosity is the extent of the financial assistance
one is disposed to give. A person with moderate or paradigmatic generosity is
disposed to give to a significant degree — perhaps to a degree that imposes a
significant but not severe hardship on herself. A person with excessive
generosity is disposed to give to an extreme degree -- perhaps to a degree that
imposes a severe hardship on herself.
So a person with excessive generosity is a person who genuinely cares
about the well-being of others, and, for this reason, is willing to go to great
lengths to help other people out - to the point of inflicting harm on herself.
For example, she gives away most of her money to strangers and as a result is
forced to live in a bad neighborhood, enduring the horrors of public
transportation, and eating bad food.
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If the person in question is to be plausibly construed as having
generosity at all, certain things must not be true of her. For instance, it must
not be the case that she is only apparently acting for the sake of the well-being
of others (e.g. we must not have here some Freudian scenario in which her
actions are all vain attempts to win her father's affections as a result of an
Electra complex).
What does my theory say about such a case? The first thing to notice is
that we may distinguish (at least) two dispositions of the person in question 99
The first of these is what I have called "paradigmatic generosity" ~ the
disposition to act for the sake of the well-being of others by assisting them
financially (to a significant degree) when it is permissible to do so. The
second of these is what I have called "excessive generosity" - the disposition
to act for the sake of the well-being of others by assisting them financially (to
an excessive degree) when it is permissible to do so. The former disposition is
a disposition to act for the sake of something that is in fact intrinsically good
(and it may also be a disposition to act for the sake of something that one
believes to be intrinsically good). Since the disposition is prima facie
admirable in at least one respect and is, as far as I can see, not prima facie
disadmirable in any respect, it follows that it is an admirable disposition and
so is a virtue.
What about the second disposition — excessive generosity? This
disposition is prima facie admirable in every way in which the first
disposition is prima facie admirable. Is there any respect in which excessive
generosity is prima facie disadmirable? Not according to my theory. One
feature that excessive generosity has which paradigmatic generosity lacks is
99 As noted above, Watson thinks of these as different degrees of a single disposition; I find it
more helpful to think of them as distinct dispositions.
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that the former implies the presence of other defective states of character — for
instance, a certain sort of imprudence. So excessive generosity brings with it
at least one other defective state of character. But on my view, implying the
presence of other defects is not a disadmirability-maker, and so the fact that a
given disposition has this property does not tell against that disposition's
admirability at all. Hence, I am saddled with the conclusion that excessive
generosity, no matter how excessive, is a virtue.! oo
Watson finds such a view unacceptable. I wish to consider his reasons
for holding this position in some detail, as I think it will turn out that his
reasons are not good ones.
Watson's first objection to the claim that excessive generosity is a
virtue is that if such a view were true, then
[W]e would have to say that those with excessive generosity are
morally better in this respect than those whose generosity is not
excessive. For. . .they have this virtue to a higher degree, and
consequently ought to be more virtuous in this respect (Watson
1984, 58).
Let's use the expression "moderate generosity" to indicate a moderate
or paradigmatic modesty of the sort characterized above. A moderately
generous person will give away some of her money -- perhaps so much that
she cannot afford the mansion she would have otherwise been able to afford -
- but not so much that she is forced into poverty. I take it, then, that Watson's
argument in the passage just cited can be formulated as follows:
Watson's First Argument
1. If excessive generosity is a virtue, then anyone who has excessive
generosity is more virtuous in some respect than anyone who has
moderate generosity.
2. If anyone who has excessive generosity is more virtuous in some respect
than anyone who has moderate generosity, then anyone who has excessive
100 But, as I will argue below, this is not an objection to my view but rather a feature of it.
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generosity is morally better in some respect than anyone who has
moderate generosity.
3. It s not the case that anyone who has excessive generosity is morally better
in some respect than anyone who has moderate generosity.
4. Therefore, excessive generosity is not a virtue.
This argument makes use of some expressions whose meanings are
not immediately clear (at least not to me). One of these is this expression: 'is
more virtuous in some respect than'. What does this expression mean? The
most likely possibility is that it simply means 'has some virtue to a greater
degree than'. In this case, the first premise becomes
la. If excessive generosity is a virtue, then anyone who has excessive
generosity has some virtue to a greater degree than anyone who has
moderate generosity.
On this interpretation, this premise is a tautology. The second premise
becomes
2a. If anyone who has excessive generosity has some virtue to a greater
degree than anyone who has moderate generosity, then anyone who has
excessive generosity is morally better in some respect than anyone who
has moderate generosity.
But now we have to contend with an even more obscure expression: 'is
morally better in some respect than'. A likely possibility here is that this
expression means something like 'is more admirable in some respect than'.
So the second premise now becomes:
2b. If anyone who has excessive generosity has some virtue to a greater
degree than anyone who has moderate generosity, then anyone who has
excessive generosity is more admirable in some respect than anyone who
has moderate generosity.
And premise three becomes:
3a. It's not the case that anyone who has excessive generosity is more
admirable in some respect than anyone who has moderate generosity.
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Is this last premise true? I see no compelling reason to think so.
Suppose we are considering a person with excessive generosity and a person
with moderate generosity. Now we consider this question: with respect to the
domain of helping other people, particularly financially, which of these two
people is more admirable? It strikes me that a perfectly natural response here
is that it is the excessively generous person who is more admirable - with
respect to this particular area of human life.
Suppose both persons have one thousand dollars. The moderately
generous person acts generously but prudently, giving, say, two hundred
dollars to charity. The excessively generous person acts generously and
imprudently, giving nine hundred dollars to charity. Which act of generosity
is more remarkable, more self-sacrificing - in short, more admirable? It is
clear, I think, that the latter is. With respect to the area of life associated with
generosity, the latter person is more admirable than the former. Therefore, I
see no reason to accept (3a) - and good reason to think that it is false.ioi
Now, it also seems to be true that there is (at least) one respect in which
the person who has excessive generosity is less admirable than the person
who has moderate generosity -- namely, with respect to the area of life
associated with the virtue of prudence. The excessively generous person
exhibits a lack of prudence that the moderately generous person does not (or
at any rate, need not) exhibit. Perhaps if we were to consider the overall
admirability of these two persons, we might conclude that the moderately
generous person is more admirable overall than the excessively generous
person -- but this in no way tells against the claim that there is some respect
101 if we accept (3a), then we must say that a less admirable trait (excessive generosity) leads to
a more admirable action than a more admirable trait (moderate generosity) does. This is not, of
course, a knock-down refutation of (3a), but it suggests at least that there is something counter-
intuitive about (3a).
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in which the excessively generous person is more admirable than the
moderately generous person.
Indeed, it strikes me as a confusion to think that excessive generosity
itself is disadmirable or even less admirable than moderate generosity. The
problem is not with the excessive generosity but rather with the overall
person: the excessive generosity may generate disadmirability elsewhere, but
this does not mean that the generosity is itself disadmirable.
If we do away with the somewhat obscure expressions 'is more
virtuous in some respect than' and 'is morally better in some respect than',
Watson's argument can be streamlined as follows:
Watson's First Argument (Streamlined Version)
1. If excessive generosity is a virtue, then anyone who has excessive
generosity is more admirable in some respect than anyone who has
moderate generosity.
2. It's not the case that anyone who has excessive generosity is more
admirable in some respect than anyone who has moderate generosity.
3. Therefore, excessive generosity is not a virtue.
But there, as far as I can see, no good reason to accept (2), and hence this
argument is unconvincing.
Watson's second objection has to do with moral education. He writes:
[A] view that allows for the possibility of excessive virtues] must
sever the connection we ordinarily suppose there to be between
developing a virtue and moral improvement. On that view,
our precept of moral education ought rather to be: "cultivate the
virtues, but not too much" (Watson 1984, 58).
I take it that the connection between developing a virtue and moral
improvement Watson has in mind is something like:
MI: For any person S and any virtue V, if the degree to which S has V
increases, then S becomes more admirable overall.
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But if there is such a thing as excessive virtue, then this principle is
false, since a person who goes from being moderately generous to be
excessively generous (at least arguably) becomes less admirable overall.
According to Watson, (MI) is true, and hence there is no such thing as
excessive virtue.
But why should we accept (MI)? Watson puts it forth without
argument, suggesting that it is part of our common sense views concerning
virtue. I admit that the principle may have some prima facie plausibility, but
it is surely not beyond doubt. Indeed, there are powerful reasons for rejecting
the principle that have nothing to do with excessive virtue. Consider Linda
Zagzebski's remarks concerning two sorts of judges:
[I]f we compare compassionate but unfair judge A and
uncompassionate and unfair judge B to truly virtuous judge C, I
would maintain that A is closer to being like judge C than judge
B is, even though B is now better than A, and even though
judge A does more wrong things than judge B because of the
combination of his compassion and his bias. . .as the unfair
judge becomes compassionate, his compassion may for a time
make him worse because more unfair (Zagzebski 1996a, 94).
The last sentence of this passage is the most important one for our
purposes. Zagzebski points out that a certain amount of increase in the unfair
judge's compassion makes him less admirable overall. The case Zagzebski
imagines seems perfectly plausible, and the possibility of such a case proves
that (MI) is false. Thus, we have good reason to reject (MI), and Watson's
second objection is unconvincing as well.
Moreover, we ought not read too much into the fact (if it is a fact) that
"cultivate the virtues as much as you can" is a widely-held precept of moral
education. We need to recognize the distinction between practical advice and
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theoretical claims. 102 "Cultivate the virtues as much as you can" is clearly a
piece of practical advice - and the purpose of giving practical advice is
generally to produce certain results rather than to say something trued 03
There is good reason for thinking that Philippa Foot is right in suggesting the
human beings naturally tend toward vice (or at least away from virtue); given
this fact, "cultivate the virtues as much as you can" is like the advice "eat as
much as you can" when given to a person in the midst of a famine. There is
little danger of such a person eating too much. Similarly, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that human beings live in a perpetual state of "moral
famine
,
and so the advice to cultivate the virtues as much as you can" is
good advice -- not because it is conceptually impossible that a virtue be
excessive, but rather because there is little danger of most people
overdeveloping a virtue!
Watson's third and final objection against the possibility of excessive
virtue goes as follows:
Precisely because the tendencies in question are liable to lead one
astray, they seem not to be, by themselves, virtues -- that is,
constitutive excellences of character; states that systematically
lead to good desires, deliberation, choice, and action (Watson
1984
,
58 ).
Here, Watson simply endorses a particular view about the nature of
virtue:
W: x is a moral virtue if and only if x is a character trait that systematically
leads to good desires, deliberation, choice, and action.
102 For more on this distinction and its relevance to Aristotle's work on moral virtue, see section
1.4 above.
103 Of course it is often the case that the best way to produce the desired result is by saying
something true - but this is not always the case.
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But what reason do we have to accept (W)? Again, it sounds pretty
good on the surface, but closer inspection reveals that it is subject to doubt.
Zagzebski's example of the compassionate but unfair judge casts doubt in this
view: his compassion does not systematically lead to good desires,
deliberation, choice, and action, yet it seems plausible to hold that the judge's
compassion is a virtue. At the very least, the denial of this position is at least
as plausible as the position itself. Without any independent support for (W),
Watson is simply begging the question here. I conclude that Watson has
provided no good reason for rejecting the possibility of excessive virtue.
Excessive generosity is a virtue.
4.16 Two Kinds Of Virtuous Persons
Gregory Trianosky begins his article "Rightly Ordered Appetites: How
to Live Morally and Live Well" as follows:
There is a familiar distinction between two sorts of morally good
people. The first always does his duty, or more, without regret,
and without even being tempted to do anything else. The
second is highly self-controlled. He too always does what is
right, whether this is required or perhaps even beyond duty; but
he must constantly exert himself in deliberation and in choice to
subjugate unruly, contrary inclinations (Trianosky 1988, 1).
Many philosophers have noted the existence of these two kinds of
admirable persons.! 04 Let us call the former sort of person the "Good Hearted
Hero" and the latter sort of person the "Conflicted Hero." One question that
often arises here is this one: who is more virtuous or admirable overall — the
Good Hearted Hero or the Conflicted Hero?
104 The most well-known of these being Aristotle; Robert C. Roberts also makes the distinction
- see Roberts 1984, 233-234.
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I think that vve may in fact distinguish (at least) two kinds of Good
Hearted Heroes, one of which is clearly more virtuous overall than the
Conflicted Hero. But first let's try to flesh out the Conflicted Hero a bit.
The Conflicted Hero is plagued by inappropriate attitudes and desires.
He experiences terror in the face of danger and must struggle to keep himself
from fleeing; he has excessive desires for food, drink, and sex which he must
constantly battle against; there is, as his name suggests, conflict brewing
within him at nearly all times. Fortunately he succeeds in his battles against
his inappropriate attitudes and he always acts as he should.
The Conflicted Hero has some admirable dispositions. For example, he
is disposed to succeed in struggles against inappropriate desires for food,
drink, and sex (for the sake of what is right). Since this is a disposition to
perform actions of a difficult type, a disposition to act for the sake of
something that one correctly believes to be morally right, and a disposition to
exercise a skill (the skill of mastering one's desires) this disposition is an
admirable one.
But the Conflicted Hero also has some disadmirable dispositions. For
example, he is disposed to experience inappropriate desires for food, drink,
and sex. Since this is a disposition toward inappropriate attitudes, the
disposition is a disadmirable one.
Neither of the two sorts of Good Hearted Heroes that I shall distinguish
(call them "Good Hearted Hero One" and "Good Hearted Hero Two"
respectively) experiences the sort of internal conflict experienced by the
Conflicted Hero. Both Good Hearted Heroes are disposed to have appropriate
attitudes in a wide range of situations -- they do not need to resist temptation,
for they are never tempted. Both sorts of Good Hearted Heroes, then, have a
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number of admirable dispositions, each of which is a disposition toward
appropriate attitudes.
Now consider the question that will be the basis for distinguishing two
kinds of Good Hearted Hero I will discuss: how would a person like the one I
have described respond if he were tempted?
Good Hearted Hero One, let us suppose, would succumb to temptation,
were he ever to face it. Now this is a fact that it may be difficult to know
about Good Hearted Hero One, since he never will in fact be tempted ~ he
will never (let us suppose) experience an inappropriate attitude. But if he
were to experience such inappropriate attitudes, he would find himself acting
in ways very unbecoming to a Hero of any sort.
Good Hearted Hero Two, on the other hand, has a certain strength of
will (although he never needs to employ it). He too will never be tempted -
but if he were, he would have the strength of will to resist such temptations.
It seems clear that Good Hearted Hero Two is more admirable overall
than Good Hearted Hero One, despite the fact that it may be very difficult --
perhaps even impossible — to tell the difference between the two simply by
observing their behavior. Good Hearted Hero Two is, in effect, the Best of All
Possible Heroes — he combines the admirable dispositions of both the
Conflicted Hero and Good Hearted Hero One and lacks the disadmirable
dispositions of those two other Heroes.
The Conflicted Hero's admirable dispositions are all dispositions of this
sort: the disposition to succeed in struggles against inappropriate desires for
food, drink, and sex. But a person may have this disposition without being
disposed to experience inappropriate desires for food, drink, or sex. And this
is how it is with Good Hearted Hero Two. The Conflicted Hero's
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disadmirable dispositions are all dispositions to have inappropriate attitudes
- and it is precisely dispositions of this sort that Good Hearted Hero Two
lacks. Good Hearted Hero Two instead has the admirable dispositions of
Good Hearted Hero One -- dispositions to have appropriate attitudes.
Therefore, Good Hearted Hero Two has all the admirable dispositions that
Good Hearted Hero One and the Conflicted Hero have, and he has none of
the disadmirable dispositions of the other two Heroes, and hence he is more
admirable overall than either of the other two Heroes.
4.17 Conclusion Of This Chapter
In this chapter I have tried to offer an account of moral virtue and
moral vice that appeals to the concepts of admirability and disadmirability.
To defend the account, I have tried to show how the account implies that
paradigmatic virtues are in fact virtues. I have also tried to show how the
account explains the hardness of certain hard cases — how the account
explains the fact that people seem to have widely conflicting intuitions
concerning certain traits of character. Finally, I have tried to appeal to the
account to address the issue of the relative admirability of the Conflicted Hero
and the Good Hearted Hero. It turns out that these two sorts of Heroes are
not mutually exclusive moral ideals: there is a particular sort of Good Hearted
Hero who combines the admirable traits of both sorts of Heroes.
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